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Charitable giving in the U.S. totaled more than $300 billion in 2009, amounting to about 2%
of GDP. These organizations depend on fundraising activities to generate donations from in-
dividuals who provide three-quarters of the funding for charitable organizations.
Despite the size and scope of these operations, practical fundraising still relies heavily on
rules-of-thumb and individual experience to design and run campaigns. These works aim to
expand the understanding of fundraising through empirical and theoretical analysis.
Leadership giving is the ϐirst fundraising practice explored. Leadership gifts are funds
collected privately by a charity prior to announcing the campaign and accepting donations
from the public. “Seeds to Succeed” examines a theoretical model for leadership giving ϐirst
put forth in Andreoni (1998). We implement his model in the laboratory and ϐind that when
ϐixed-costs are high leadership gifts can greatly increase the chances a project producing ben-
eϐits for the public. Intriguingly, with low ϐixed-costs leadership giving can actually have a
small negative effect on subsequent donations.
The secondchapter, “ProvisionPointMechanismsand theOver-provisionof PublicGoods”,
examines the use of contribution refunds by fundraisers. That rather simple tool of guar-
enteeing refunds theorectically provides fundraisiers the ability to extract a large amount of
contributions. The result is that the expected outcome of the campaign is the collection of
inefϐiciently large contributions. The predicted over-provision occurs in 82% of the time in
our laboratory environment.
The ϐinal chapter, “Fundraising Goals”, looks at the role of announcements at the start of
campaigns. We theorize that announcements improve contributions by reducing donor’s un-
iii
certainty about the project. Large improvements are possible with up to a 73% increase in
contributions and a large increase in the donor base. Experimental data supports the pre-
diction that announced goals increase contributions. Reducing uncertainty did not have the
effect of further increasing contributions but led to greater coordination of contributions
around the goal. The improved coordination signiϐicantly increases donor welfare under an
uncertainty reduction.
iv
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1.0 SEEDS TO SUCCEED? SEQUENTIAL GIVING TO PUBLIC PROJECTS
CO-AUTHORS:
Anat Bracha, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Lise Vesterlund, University of Pittsburgh
1.1 INTRODUCTION
A rule of thumb commonly followed by fundraisers is that past contributions are announced
to future donors. This practice is perhaps most noteworthy in capital campaigns where the
announcement of a substantial seed donation is used to launch the public phase of the cam-
paign. The practice of sequential fundraising is intriguing in light of the analysis of voluntary
provision of public goods provided by Varian (1994). Examining a model with continuous
production of the public good, he compares the contributions that result when donations are
made simultaneously versus sequentially. Recognizing that one donor’s contribution is a per-
fect substitute for that of another, he demonstrates that sequential provision enables the ini-
tial donor to free ride off of subsequent donors, and as a result the overall provision in the
sequential contribution game will be no greater than in the simultaneous one.1
This inconsistency between common fundraising practice and theoretical prediction has
prompted researchers to identify conditions under which it may be optimal to raise funds
1 Experimental investigations of the quasi-linear environment of Varian (1994) conϐirm the prediction of
lower contributions in the sequential game (Andreoni et al., 2002; Gachter et al., 2010). As emphasized by
Vesterlund (2003), this prediction relies on the somewhat unrealistic assumption that initial donors can commit
to giving only once. Absent this assumption the contribution level is predicted to be the samewith simultaneous
and sequential moves. Thus the strict preference for sequential giving remains a puzzle in this case.
1
sequentially. Andreoni (1998), the ϐirst to propose an explanation, showed that a sequential
fundraising strategy is preferable when there are ϐixed production costs. The reason is that,
whenno individual singlehandedly iswilling to cover the ϐixed costs, simultaneous givingmay
result in both positive and zero provision equilibria. Thus fundraising campaigns that rely on
simultaneous giving may get stuck in an equilibrium where donors fail to coordinate on a
preferred positive provision outcome. Interestingly, a sequential fundraising strategy helps
eliminate such inferior equilibria, as a large initial contribution secures that the ϐixed costs
will be covered and that the good will be provided.
List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) use a ϐield experiment to examine the prediction that fol-
lowers respond positively to a large initial contribution. Raising funds for a number of $3000
computers, they sent out solicitations in which the initial contribution to the nonproϐit insti-
tution varied between 10%, 33%, and 67% of the computer’s cost. They ϐind that the likeli-
hood of contributing and the average amount contributed is greatestwhen 67%of the project
funding had already been provided.2 In fact a six-fold increase in contributions is seen when
moving from the lowest to the highest seed amount. Qualitatively the results are verymuch in
linewith the prediction of Andreoni’smodel. However the results are also in linewith the pre-
dictions made by a number of other models on sequential giving. For example, the increase
in giving may also be explained by donors interpreting the initial contribution as a signal of
the nonproϐit’s quality (Vesterlund, 2003).3
WhatdistinguishesAndreoni’s predictions fromalternativemodels of sequential fundrais-
ing is the crucial role played by the presence of ϐixed production costs. Sequential giving is
effective because it eliminates the inefϐiciencies thatmay arise as a result of ϐixed costs. Unfor-
tunately in a ϐield setting it is not straightforward to ϐind a cause forwhich it is possible to vary
the ϐixed costs while keeping all other characteristics constant. The objective of the present
paper is to use laboratory experiments to examine the role of sequential giving in the presence
and absence of ϐixed costs. By using the laboratory we can test a simpliϐied environment and
2 A series of ϐield experiments also ϐind that giving is inϐluenced by the size of the initial contribution. For
example, Frey and Meier (2004) show that contributions to charitable funds at the University of Zurich are
affected by information on howmany others donated in the past. In a campaign for a public radio station, Croson
and Shang (2008) show that donations increase when a donor is informed that others have contributed more
than he did in the past. Martin and Randal (2008) change the amount placed in an art gallery’s donation box
and show that average donations increase when it appears that others have given larger amounts.
3 See also Potters et al. (2005, 2007); Andreoni (2006b); Komai et al. (2007).
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determine if ϐixed costs play a critical role in the success of sequential giving. It is important to
recognize that the question is notmerely one of conϐirming previous evidence that sequential
play improves efϐiciency in coordination games (see for example Weber et al. (2004)). With
simultaneous play of the public good game there may be an incentive to contribute in excess
of the preferred Nash equilibrium as it improves overall efϐiciency and alleviates strategic un-
certainty, thus in the presence of ϐixed costs simultaneous play need not give rise to inefϐicient
outcomeswhich sequential play can improve upon; furthermore absent ϐixed costs sequential
play may in and of itself increase contributions thereby decreasing the likelihood that ϐixed
cost play a critical role in explaining the frequent use of sequential fundraising.
Our study is designed to answer the following research questions. First, do sequential
moves increase giving when there are no ϐixed costs? Second, do ϐixed costs give rise to in-
efϐicient outcomes under simultaneous provision? That is, do contributions decrease when
we introduce ϐixed costs such that no individual has an incentive to single-handedly provide
the good? Third, if such inefϐicient outcomes exist, does sequential play help eliminate these
inefϐiciencies and increase the likelihood of providing the public good? Speciϐically do ini-
tial contributors respond to the coordinating role they hold in the sequential game, and do
subsequent donors follow? Finally, to evaluate the extent to which the success of seedmoney
depends on thepresence of ϐixed costs, we askwhether the potential increase in contributions
under sequential provision is sensitive to the size or even the presence of ϐixed costs.
Our results are supportive of the theory for high, but not for low ϐixed costs. Surpris-
ingly, under simultaneous provision we ϐind that the introduction of small ϐixed costs in-
creases rather than decreases overall provision. Individuals seem uncertain of which equi-
libriumwill be played and, at the risk of decreasing their payoff, they increase their contribu-
tions to ensure that the public good is provided. By facilitating coordination on the positive
provision outcome, seed money effectively removes the strategic uncertainty and the risk of
under-provision. Sequential contributions decrease to the predicted equilibrium level and
fall below the greater-than-expected contributions in the simultaneous game. Consequently,
our results show that sequential provision has no role when ϐixed costs are small. However,
when ϐixed costs are high, contribution behavior is in line with the theoretical prediction:
individuals often fail to provide the public good in the simultaneous game, and sequential
3
provision successfully facilitates coordination and eliminates these undesirable outcomes.
As a result, when ϐixed costs are high the likelihood of securing provision of the public good
is much greater when contributions are made sequentially. The effect of sequential play on
earnings is even greater than that seen absent ϐixed costs. Thus consistent with Andreoni’s
model we ϐind that sequential moves play a unique coordinating role when there are (large)
ϐixed costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We ϐirst describe the theoretical in-
sights in a simple example of Andreoni’s model, and explain how the derived hypotheses
helped shape our experimental design. The effect of sequential play under three different
ϐixed cost treatments is presented in section 1.3. In section 1.4 we examine the interaction
between sequential play and ϐixed costs of production. We conclude the paper in section 3.6.
1.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Andreoni (1998) fully characterizes the equilibria of the contribution game with ϐixed costs.
To demonstrate the insights of interest for this study, we start by presenting a simple two-
person example of hismodel. This example has precisely the characteristics we want for our
experiment and will serve as the basis for our design. We complete the section by describing
the parameters and procedures used for the study.
1.2.1 Theory
Consider the following two-person voluntary contribution environment. A donor, i = 1; 2,
has an endowment, wi, which he must allocate between private consumption, xi, and contri-
butions to a public good, gi. Let c(gi) denote i’s cost of giving gi and r(G) i’s beneϐit from a
total contribution of G = g1 + g2.4 Assuming that the price of the private good is 1, let i’s
4 The interest in examining public good provision is driven by the classic view that altruistically motivated
giving can be viewed as voluntary contributions to a public good (see Becker (1974)). Rather than relying on
altruistic preferences we instead follow Andreoni (1993) and induce preferences for a public good through the
payoff function described earlier.
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quasi-linear utility be given by
Ui(xi; G) = wi   c(gi) + r(G):
Let the return from the public good equalm per unit contributed to the public good, provided
that the total contribution exceeds a ϐixed cost of FC .
r(G) =
8><>:0 ifG < FCmG ifG  FC
Further assume that costs are convex and piecewise linear of the form
c(gi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
gi if gi 2 [0; lne]
lne + (gi   lne) if gi 2 (lne; lpe]
lne + (gi   lne) + (gi   lpe) if gi 2 (lpe; l]
Thus the marginal cost of contributing is initially a, then , and ϐinally . To secure an in-
terior Nash equilibrium and an interior Pareto optimal outcome with FC = 0 assume that
0 <  < m, m <  < 2,  > 2m, and that 0 < lne < lpe < wi. In analyzing the game,
let us start by characterizing the equilibria of the simultaneous game and describe how these
changewith the size of the ϐixed cost. For this purpose itwill be beneϐicial to deϐine the follow-
ing two ϐixed cost levels: let FC1 denote the ϐixed cost where the return to covering the ϐixed
cost single-handedly equals the cost, i.e., r(FC1) = c(FC1), and let FC2 denote the ϐixed cost
where the return from covering the ϐixed cost equals the cost of contributing an amount equal
to half of the ϐixed cost, i.e., r(FC2) = c(FC2/2). Absent ϐixed costs (FC = 0) the dominant
strategy for each individual is to contribute lNE , thus the equilibrium is (g?1; g?2) = (lNE; lNE).
This remains the unique equilibrium outcome as long as individuals are willing to single-
handedly cover the ϐixed cost, i.e., FC < FC1. For higher ϐixed costs, i.e., FC > FC1, a zero
provision equilibrium arises. The reason is that when FC > FC1 the best response to gi = 0
is a contribution of gi = 0; thus for a sufϐiciently high ϐixed cost, (g?1; g?2) = (0; 0) is aNash equi-
librium of the simultaneous game. In fact zero provision is the unique equilibrium outcome
when FC > FC2. For intermediate value ϐixed costs, that is, when FC1 < FC < FC2, there
are both zero and positive provision equilibria. Although all players would prefer positive
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provision, a failure to coordinate may trap contributors at zero provision. The role of seed
money demonstrated by Andreoni (1998) arises when the ϐixed cost is in the intermediate
range where the simultaneous game gives rise to multiple equilibria. He showed that while
the simultaneous game may result in zero provision, such inefϐiciencies are eliminated with
sequential play. The reason is that by providing a sufϐiciently large ϐirst donation the ϐirst
mover can ensure that the second mover is willing to cover the remainder of the ϐixed cost.
Thus for ϐixed costs in this intermediate range the fundraiser can secure positive provision by
announcing the ϐirst donor’s contribution.
1.2.2 Experimental parameters
We are interested in examining the effect of sequential giving for ϐixed costs in the intermedi-
ate range described above. In determining the interaction between ϐixed costs and sequential
play we initially considered a simple 2  2 design, comparing simultaneous and sequential
giving with and without ϐixed costs. In choosing the ϐixed costs we wanted to secure that the
ϐixed cost, while high enough to give rise to positive and zero provision equilibria, was small
enough that the positive provision equilibrium of the simultaneous game with ϐixed cost was
the same as that absent ϐixed cost. However this resulted in a relatively low ϐixed cost and our
investigation of this setting soon revealed that it also was of interest to examine the effect of
sequential giving with a higher ϐixed cost. Thus we added two highcost treatments resulting
in a 3 2 design: ϐixed cost 2 f0; low; highg  play 2 fsimultaneous; sequentialg.
Our design is based on the example presented above as it captures the critical features
of Andreoni’s model. Furthermore it is relatively simple and has characteristics that are de-
sirable for our experimental design: an interior Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies and
an interior Pareto optimal outcome.5 Thus in contrast to the classic voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM)where the dominant strategy is to give nothing and the Pareto optimal out-
come is to give everything, this design allows for participants not only to overcontribute but
also to under-contribute. Furthermore, contributions are not limited to being inefϐiciently
low but may also be inefϐiciently high. While previous studies have examined environments
5 Menietti et al. (2009) examine a similar payoff structure.
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FC = 0 FC = 6 FC = 8
Simultaneous (3,3) (0,0) & (3,3) (0,0),(3,5), (4,4), & (5,3)
Sequential (3,3) (1,5) (2,6)
Table 1: Equilibrium predictions (g?1; g?2).
in which both the Nash and Pareto optimal outcomes are interior, the attraction of our ex-
ample is that we secure the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies using piecewise linear
payoffs, which are easily explained.6
The speciϐic parameters chosen for the study were as follows. Participants interacted in
a one-shot manner in groups of two. Provided that the ϐixed cost is covered, the marginal
return per unit invested in the public account was 50 cents. The per unit cost of investingwas
40 cents for units 1 to 3, 70 cents for units 4 through 7, and ϐinally $1.10 for units 8 through
10. Thus the experimental parameters were: m = 0:5,  = 0:4,  = 0:7,  = 1:1, lNE = 3,
and lPE = 7. Absent ϐixed costs it is a dominant strategy to contribute 3 units, and Pareto
efϐiciency is achieved with each contributing 7 units.
As previously noted we selected the ϐixed cost to be so large that no individual had an in-
centive to cover the ϐixed cost single-handedly, yet small enough to secure both positive and
zero provision equilibria of the simultaneous game. Furthermore in selecting the cost for the
low-ϐixed-cost treatments we wanted to facilitate an easy comparison across treatments and
selected a ϐixed cost for which the positive provision equilibrium was identical in the simul-
taneous games with and without ϐixed cost. A ϐixed cost of six satisϐied these criteria. With
FC = 6 it remains an equilibrium of the simultaneous game for each individual to contribute
3 units, yet if the other person contributes zero the best response is to contribute zero aswell.
This is because the cost of covering the ϐixed cost alone is $3.30 (= 3  0:4 + 3  0:7) which
6 See Laury and Holt (2008) for a review of the literature on VCMs with interior Nash equilibria. Our design
also differs from the threshold models, be it for contributions or a minimum contributing set, where there is no
return from exceeding the threshold, see, for example, Erev and Rapoport (1990); Dorsey (1992); Cooper and
Stockman (2007); Coats et al. (2009); as well as the review by Croson and Marks (2000).
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outweighs the beneϐit of $3 (= 6  0:5). Thus with simultaneous play and FC = 6 there
are two Nash equilibria-one that provides the public good and another that does not. Under
sequential provision, however, the zero provision outcome is eliminated. The reason is that
the ϐirst mover has an incentive to provide just enough to secure that the second mover will
cover the remaining ϐixed costs.7 Examining the second mover’s incentives, we see that the
second mover’s best response is
g2(g1) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if g1 = 0
6  g1 if g1 2 f1; 2g
3 if g1 2 [3; 10]
where g1 denotes the ϐirstmover’s contribution and g2 the secondmover’s contribution. Thus,
the ϐirst mover, by contributing 1 unit, can secure completion of the project andmaximize her
own payoff.
For the high ϐixed cost treatments we increased the cost to 8 units. Once again the ϐixed
costs give rise to both zero and positive provision under simultaneous move. However in
increasing the ϐixed cost beyond 6 units we also increase the number of positive provision
equilibria of the simultaneous game. In particular there are now three Nash equilibria that
secure provision: (3,5), (4,4) and (5,3). Introducing sequential play leads to a unique sub-
gameperfect equilibriumof (2,6), thus sequential play not only eliminates the inefϐicient (0,0)
equilibrium, it also eliminates the coordination problem associated with selecting one of the
positive provision equilibria. The implications of the high-cost treatments are discussed in
greater detail in subsection 1.3.3.
Our 3  2 design - fFC = 0; FC = 6; FC = 8g  fsimultaneous play; sequential playg -
gives rise to the predictions in table 1.
Of course, various forms of other-regarding preferences may give rise to deviations from
the predicted equilibria.8 Altruism may cause contributions to exceed the predicted contri-
butions. The attraction of the fair and Pareto superior outcome may be so strong that we
7 The characteristic of this subgame perfect equilibrium is similar to that of the ultimatum game where the
proposer offers the smallest nonzero amount possible and the responder accepts. The equilibrium also resem-
bles the quasi-linear settings by Andreoni et al. (2002) and Gachter et al. (2010), where there is a substantial
ϐirst mover advantage.
8 See Cooper and Kagel (Forthcoming) for a review of other-regarding preferences.
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observe no inefϐiciencies in the simultaneous gamewith ϐixed costs. Reciprocity and inequal-
ity aversion may cause deviations in the sequential game where small initial contributions
can be punished, while large contributions can be rewarded. In light of the many behavioral
factors that may cause deviations from the equilibrium prediction, we refrain from assess-
ing themodel’s predictive power by examining adherence to the predicted equilibria; instead
we focus on the predicted comparative statics. Needless to say the role of sequential giving
relies critically on inefϐiciencies arising with simultaneous giving, and when examining the
comparative statics of sequential giving we therefore assume that there is a positive proba-
bility that simultaneous moves result in zero provision. In examining the comparative statics
between and within the no ϐixed cost and ϐixed cost treatments we can answer the questions
of interest. First, do sequential moves absent ϐixed cost increase contributions? Second, does
the introduction of ϐixed cost gives rise to inefϐiciencies and decrease contributions. Third,
comparing treatments (simultaneous versus sequential play) with ϐixed cost, do we ϐind ev-
idence that sequential play increases contributions and the likelihood of provision? Fourth,
does sequential play have a unique coordinating role in the presence of ϐixed costs, and is such
a role sensitive to the level of ϐixed costs?
1.2.3 Experimental procedures
The sessions were conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory at the
University of Pittsburgh. Three sessionswere conducted for each of the initial four treatments
(FC = 0 andFC = 6), and two sessionswere conducted for each of the subsequent high ϐixed
cost treatments (FC = 8). With 14 participants per session a total of 224 undergraduate stu-
dents participated in the study. Each session proceeded as follows: First instructions and a
payoff table were distributed.9 Care was taken to make the payoff table as clear as possible.
The payoffs to the participant and her groupmember are distinguished by color and location
in each cell (see ϐigure 1 for an example of the payoff table when FC = 0). The instructions
were read out loud and a short quiz was given to gauge the participants’ understanding. The
quiz asked participants to use the payoff table to determine the payoffs earned by a partici-
9 See section A.1 and section A.5, for the instructions and payoff tables.
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Figure 1: Payoff table with FC = 0.
pant and her groupmember for several combinations of contribution levels above and below
the ϐixed cost level. To avoid priming the participants, the examples did not include focal out-
comes, such as the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal outcome. The quiz questions were
the same for all treatments, though the answers varied with the size of the ϐixed costs.
Once all participants had completed the quiz a solution key was distributed. The quiz an-
swers were explained by an experimenter using a projection of the payoff table. Screen shots
of the experimental software were shown and explained. The payoff table was displayed on
all decision screens. Participants then began the portion of the experiment that counted for
10
payment. They played 14 rounds of the public goods game. In each round each participant
was randomly paired with another participant, was given a $4 endowment and the opportu-
nity to invest any number of units between zero and ten in a public account.10
Contributions were either made “simultaneously” or “sequentially.” Effectively decisions
were made sequentially in both treatments with half the participants called “ϐirst movers”
and the other half “secondmovers.” However only in the sequential treatmentwas the second
mover informed of the ϐirst mover’s contribution before making her decision. The variation
in information for the second mover was the only difference between the sequential and si-
multaneous treatments, which resulted in minimal variations in instructions and procedures
between the two treatments.11 The experimentwas programmed and conducted using the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). When the 14 rounds were completed, we randomly se-
lected three rounds to count for payment.12 Participants were then asked to complete a short
questionnaire, following which they were paid in private and in cash. Sessions lasted approx-
imately one hour and average earnings were $22, including a $5 show-up fee.
1.3 THE EFFECT OF SEQUENTIAL GIVINGWITH ANDWITHOUT FIXED COSTS
Our experiment is designed to examine the role of sequential fundraising in eliminating inef-
ϐicient outcomes that may arise in the presence of ϐixed costs and simultaneous play. In re-
porting the results we ϐirst determine the effect sequential play may have absent ϐixed costs,
we then see if the introduction of a ϐixed cost of six gives rise to inefϐicient outcomes when
10 A consequence of our design is that a participant’s cost can exceed their endowment; in effect they borrow
against earnings from the group account. We made this clear in the instructions, and participants did not ex-
press any concerns about this aspect of the design. Throughout the experiment participants relied on the payoff
table when making decisions. Thus their decisions appeared to be determined solely by ϐinal payoffs. Only one
participant asked how purchases could exceed his endowment. The participant appeared satisϐied with the ex-
planation that the cost was taken out of his earnings from the group account. While we think it is unlikely, we
cannot rule out that limited endowments rather than decreasing payoffs, restrained contributions.
11 This procedure allows us to directly test the informational effect of sequential play and eliminates the pos-
sibility that sequencing alone can explain the results (see e.g., Cooper et al. (1993)). Potters et al. (2005, 2007)
use a similar approach.
12 This differs from the common approaches where either all or only one round count for payments. However
we see no reason why this approach should be inferior and it allows us to keep the average payments in line
with those commonly seen, and secures a transparent payoff table.
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All rounds 1-14 First seven 1-7 Last seven 8-14
Sequential 0.668 0.752 0.585
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Round -0.030 -0.031 -0.060
(0.001) (0.238) (0.017)
N 1176 588 588
Participants 84 84 84
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
Table 2: GLS random effects regression dependent variable: individual contribution,FC = 0.
contributions are made simultaneously, and whether sequential moves may help overcome
such inefϐiciencies. We conclude the section by determining whether the answers to these
questions are robust to an increase in the ϐixed cost.
1.3.1 Contributions with zero ϐixed costs
Absent ϐixed costs the unique equilibriumprediction of both the sequential and simultaneous
game is for each member of the two person group to contribute three units. Hence the ϐirst
hypothesis is
Hypothesis 1. With zero ϔixed costs, sequential play has no effect on contributions.
The average contributions for the simultaneous and sequential games with zero ϐixed
costs are shown by round in Fig. 2. Focusing ϐirst on the simultaneous game, we note that
average contributions are very close to the three-unit equilibrium prediction. With a mean
contribution of 2.87 units we cannot reject that participants contribute the predicted amount
(p=0.382).13 Furthermore we do not see a substantial decrease in contributions over the
13 To account for fact that each individual makes 14 decisions, the reported test statistics in our paper refer
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Figure 2: Simultaneous moves with ϐixed costs of zero and six.
course of the experiment – a sharp contrast to the behavior in the classic VCM game where
contributions initially exceed the dominant strategy of zero giving and decrease over time.14
Our data does however resemble that of previous VCMs in that the frequency of equilibrium
play increases over the course of the experiment ￿ from 57% during the ϐirst half of the ex-
periment to 66% during the second half of the experiment. The unusually high frequency of
equilibrium play is most likely driven by the fact that we use a very simple piecewise linear
cost function to secure an interior dominant strategy.15
While contributions in the simultaneous game are consistent with the equilibrium pre-
diction, we see greater-than-predicted giving in the sequential game. In every round of the
the results from random effects regressions. Exceptions will be noted.
14 A randomeffects regression of individual contributions on round shows that contributions decrease signiϐi-
cantly over time, but the coefϐicient is small (-0.028, p = 0:042) in the simultaneous game and corresponds to no
more than a one percent decrease in giving per round. See Ledyard (1995) for a review of commonly observed
contribution patterns in the classic VCM.
15 Previous examinations of interior equilibria in dominant strategies use the more complicated quadratic
cost function and fail to see substantial equilibrium play (see Keser (1996); Sefton and Steinberg (1996); van
Dijk et al. (2002) and Laury and Holt (2008) for a review). Menietti et al. (2009) use a linear payoff structure
similar to that examined here and ϐind substantial equilibrium play.
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sequential game average contributions exceed the predicted contribution of 3. Indeed the
mean contribution of 3.54 differs signiϐicantly from the prediction (p = 0:00). Note however
that 73% of all decisions are at the predicted contribution of 3.
In describing the experimental design we hypothesized that reciprocity might cause be-
havior in the sequential game to deviate from the equilibrium prediction, and our data are
consistent with this explanation. While our results do not show evidence of negative reci-
procity there is some evidence of positive reciprocity.16 When the ϐirst mover’s contribution
ranges between 0 and 3 units, second movers opt for the dominant strategy and contribute
an average of 2.99 units. However the average secondmover contribution increases to 3.80
units when ϐirst movers give more than their dominant strategy. To assess the return from
increasing ϐirst contributions by 1 unit, we use random effects to regress second mover con-
tributions on that of the ϐirst mover. When ϐirst mover contributions range from 3 to 7 units
we ϐind that a one-unit increase in ϐirst mover contributions increases the second mover’s
contribution by 0.29 units. Although the positive coefϐicient is consistent with reciprocity the
response is not large enough to make it payoff maximizing for ϐirst movers to deviate from
their dominant strategy.17 Nonetheless the incentive for ϐirst movers to give is greater with
sequential play and average ϐirst mover contributions are found to be signiϐicantly higher in
the sequential than simultaneous game (3.85 vs. 2.96, p = 0:005).
Comparing the sequential and simultaneous treatments with zero ϐixed costs we ϐind a
signiϐicant effect of sequential moves.18 Using random effects Table 2 reports the results from
regressing individual contributions on a “sequential” dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
game is sequential and 0 otherwise, and a round number variable “round” which controls for
changes in contributions over time, be it due to learning or changes in preferences.
16 As noted by Charness and Rabin (2005) the experimental evidence of negative reciprocity is substantial
whereas that on positive reciprocity is more limited. As demonstrated by Andreoni et al. (2003) the degree of
both negative and positive reciprocity is however sensitive to the examined environment and the perceptions
individuals have of a particular action. A contribution below the dominant strategy equilibrium is costly to the
individual and may not be perceived as unkind.
17 The net cost of contributing in the 4-7 unit range is 20 cents; thus it is payoff maximizing to increase ϐirst
mover contributions by 1 unit if it generates an increase in second mover contributions of more than 0.4 units.
18 This result is likely to be sensitive to the environment examined. In our study the equilibrium is symmetric
and is predicted to be the same under sequential and simultaneous moves. In sharp contrast Andreoni et al.
(2002) and Gachter et al. (2010) examine quasi-linear environments where contributions are predicted to de-
crease with sequential moves and where the asymmetric subgame perfect equilibrium predicts a substantial
ϐirst-mover advantage. Both studies ϐind evidence of lower sequential than simultaneous giving.
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Figure 3: Fixed costs of zero, mean individual contributions.
Table 2 shows thatwhen pooling the sequential and simultaneous datawe continue to see
a slight decrease in contributions with round. While the decrease is signiϐicant overall and in
the last seven rounds, it is not signiϐicantly different from zero during the ϐirst seven rounds.
As expected from Fig. 2 sequential play is found to cause a signiϐicant and substantial 20%
increase in contributions. This implies a 32 cent or 6% increase in earnings.19 This positive
effect is robust to breaking the data into the ϐirst-seven and last seven rounds. Hencewe reject
1.20 When ϐixed costs are zero, sequential play increases contributions.21
19 For rounds 1-14we get a constant of 5.67 (p = 0:00), coefϐicients of 0.32 (0.00) on sequential play, and -0.01
(0.10) on round. For rounds 1-7 the constant is 5.68 (p = 0:00), and the coefϐicients are 0.35 (0.00) on sequential
play and -0.02 (0.30) on round. Finally, for rounds 8-14 the constant is 5.78 (p = 0:00) and the coefϐicients are
0.29 (0.00) on sequential play, and -0.017 (0.23) on round.
20 Session level analysis generates the same result. Mean contributions in the three sequential sessions sys-
tematically exceed those of the three simultaneous sessions.
21 Our results are robust to controlling for the correctness of the answers provided on the quiz. However
the coefϐicient on the correctness of the quiz is never signiϐicant and including it has no qualitative (and most
often no quantitative) effect on the estimated coefϐicients. An explanation for why a participant’s initial ability
to read the payoff table has no signiϐicant effect on behavior may be that the experimenter carefully reviewed
and explained the quiz answers prior to the decision phase of the experiment.
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Having found that sequential play increases contributions in our zero-ϐixed-cost treat-
ments, we continue our analysis to determine how behavior responds to the introduction of
ϐixed costs. The primary question of interest is whether in the presence of ϐixed costs, se-
quential play causes an even greater increase in giving as it eliminates inefϐicient outcomes.
Outcomes that may arise as a result of ϐixed costs in the simultaneous game. We begin by
examining the response in our low-cost treatments where the ϐixed cost is six. To evalu-
ate the potential role of sequential play we start by examining whether the introduction of
low ϐixed costs causes coordination failure and zero provision outcomes in the simultane-
ous game. We compare contributions under simultaneous play when ϐixed costs are zero and
six. As shown earlier, with ϐixed costs of six the simultaneous game admits two Nash equilib-
ria: (g?1; g?2) 2 (0; 0); (3; 3). That is, an inefϐicient equilibrium with zero contribution emerges
along with the previous equilibrium of three-unit contributions by each of the group mem-
bers. Although the existence of an additional and inefϐicient equilibrium does not guarantee
it will be played, this is an implicit assumption in Andreoni’s argument for the role of sequen-
16
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All rounds 1-14 First seven 1-7 Last seven 8-14
Sequential -0.917 -1.129 -0.704
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Round -0.064 -0.097 -0.082
(0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant 4.560 4.767 4.678
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1176 588 588
Participants 84 84 84
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
Table 3: GLS random effects regression dependent variable: individual contribution,FC = 6.
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tial fundraising. If the inefϐicient equilibrium is played with some positive probability, aver-
age contributions are predicted to be lower with ϐixed costs of six. This comparative static
prediction is summarized in the second hypothesis
Hypothesis2. Average contributions in the simultaneous gamewith ϔixed costs of six are smaller
than with ϔixed costs of zero.
Fig. 3 panel (a) demonstrates the mean contributions by round in the two simultaneous
treatments (FC = 0 and FC = 6). With ϐixed cost the contribution pattern is in sharp con-
trast to the prediction. Rather than decreasing contributions, the introduction of low ϐixed
costs is found to signiϐicantly increase contributions.22 A random effects regression of indi-
vidual contribution on round and a dummy variable (FC = 6) that takes a value of 1 for
observations with ϐixed costs of six and 0 for observations with zero ϐixed cost reveals a pos-
itive and signiϐicant coefϐicient for the ϐixed cost dummy. All else equal, in the simultaneous
game introducing a ϐixed cost of six increases individual contributions by 1.20 units.23 Thus
we reject hypothesis 2. To better understand the deviation from the predicted comparative
staticwe examine the probability distribution of individual contributions. As seen in ϐigure 2b
the distribution with a ϐixed cost of six ϐirst-order stochastically dominates the distribution
with a ϐixed cost of zero. Relative to the zero-ϐixed-cost treatment, we see a decrease in the
number of contributions of less than 3 units and an increase in contributions between 4 and
7 units. Contributions in excess of the dominant strategy account for 26% of play when there
are no ϐixed costs and increase to 55% when the ϐixed cost increases to six. Perhaps most
importantly, and contrary to expectations, the presence of ϐixed costs is not found to increase
the frequency of zero unit contributions. We conjecture that strategic uncertainty is the pri-
mary cause for the increase in contributions. Contributing all of the ϐixed costs happens to be
a best response for a wide range of beliefs over the partner’s contribution. Consider beliefs
that only place weight on the partner selecting an action associated with the two Nash equi-
libria: contributing 0 or 3 units. If the subject is very certain to be matched with someone
22 Session level data reveal the same contribution pattern: the simultaneous treatments with ϐixed costs of
six systematically generate larger session averages than that observed with ϐixed costs of zero.
23 A random effects regression of individual contributions for rounds 1-14 reveals coefϐicients of 1.20 on a
FC = 6 dummy, -0.06 on round, and 3.32 as the constant. For rounds 1-7 the coefϐicient is 1.46 on FC = 6,
-0.10 on round, and 3.31 as the constant. Finally, for rounds 8-14 the coefϐicient is 0.95 on FC = 6, -0.08 on
round, and 3.70 as the constant. All p-values are smaller than 0.01.
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contributing zero, the individual’s best response is instead to contribute zero as well. Simi-
larly, if she is very certain to bematchedwith someone contributing 3 units, the best response
is to contribute three. However, if the likelihood of beingmatchedwith a zero contributor lies
in the range of 40 to 80%, the best response is to contribute 6 units. Thus absent the ability to
coordinate on one of the two Nash equilibria, individuals may beneϐit from single-handedly
securing provision of the project. There are other examples in which a contribution of 6 units
is a best response due to the tradeoff between risk of coordination failure and contribution
costs. In fact there are a number of symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibria that require
that the individual contributes six with a positive probability.24
If the strategic uncertainty argument is correct, one would expect equilibrium play to in-
crease as uncertainty about the strategies being employed diminishes. The data is consistent
with an increase in equilibrium play. The effect of ϐixed costs is found to decrease from the
ϐirst to the second half of the experiment, and over the course of the experiment the num-
ber of six-unit contributions decrease while the number of three-unit contributions increase.
During the ϐirst seven rounds of the game, three- and six-unit contributions each account for
25% of all play. These numbers change for the latter half of the experiment, with 44% of all
contributions at three and only 14% at six. Interestingly the frequency of zero contributions
also decreases slightly over the course of the experiment. During the ϐirst and second half of
the experiment a contribution of zero accounts for, respectively, 9 and 7% of overall contri-
butions. We complete our analysis of the low-ϐixed-cost treatments by examining the effect
of sequential play. With ϐixed costs of six the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the se-
quential game is (g?1; g?2) = (1; 5): the ϐirst mover gives 1 unit while the second mover gives
the remaining amount to cover the ϐixed cost, i.e., 5 units. From a theoretical viewpoint, the
sequential game eliminates the inefϐicient Nash equilibrium outcome of zero provision, po-
tentially increasing contributions (to an average of 3 units). This is summarized in the third
hypothesis
24 To see this formally, section A.3 presents the inequalities which determine whether or not contributing six
is a best response. The set of inequalities contains 6 inequalities, which together deϐine whether the strategy
of contributing 6 units is a best response. The set of symmetric mixed strategy NE is {(0,3,6) with probability
(0.4, 0.2, 0.4); (0,1,5,6) with probability (0.08, 0.36, 0.048, 0.512); (0,2,4,6) with probability (0.2, 0.15, 0.075,
0.575); (0,1,3,5,6) with probability (0.08, 0.24, 0.06, 0.036, 0.584); (0,2,3,4,6) with probability (0.2, 0.12, 0.024,
0.072, 0.584); (0,1,2,4,5,6) with probability (0.08, 0.096, 0.138, 0.0228, 0.02736, 0.63584); (0,1,2,3,4„5,6) with
probability (0.08, 0.096, 0.1152, 0.01824, 0.021888, 0.026266, 0.642406)}.
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Hypothesis 3. With ϔixed cost of six, sequential play increases contributions.
Our results from the simultaneous game leave one skeptical that support for hypothesis 3
will be found in the low-ϐixed-cost environment. The limited evidence of inefϐicient outcomes
in the simultaneous game with ϐixed costs leaves little room for sequential play to improve
on the simultaneous outcomes. Furthermore, we argued that uncertainty with regard to the
partner’s play helped explain why ϐixed costs increased contributions in the simultaneous
game. As this uncertainty is reduced in the sequential game, contributions may instead de-
crease to the equilibrium level. Figure 2a shows the mean individual contributions by round
in the sequential and simultaneous game with low ϐixed costs. In contrast to the predicted
comparative statics we see that mean contributions are lower with sequential play than with
simultaneous play. Table 3 presents a random effects regression analysis of individual con-
tributions for FC = 6. As before, the dependent variable is individual contribution and the
explanatory variables are whether the game is sequential or simultaneous and the number
of rounds. The effect of sequential play is found to be negative and signiϐicant. All else equal
sequential play reduces individual contributions by almost 1 unit. Thus we reject hypothe-
sis 3 with ϐixed costs of six, sequential play decreases the mean contribution.25 The rejection
of hypothesis 3 is not caused by behavior in the sequential game. In fact we cannot reject
that the average contribution of 3.16 in the sequential game equals the predicted three-unit
mean contribution (p = 0:380). Instead the deviation from the predicted comparative static
(hypothesis 3) is driven by the higher-than-expected contributions in the simultaneous game.
Before we draw any conclusions on the relative advantages of sequential versus simultane-
ous play, we should however examine the actual provision of the public good. After all, donors
beneϐit from provision rather than contribution, thus contributions may be misleading when
selecting between fundraising techniques. For example, it is possible that an individual gift
of 5 units in the simultaneous game is matched with a contribution of zero causing the public
good not to be provided. Figure 4b presents the fraction of cases in which the public good
was provided, by round and by treatment (simultaneous versus sequential). The provision
rate is high and in excess of 80% in both treatments. Despite the coordination problem asso-
25 Session level data reveal the same contribution pattern, with the sequential treatments systematically gen-
erating lower session averages than those observed with simultaneous moves.
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ciated with simultaneous giving, the 30% of contributions that are large enough to guarantee
public good provision in the simultaneous game help secure similar provision rates in the
two treatments. The high provision rate combined with the larger average contributions in
the simultaneous treatment implies that individual earnings are slightly lower with sequen-
tial than simultaneous play. Using random effects to regress individual round earnings on a
sequential treatment dummy and round number we ϐind that sequential play reduces par-
ticipant earnings by about 25 cents per round.26 While this difference is signiϐicant it only
corresponds to a 4% decrease in earnings. Contrary to the expectations we do not ϐind evi-
dence to suggest that participants on average get higher earnings in the sequential treatment
when the ϐixed cost equals six.
1.3.3 Contributions with high ϐixed costs
Our analysis of contributions with a six-unit ϐixed cost did not show the expected increase
in contributions from sequential play. This result was driven by the larger than expected
contributions in the simultaneous game. We argued that strategic uncertainty and the asso-
ciated risk of coordination failure could help explain this behavior. To illustrate this point we
used an example of an individual who believes that her partner either contributes nothing or
covers half of the ϐixed cost, and found that single-handedly covering the ϐixed cost is a best
response for this individual as long as she believes the probability of the other group mem-
ber contributing nothing is between 40 and 80%. The substantial probability range (40 to
80) makes the risk of coordination failure a real concern, and reduces the attractiveness of
contributing less than six. For instance if the individual gives 3 units and the threshold is not
met she will incur a loss of 1.2; however if she contributes 6 units herself, the worst that can
happen is the partner contributing zero yielding a loss of 0.3.
Accounting for this type of strategic uncertainty renders contributions of six a best re-
sponse. In this section we examine if behavior may bemore in line with theory in a ϐixed-cost
treatment where this type of strategic uncertainty does not make it a best response to single-
26 For rounds 1-14 we get a constant of 5.97 (p = 0:00), coefϐicients of -0.25 (0.00) on sequential play, and
-0.02 (0.03) on round. For rounds 1-7 the constant is 6.02 (p = 0:00), and the coefϐicients are -0.28 (0.01)
on sequential play and -0.03 (0.25) on round. Finally, for rounds 8-14 the constant is 6.01 (p = 0:00) and the
coefϐicients are -0.22 (0.00) on sequential play, and 0.02 (0.32) on round.
21
All rounds 1-14 First seven 1-7 Last seven 8-14
FC = 6 -0.526 -0.526 -0.527
(0.000) -0.001 (0.000)
FC = 8 -1.091 -0.986 -1.091
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First mover -0.453 -0.545 -0.362
-0.001 -0.001 -0.011
FC = 6 (First Mover) 0.385 0.389 0.381
-0.039 -0.086 -0.049
FC = 8 (First Mover) 1.322 1.272 1.372
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Round -0.174 -0.029 -0.0136
-0.006 -0.127 -0.432
Constant 6.148 6.229 6.067
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1568 784 784
Participants 112 112 112
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
Table 4: GLS random effects regression dependent variable: individual earnings.
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handedly cover the cost. Speciϐically we examine an environmentwith an eight unit ϐixed cost
where, given the belief that the other groupmember either contributes nothing or covers half
the ϐixed cost, it is not a best response to contribute eight.27 Recall that with a ϐixed cost of
eight there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium at (2,6), and four Nash equilibria of the
simultaneous game: (3,5), (4,4), (5,3) and (0,0). As noted in Section 2, with ϐixed costs of
eight there are two ways in which sequential play may increase contributions: ϐirst through
the elimination of the zero contribution equilibrium, and second by alleviating the coordina-
tion problem associatedwith selecting one of the positive provision equilibria. If participants
in the simultaneous game play the zero contribution equilibrium with some positive proba-
bility, then the comparative static of the low-ϐixed-cost treatment should still hold. Thus we
test the following fourth hypothesis
Hypothesis 4. With an eight-unit ϔixed cost, sequential play increases contributions.
We ϐirst examine if there is coordination failure in the simultaneous game. The contribu-
tion distribution in the simultaneous game is shown in ϐigure 5. As with ϐixed costs of six, a
substantial fraction of contributions are found to cover half of the ϐixed cost (four), and a fair
number of contributions are at the efϐicient level (seven). However, in sharp contrast to our
earlier ϐindings with ϐixed costs of six it is rare to see individual contributions that cover the
ϐixed costs, and the modal choice now is to contribute nothing.28 A third of all contributions
are at zero units.29 Thus behavior in the simultaneous game suggests that there is room for
sequential play to improve outcomes. Figure 6b compares the mean individual contributions
in the sequential and simultaneous game by round. Despite the high frequency of zero unit
contributions in the simultaneous game, themean contributions are found to be quite similar.
27 If the agent assigns a probability p to the opponent playing 0 and the probability 1   p to the opponent
playing 4, then it is easily seen that there is no positive probability for which the agent would prefer giving 8
rather than either 0 or 4. Speciϐically if given only the choice of 0, 4 or 8, the agent will never give 8, andwill give
0 when the probability that the opponent gives zero is more than 0.525, and will give four otherwise. Note that
with a probability of 0.525 both 0 and 4 will give an expected payoff of 4, whereas the expected payoff from 8 is
3.85.
28 A reviewer suggested that this need not result from differences in earnings, but may be a consequence of
the low initial endowment. As noted in footnote 10 we are skeptical that participants used the costs rather than
the ϐinal payoffs to make decisions. However if participants felt restricted by the costs then the comparative
statics nonetheless shed light on the effect of sequential contributions in situations where budget constraints
prevent donors from covering the ϐixed costs of a public project.
29 The frequency of zero contributions increases from 31 to 35% between the ϐirst and second half of the
experiment.
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The similarity in mean contributions is further supported by a random effects regression of
individual contributions on a sequential dummy and rounds. The coefϐicient on the sequen-
tial dummy is found to be small and insigniϐicant whether it is examined overall, or during
the ϐirst or second half of the experiment.30 Thus contrary to hypothesis 4, sequential play
does not signiϐicantly increase individual contributions. While sequential play is not found to
increase mean contributions, the likelihood of providing the public good does increase sub-
stantially. As ϐigure 6b illustrates, the difference in provision rates is large and persistent
across the fourteen rounds of play. On average, sequential play almost doubles the likelihood
of providing the public good from 40% when contributions are simultaneous, to 76% when
contributions are sequential. Donors accrue substantial beneϐits from the increase in pro-
vision. Using random effects to regress round payoffs on a sequential dummy, we ϐind that
sequential play increases round earnings by approximately $1.20, a 27% increase.31
1.4 THE ROLE OF SEQUENTIAL MOVESWITH ANDWITHOUT FIXED COST
Our results demonstrate that the response to sequential play is rather sensitive to the pres-
ence and level of ϐixed costs of production.
While sequential play decreased giving in the low-ϐixed-cost treatment, it increased giving
in both the zero andhigh ϐixed cost treatments. With high ϐixed cost, sequential play increased
earnings by 27%. By comparison, sequential play increased earnings by 6%when therewere
no ϐixed costs and decreased it by 4%when the ϐixed costs were low.32 Thus our results con-
ϐirm that sequential play is particularly effective under high ϐixed costs.
The differences in return from sequential play are largely driven by the larger than ex-
30 The sequential coefϐicient equals -0.051 (p = 0:91) over all 14 rounds, 0.240 (p = 0:61) for the ϐirst seven
rounds, and -0.342 (p = 0:49) for the last seven rounds.
31 A random effects regression of individual earnings reveals for rounds 1-14 a constant of 4.41 (p = 0:00),
coefϐicients of 1.18 (0.00) on sequential play, and -0.01 (0.39) on round. For rounds 1-7 the constant is 4.56
(p = 0:00), and the coefϐicients are 1.34 (0.00) on sequential play and -0.07 (0.10) on round. Finally, for rounds
8-14 the constant is 4.07 (p = 0:00) and the coefϐicients are 1.02 (0.00) on sequential play, and 0.03 (0.54) on
round.
32 A random effects regression reveals that the effect of sequential play is signiϐicant at the 0.02 level in each
of the 3 ϐixed cost treatments; in addition the difference in response to sequential play is signiϐicant at the 0.00
level.
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Figure 6: Fixed costs of eight.
pected contributions in the simultaneous gamewith low ϐixed cost. In both the zero and high
ϐixed cost treatment behavior of the simultaneous game was very much in line with equilib-
riumpredictions. Absent ϐixed costs participants on averagemade the predicted 3 unit contri-
bution, and under high ϐixed costsmany individuals opted to not contributewhich resulted in
frequent failure to provide the public good. By contrast when the ϐixed cost was low individ-
uals instead overcame strategic uncertainty by increasing contribution and single-handedly
covering the ϐixed costs. Under low ϐixed costs simultaneous play only rarely resulted in zero
provision outcomes.
While the emphasis has been on the surprising behavior under simultaneous play, it is
important to note that adherence to equilibrium also is sensitive to the ϐixed cost when con-
tributions are made sequentially. Figure 7 illustrates the behavior under the three sequential
games reporting the observed combinations of ϐirst and second mover contributions. Fig-
ure 7a shows contributions in the no ϐixed cost treatment. Absent ϐixed cost there is substan-
tial adherence to the highlighted subgame perfect equilibrium at (3, 3). The few deviations
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Figure 7: Contribution frequency.
from equilibrium suggest that contributions below the dominant strategy of 3 are not pun-
ished, whereas contributions in excess of 3 are sometimes rewarded. One reason why ϐirst
mover contributions below three are not punished may be that it is costly for the ϐirst mover
to give less than her dominant strategy, and in doing so she does not inϐluence the second
mover’s payoff from giving. Introducing ϐixed costs gives rise to an asymmetric subgame per-
fect equilibrium with a substantial ϐirst mover advantage. This inequality may help explain
why in panel ϐigure 7b and ϐigure 7c the ϐixed-cost-treatments result in greater deviations
from the subgame perfect equilibrium. As predicted, contributions in the ϐixed-cost treat-
ments generally cover the ϐixed cost. Provision rates are 86% with a ϐixed cost of six and
76% with a ϐixed cost of eight. However, there are large differences in the manner in which
provision is secured. With a six-unit ϐixed cost, participants shy away from the highlighted
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subgame perfect equilibrium (1,5). Instead, the modal outcome is for the ϐirst and second
mover to each contribute 3 units. In contrast, with ϐixed costs of eight the modal outcome is
the highlighted subgame perfect equilibrium of (2,6). The difference in the frequency of equi-
librium play is intriguing as in both cases the subgame perfect equilibrium involves the ϐirst
player free riding off of the second player’s desire to secure provision of the public good.33
Two factors may help explain the difference between the two sequential ϐixed-cost con-
ditions (FC = 6, FC = 8): one is reciprocity and the other is trust. Reciprocity could be a
factor since second movers may view contribution of one out of six as more unfair relatively
to contribution of two out of eight; it may be easier for the second mover to accept the in-
equality associated with the subgame perfect equilibrium in the case of ϐixed costs of eight.34
Indeed, with a ϐixed cost of six and an initial contribution of one, there is a 40% chance that
the secondmover selects a contributionwhich is insufϐicient to secure provision. By contrast,
with a ϐixed cost of eight and an initial contribution of two there is only a 20% chance that the
project fails to be provided. Despite the prediction that ϐixed cost gives rise to a ϐirst mover
advantage, such an advantage only emerges in the high ϐixed cost treatments. Trust may also
be a factor in explaining the difference in behavior across the ϐixed cost conditions: giving 1
unit risks 40 cents or 10% of the endowment, while contributing 2 units risk 80 cents or 20%
of the endowment. Hence, it is possible that secondmovers interpret a two-unit contribution
by the ϐirst mover as a stronger signal of trust compared with 1 unit contribution.
We investigate the difference in ϐirst mover advantage in Table 4. Pooling the earnings
data from the three sequential treatments we note ϐirst that absent ϐixed cost there is a sig-
niϐicant disadvantage to being a ϐirst mover, with ϐirst movers on average earning 53 cents
less per round. Despite the prediction that ϐixed cost will introduce a ϐirst mover advantage,
as seen by the ϐirst mover and the interaction term, we do not see such an effect under low
33 Examining sequential public goods games, Andreoni et al. (2002); Cooper andStockman (2007) andGachter
et al. (2010) also ϐind that free riding by a ϐirst mover causes subsequent subjects to not give, even when it is
a dominant strategy to do so. The asymmetric payoff outcome under high ϐixed cost may help explain why the
likelihood of provision decreases in the high ϐixed cost treatment.
34 Note that it is not only the perceived fairness of the equilibrium that may change when moving from a
subgame perfect equilibrium of (1,5) to one of (2,6). The cost of punishing is also higher in the (2,6) equilib-
rium. Most games where distributional concerns may play a role have the characteristic that an improvement
in fairness also increases the costs of punishment. Andreoni et al. (2003) is an exception as they keep the cost
of punishment and rewards constant while allowing the distribution of payoffs to vary.
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ϐixed cost. With ϐixed cost of six ϐirst movers earn 7 cents less than second movers, however
this difference is not signiϐicant (p = 0:60). A signiϐicant and substantial ϐirst mover advan-
tage is however seen when the ϐixed cost is eight, as the earnings of ϐirst movers on average
exceed those of the second movers by 87 cents (p = 0:00). The advantage to the ϐirst mover
is relatively robust over the ϐirst and second half of the experiment.
To summarize in the no andhigh ϐixed cost treatments behavior in both the sequential and
simultaneous games is broadly consistent with the equilibrium predictions, however in the
low-cost treatments we see substantial deviations in both the sequential and simultaneous
games. On one hand strategic uncertainty appears to cause greater than predicted simulta-
neous giving when the ϐixed cost is low; on the other hand the tension associated with the
substantial ϐirst mover advantage appears to move behavior away from the asymmetric sub-
game perfect equilibrium. Interestingly this asymmetry is more readily accepted when the
ϐixed cost is high. The sensitivity to the size of the seed relative to the total ϐixed costmay sug-
gest that fundraisers and initial donors should use caution when trying to exploit a potential
ϐirst mover advantage.
1.5 CONCLUSIONS
Our study was designed to examine whether the frequent use of sequential fundraising and
seed money contributions may be explained by the presence of ϐixed production costs. We
ϐind support for this claim for sufϐiciently high ϐixed costs, but not for low ϐixed costs. More
speciϐically, the theoretical argumentmade byAndreoni (1998) is that in the presence of ϐixed
costs, giving simultaneously to a public good may result in both positive and zero provision
equilibria. Thus absent informationonwhat others give, donorsmayget stuck in an inefϐicient
equilibriumwith zero provision of the public good. The attraction of sequential giving is that
it eliminates such inefϐicient outcomes and guarantees provision of desirable public projects.
Thus sequential fundraising is predicted to increase giving and individual payoffs.
For small ϐixed costswedonot ϐind support for this claim; instead sequential play is shown
to decrease both contributions and individual payoffs. The reason for this deviation from the
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predicted comparative statics is found in the simultaneous game where, surprisingly, the in-
troduction of ϐixed costs increases rather than decreases contributions. The explanation for
the larger than expected contributions is due to the coordination difϐiculties of the simultane-
ous game combined with the relatively low ϐixed costs. Interestingly, uncertainty over which
equilibrium the partner is playing often makes it a best response to contribute an amount
large enough to single-handedly cover the ϐixed cost. The sequential game, however, allevi-
ates the coordination problem and participants can “safely” contribute less and still secure
provision of the public good. Thus for low ϐixed costs we ϐind that contributions in the simul-
taneous game exceeded those in the sequential game. While this result was not anticipated,
it is not difϐicult to envision a case where the cost from contributing is so low and the beneϐit
from provision is so high that individuals in a simultaneous move game will contribute an
inefϐiciently large amount in order to secure the good.35
In the case of large ϐixed costs, behavior was found to be more in line with the theory.
Although sequential play did not increase contributions, it did increase the likelihood of pro-
vision and individual earnings. As predicted, with simultaneous play many participants did
not contribute to the public good, or failed to coordinate to meet the ϐixed costs level which
is necessary to provide the good. With high ϐixed cost sequential play improved upon the si-
multaneous outcome through two channels: not only did it eliminate the zero contribution
outcomes, it also eliminated the inefϐiciencies that result when participants fail to coordinate
on one of the simultaneous game’smultiple positive-contribution equilibria. Thus the success
of sequential play with large ϐixed costs may partly be explained by the fact that the coordi-
nation problem is greater in this case.
While sequential play helps donors coordinate on positive provision outcomes, one needs
to be wary of the risk associated with allowing for too low an initial contribution. The pres-
ence of ϐixed costs enables the ϐirst contributor to free ride off of the second contributor, and
to fully extract the second mover’s beneϐit from provision. Full exploitation of this advantage
may cause second contributors to object to the unequal division of the burden and result in
a failure to provide the public good. Examining the sequential game with both low and high
35 Perhaps the excessive contributions seen in connections with the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the
Asian tsunami in 2004 would have been smaller if donations had been made in a more sequential manner.
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ϐixed costs, we found evidence to suggest that the success of the sequential play in our case
was sensitive to the share of funds provided by the ϐirst contributor.
Research has proposed several explanations for why fundraisers rely on sequential solic-
itation strategies. Many of these explanations reduce the ϐirst contributor’s inherent ability
to free ride off of second contributors in a public good game.36 By contrast, the introduction
of ϐixed costs increases the ϐirst mover advantage inherent in the public good game, and a po-
tential risk of sequential play is that provision may fail unless the fundraiser is successful in
convincing initial contributors to donate a fair share. Perhaps this concern for equity helps
explain why fundraisers have speciϐic goals for how large seed money contributions need to
be as a share of the overall fundraising goal.37
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2.0 PROVISION POINTMECHANISMS AND THE OVERPROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
CO-AUTHORS:
Massimo Morelli, Columbia University
Lise Vesterlund, University of Pittsburgh
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Fundraising campaigns fornon-proϐit causesoften feature goals for total contributions. Some-
times these goals are binding in the sense that if the the campaign fails to raise total contri-
butions that exceed the goal then pledges are not collected or contributions are refunded.
For instance, Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) present a case from Manitoba, Canada, where the
New Democratic Party in 1980 and 1985 sent letters to its larger contributors soliciting ad-
ditional funds to mount an upcoming election campaign. The letters stipulated that a target
had been set at $200, 000 and that the New Democratic Party would refund all contributions
if the target were not reached by a certain date. Both campaigns succeeded.1 The ability of
a fundraiser to collect pledges or offer refunds contingent on a goal for total contributions
has been investigated both theoretically and experimentally, e.g., Admati and Perry (1991),
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), and Andreoni (1998).
Though collecting pledges contingent on a goal appears to be an innocuous power, it gives
fundraisers the ability to artiϐicially truncate the production function for the public good. If a
fundraiser can commit to refunding contributions that fail to meet a threshold, then donors
1 Other examples are presented in Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) as well as in Marks and Croson (1998) and
Marks et al. (1999).
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view production as having a step-wise structure. Contributions that fail to exceed the thresh-
old do not increase production. As contributions cross the threshold, production of the public
good increases discontinuously. Such an environment presents donors with incentives that
are quite similar to those in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). They show that a discrete public
good can be efϐiciently provided by a fundraiser employing a refund rule. The fundraiser
takes production of the public good as given and operates the mechanism to collect pledges
and provide the public good. We aim to understand how a fundraiser with the ability to em-
ploy such thresholds chooses to use them and the resulting impact on provision of the public
good.
The contribution game we study is similar to that commonly examined in the literature
on private provision of public goods: A ϐinite number of potential donors simultaneously al-
locate income between consumption of a private good and contributions to a public good,
and individuals’ utility depends only on the consumption levels of private and public goods.2
With continuous production it is predicted that the result is under-provision of the public
good. Added to this environment is a contributionmaximizing fundraiser who can artiϐicially
truncate the production function. This truncation is secured by setting a threshold for total
contributions, andby allowingdonors tomake contributionpledges contingent on the thresh-
old being reached. Alternatively the fundraiser may collect contributions and refund them if
they fall short of the goal.3
The primary result of the paper is that a fundraiser who can commit to such a strategy
always chooses to set a threshold, and that the chosen threshold is “too high.” At the equi-
librium of this game more public good is produced than at any outcome in the core of the
game; we consider this over-provision. This result does not strictly depend on the fundraiser
committing to zero production of the public good if the threshold is not met or exceeded. We
extend the model to allow the charity to run a second campaign if the threshold is not met.
This campaign has no threshold, all contributions are accepted and used to produce the pub-
lic good. At the equilbirium of this gamemore public good is produced than at some outcome
in the core of the game; we consider this not under-provison.
2 See for example the seminal work of Bergstrom et al. (1986)
3 Marks et al. (1999) argue that these two mechanisms are isomorphic.
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The equilibria that exhibit over-provision are not the unique Nash equilbria of the game.
However, theseover-provisionequilibria are theonly equilbria that are subgame, undominated-
perfect equilbria. This reϐinement is adapted from the undominated-perfect equilibrium re-
ϐinement from Bagnoli and Lipman (1989).
The behavioral assumptions of the reϐinement are not a theoretical curiousity. Experi-
mental results strongly support the equilibrium reϐinements used to select the equilibrium
outcome. When possible, inefϐicient over-provision occurred in 82 percent of cases overall.
The cases in which provision did not occur appear to result frommis-coordination on how to
reach the threshold, not a belief that over-provision would not occur..
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model and de-
scribe the contribution game. Section 2.3 describes the main theoretical results. Then in
section 2.4 we extend the model to allow for further contributions in the event the threshold
is not reached and contributions are refunded. Section 3.4 discusses a laboratory experiment
testing the models implications and presents the results. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 THE MODEL
Themodel is one in which the underlying production technology of the public good is contin-
uous, where a contribution maximizing fundraiser artiϐicially truncates the production func-
tion by setting aminimum threshold for total donations. We call this game the threshold game.
If the threshold is not reached, all contributions are returned to the respective donors. The
outcomes that can be supported hinge on the outside option of the donors. In the simplest
andmost extreme case, the fundraiser commits to not producing the public good unless sufϐi-
cient funds are raised, hence the outside option is no production and donors allocate all their
endowment to the private good. At the other extreme, if the fundraiser cannot refuse any
contributions then in the event that funds fall short of the threshold the outcomes coincide
with those of a standard continuous voluntary contribution game. In this sectionwe consider
the simplest case where the fundraiser can commit to no production of the public good if the
threshold is not met. In the next section we will consider a more general model that allows
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for another round contributions without a threshold in the event the threshold is not met.
2.2.1 Agents, Utility, and Production
There are n+ 1 agents in the model. A set of donors, I , who number n 2 N, and a fundraiser,
c. The donors, indexed by i 2 I , are endowed withmi 2 R++ of a private good. Each donor i
values the private good and has altruistic preferences over the public good determined by her
utility function, ui : [0;mi] R+ ! R. In the expression ui(x;G), x denotes an amount of the
private good and G an amount of the public good. We assume that ui is strictly concave, and
strictly monotone. Additionally, assume that both the public and private goods are normal
goods for all donors.
Additionally, assume that production of the public good is a strictly increasing, continuous
function of contributions. Hence without loss of generality, we treat the sum of contributions
of the private good,Pi2I gi, as the public good itself.4 The fundraiser seeks to maximize total
contributions to the public good, uc :
Q
i2I [0;mi]! R, uc(g) = 0g.
Notation. We often need to refer to a vector, for example of contributions g 2Qi2I [0;mi], and
the sum of its elements,Pi2I gi. We prefer the succinct notation, 0g = Pi2I gi, where  is an
appropriately sized vector of ones.
2.2.2 Agent’s Decision Problems
The fundraiser chooses a threshold for contributions, T 2 R+, such that any vector of contri-
butions which totals less than T is refunded to donors. The provision level of the public good
is then determined by
G (0g; T ) =
8><>:
0g if 0g  T
0 otherwise
:
When the threshold is notmet the contributions are refunded and no public good is provided.
4 Any increasing production function can be viewed as a monotone transformation of the utilities and thus
represents the same preferences.
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Once a threshold has been selected by the fundraiser, the n donors simultaneously con-
tribute to the public good, choosing gi 2 [0;mi]. If the contributions, g, exceed the threshold
T , 0g  T , then the payoff to the fundraiser is uc(g) = 0g and each donor receives a payoff of
ui(mi   gi; 0g). Otherwise no production of the public good occurs, the fundraiser receives a
payoff of uc(g) = 0 and each donor receives a payoff of ui(mi; 0).
2.3 EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
2.3.1 Efϐiciency and Over-provision
Before developing the equilibrium results we need to be precise about what constitutes over-
provision of the public good. Over-provision implies that the amount of public good produced
is larger than the socially efϐicient amount of public good under the continuous production
function; society could be made better off producing less public good. We assume that the
socially efϐicient allocation is an element of the core, as deϐined in deϐinition 1.5
Deϐinition 1. s  I is said to be a blocking coalition of g0 2 Qi2I [0;mi] if 9g 2 Qi2s[0;mi]
such that
1. uj(xj; 0g)  uj(mj   g0j; 0g0), for all j 2 s,
2. uk(xk; 0g) > uj(mk   g0k; 0g0), for at least one k 2 s,
3. Pi2s xi Pi2s(mi   gi).6
The core of threshold game X , C(X)  Qi2I [0;mi], is the set of all contribution vectors not
blocked by any coalition.
Wedenote the least amount of public goodprovided at a core outcomebyCmin = ming2C(X)0g.
Similarly, we denote the maximum amount of public good provided at a core outcome by
Cmax = maxg2C(X)
0g. Provision, G, of the public good can be broken into three regions: a) G 2
[0; Cmin), under-provides the public good, b)G 2 [Cmin; Cmax], does not under-provide the pub-
lic good, c) andG 2 (Cmax;1), over-provides the public good.
5 We adapt our deϐinition of the core from Bagnoli and Lipman (1989).
6 Note that redistribution of endowments is allowed; the bounds for consumption are based on the total
endowment of the coalition.
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2.3.2 Undominated-perfect, subgame equilibria
There are many Nash equilibria of the threshold games we examine. Our results employ
an equilibrium reϐinement borrowed from Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), undominated-perfect
equilibrium. We adapt their reϐinement to ϐit our sequential move environment.
Theundominated-perfect equilibriumreϐinement is similar to trembling-handperfection.
However, trembles to strictly dominated strategies are not permissible. It is as though strictly
dominated strategies are removed from the game, and then trembling-hand perfection is con-
sidered. Our subgame, undominated-perfect equilibrium strengthens subgame perfection by
requiring the subgame equilibria to be undominated-perfect equilibria.
2.3.3 Equilibria
The main result, proposition 1, states that the unique outcome of a threshold game is one of
over-provision of the public good. The addition of a fundraiser with the non-coercive ability
to set thresholds and offer refunds not only corrects any inefϐiciency from too few contribu-
tions, but introduces a new inefϐiciency from extracting too many contributions. A formal
discussion and proof of proposition 1 is placed in section A.4; here we give the intuition and
illustrate a parametric example.
Proposition 1. Let X =
n
c; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be a threshold game. Then there exists an equilib-
rium outcome, fT; gg 2 R+;Qi2I [0;mi]	, in which total contributions, 0g, are greater than in
any otherNash equilibriumof any subgame. fT; gg is the unique subgame, undominated-perfect
equilibrium outcome in any game in which a Nash equilibrium exists for every T 0 2 R+.
Moreover, fT; gg, over-provides the public good.
The existence of the equilibrium outcome, fT; gg, is established by constructing indiffer-
ence curves for the donors to ϐind their maximum willingness-to-pay for a given level of the
public good. With only two donors the equilibrium can be illustrated rather well. Figure 8
illustrates the indifference curves for a two player, symmetric threshold game. The x-axis
marks the contributions of donor 1, and the y-axis marks the contributions of donor 2. In the
diagram, a ϐixed level of total contributions would be a line of slope 1.
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Each indifference curve marks the set of contributions that make the respective donor
indifferent between contributing to the public good and consuming all of her endowment
as private good. These are precisely the points where the donors’ incentive compatibility
constraint binds. A donor considering a contribution of gi tomeet the threshold, T , compares
her utility if the threshold is met to her utility from no provision,
ui(mi   gi; T )  ui(mi; 0)  0: (2.1)
When total contributions just meet the threshold, T , then contributing gi is a best response
as long as the left-hand side equation 2.1 is non-negative.
Finding the largest equilibrium threshold is then a matter of moving out from the origin
until the indifference curves intersect; marked as fT; gg in ϐigure 8. Our assumptions of con-
tinuity and monotonicity ensure that an intersection will occur. At such a point total contri-
butions precisely equal the threshold and each donor is best responding to the threshold and
the other contributions. If there are multiple such points (there is only one in ϐigure 8) then
the fundraiser selects the one farthest from the origin. They are sufϐicient, but not necessary
conditions for the public good to be over-provided.
Over-provision at the equilibrium outcome, fT; gg, results from the fact that donor sur-
plus is fully extracted; each donor is indifferent between contributing and receiving the public
good and giving nothing and consuming her endowment. By assumption, the zero provision
outcome is not in the core of the game. It follows that each donor prefers any core contribu-
tion vector to the zero provision outcome. Hence there is always some positive donor surplus
for contributions within the core. Hence T can be increased somewhat beyond any level of
contributions in the core by extracting that surplus. Therefore, T > Cmax and the public good
is over-provided in equilibrium.
Proving that fT; gg is the unique subgame, undominated-perfect outcome is more subtle.
The logic for two donors extends basically unchanged to any ϐinite number of donors. Con-
sider a threshold, ~T , that is just below the equilibrium T , so that the donors strictly prefer
meeting the threshold to the no provision outcome.7 This situation is illustrated in ϐigure 9.
7 The subgame for this threshold has the same structure as the economy in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989). The
logic of the proof for establishing uniqueness in the subgame is the same and readers are encouraged to see their
approach.
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Any contribution vector that sums to the threshold is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
outcome. At these points each donor’s contribution is a strict best response and so each re-
mains a best response for small enough trembles to other strategies. However, contributions
of (0,0) are also trembling-hand perfect equilibrium outcomes. Since neither donor will meet
the threshold on her own, contributing zero is a best response if the other donor also con-
tributes zero. Contributing zero is also a strict best response if the other donor contributes
more than the threshold. As in that case contributing any positive amount for more of the
public goodwould be outweighed by the costs. Hence trembles that placeweight on the other
donor contributing in excess of the threshold can support the (0,0) outcome.
The trembles that support (0,0) as a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium outcome place
weight on contributions that are strictly dominated; no donor is ever willing to contribute
more than the threshold. If dominated contributions are removed from consideration, the
possible outcomes are greatly reduced; as illustrated in ϐigure 9b. On the set of undominated
contributions, contributing zero is not a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium outcome. Con-
tributing zero is never a strict best response to undominated contributions. The the donor
does strictly better by contributing a positive amount and having a chance of getting more
than the outside option u(m; 0).
The above reasoningensures that thresholds slightly belowT will bemet in anyundominated-
perfect equilibrium of the subgame. The uniqueness of the outcome fT; gg comes from the
fundraiser maximizing collected contributions. Undominated-perfect equilibrium strategies
in the subgame must meet thresholds that can be arbitrarily close to T . As no thresholds
larger than T will be met, the only threshold that maximizes contributions is T . The unique-
ness of the contribution vector, g, comes from extracting the whole surplus from each donor;
there can be only one largest compatible contribution from each donor.
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The origin is part of each donor’s the indifference set, but is not connected to the
indifference curves. The donors strictly prefer to consume some of their endowment as
public good so it is only after contributing more than their preferred amount that utility
falls back to the level at the origin. Hence, the indifference curves cut the axes away from
the origin.
Figure 8: Two donor, symmetric threshold example.
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Figure 9: Illustration of the removal of dominated contributions.
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2.4 WEAKENING THE FUNDRAISER
The over-provision results thus far (proposition 1) hinge to some extent on the assumption of
the zero-provision outcome being the alternative for donors. It may be unrealistic to assume
that the fundraiser can commit to refusing any subsequent contributions; implying that if
the fundraising campaign fails no public good is provided. Suppose instead that the “status
quo” is to have the public good provided without active fundraising. The fundraiser sets no
threshold, but merely collects contributions that are offered. Then the environment is that of
a classic contribution game similar to that studied in Bergstrom et al. (1986).
The anticipated contribution for a simultaneous contribution game is the Nash equilib-
rium, g?. The assumptions we have made thus far ensure that such a Nash equilibrium exists
and is unique. Requiring subgame perfection of the outcome of the contribution gamemeans
we can ϐix its outcome to the Nash outcome. Then, given a threshold T , from the donors’
perspective the provision of the public good follows,
G (0g; T ) =
8><>:
0g if 0g  T
0g? otherwise
:
Once a threshold has been selected by the fundraiser, the n donors simultaneously contribute
to the public good, choosing gi 2 [0;mi]. If the contributions, g, exceed the threshold T , 0g 
T , then the payoff to the fundraiser is uc(g) = 0g and each donor receives a payoff of ui(mi 
gi; 
0g). Otherwise, the fundraiser receives a payoff of uc(g?) = 0g? and each donor receives a
payoff of ui(mi   g?i ; 0g?). We call this game the extended-threshold game.
Proposition 2 states that the unique equilibrium outcome of an extended-threshold game
does not under-provide the public good, i.e., the total collected, 0g, is larger than Cmin.8 By
improving the alternative available to donors, the limits on provisionweaken. Over-provision
is no longer guaranteed, only that the amount of public goodwill not be under-provided. Note
that this is only a lower-bound on provision. For example, if there exists a Pareto optimal
contribution vector then the core of the game reduces to a singleton, thePareto optimal vector.
Then over-provision is guaranteed.
8 The result extends beyond the Nash alternative outcome, to any alternative that is not in the core of the
corresponding threshold game.
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Proposition 2. LetX =
n
c; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be an extended-threshold game. Then there exists an
equilibrium outcome, fT; gg 2 R+;Qi2I [0;mi]	, in which total contributions, 0g, are greater
than in anyotherNash equilibriumof any subgame. fT; gg is the unique subgame, undominated-
perfect outcome in any game in which a Nash equilibrium exists for every T 0 2 R+.
Moreover, fT; gg, does not under-provide, or over-provides the public good.
The proof of proposition 2 is quite similar to the proof of proposition 1. The indifference
conditions need to be adjusted to match the new alternative outcome,
ui(mi   gi; T )  ui(mi   g?i ; 0g?)  0:
Then existence and uniqueness are established in the same manner. The result that fT; gg,
does not under-provide the public good follows from the fact that g? is alwaysweakly inferior
to a contribution vector in the core. There always exists a contribution vector in the core of
the corresponding threshold game that is preferred to the Nash contribution by every donor.
Then it is guaranteed that 0g > Cmin.
2.5 AN EXPERIMENT
While the existence of over-provision in these models relies on simple, robust mechanisms,
the over-provision outcome coexists with zero provision outcomes that do not survive the
undominated perfect equilibrium reϐinement. Reϐinements of this type are in some sense
an assumption on behavior. We have assumed that agents prefer strategies that are robust to
small errors in others’ actions, and that such errors are conϐined to undominated strategies. It
is perfectly rational for an agent who believes that the threshold will not bemet to contribute
zero, and if such beliefs are held in common they are self-reinforcing. If the reϐinement is not
justiϐied in practice, then the over-provision outcome may not occur or may occur so infre-
quently as to be safely ignored. The extent towhichwe can justify reϐining the set of equilibria
and focusing on over-provision is an empirical matter we address with experiments.9
9 The undominated perfect equilibrium reϐinement was experimentally examined in Bagnoli and Mckee
(1991). The authors ϐind strong support for the reϐinement in their environment; in which the public good
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In order to examine whether and how likely over-provision occurs, we implemented an
over-provision environment in the laboratory. We use a simple two treatment layout to test
the implications of the theory. The comparison is between a control environment with no
threshold and a treatment environment with an inefϐiciently large threshold. A between-
subjects, factorial design was used; each subject only participated in one session and only
one treatment was run each session.
2.5.1 Payoffs 10
In order to examine the over-provision setting in the laboratory, it must be possible to clearly
observe both Nash play and over-provision (contributions in excess of the social optimum).
For this setting, the contributions thatmaximize total payout to the group of subjects are con-
sidered the socially efϐicient contributions. The payoff function we choose must then have
interior Nash and socially optimal contribution levels. We achieve these solutions by using
a continuous, piecewise-linear function. Importantly, we introduce concavity into the payoff
function by manipulating the return to the private good, not the public good. With no thresh-
old, this results in a dominant strategy to contribute a positive amount.
Subjectswerematched into groupsof two for each roundof play. The individual’smarginal
cost to contributing to the public good is $0.10 for the ϐirst three units, $0.70 for units four
to seven, and $1.30 for units eight to twelve. Each unit contributed to the public good results
in a $0.50 return to each group member. The individual’s return from contributing is greater
than the cost from contributing for the ϐirst three units, but costs dominate thereafter. Hence
the dominant strategy is to contribute three units. The return to the group for each unit con-
tributed is 2  $0:50 = $1:00. Hence the group return to contributions is positive up to the
seventh unit. Then the payout maximizing contributions are for each group member to con-
tribute seven units. Consuming all of the endowment as private good gives a payoff of $4; the
payout maximizing outcome is $7.90.
We selected a sixteen unit threshold; two units above the socially efϐicient level of con-
comes in a single discrete amount. It has not been examined in our case of continuous provision with inefϐi-
ciently large thresholds.
10Laury and Holt (2008) contains a detailed discussion of payoff functions with interior equilibria in public
goods experiments.
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tributions, fourteen units. If the threshold level is not achieved, contributions are refunded
to the subjects. The refund rule creates a great deal of indifference in the payoffs, creating
many equilibria in which the public good is not provided. The equilibria of interest lie along
the threshold: (10, 6), (9, 7), (8, 8), (7, 9), and (6, 10). In these equilibria the public good
is provided, in fact over-provided in the sense contributions exceed the payout maximizing
contribution level. The full speciϐication can be found in ϐigure 10.
The payoffs are presented in a payoff table (see ϐigure 24, in section A.5). For simplicity
the payoff table only shows the subjects’ ownpayoffs in each cell. 11 As the game is symmetric,
the other group members’ payoffs can be found by reversing the row and column indexes.
2.5.2 Experimental Procedure
The experiments were conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory at
the University of Pittsburgh. Three sessions with a threshold of sixteen and three sessions
with no threshold were run with fourteen subjects per session for a total of eighty-four sub-
jects. Fourteen rounds of our voluntary contributionmechanismwere played in each session
with subjects randomly rematched into groups between each round of play. Three of these
rounds were randomly selected for payment; average earnings were twenty-six dollars in-
cluding a ϐive dollar show up fee.12 Sessions lasted approximately one hour.
Each session had several steps. First the instructions and payoff table were distributed
and read out loud. Then a short quiz on reading the payoff table was given to gauge the sub-
jects’ understanding. Once all subjects had completed the quiz, a solution keywas distributed.
The quiz answers were then read and demonstrated by the experimenters. Once the quiz so-
lutions had been read, a practice version of the software was played. After two rounds of
play in the practice software, the subjects began playing the fourteen rounds that counted for
payment. Subjects were then paid in private and in cash.
11 The high amount of equilibrium play seen in our experiment was surprising to us as experimenters. We
suspected it may have been partly due to the payoff tables we used which only placed the subjects’ own payoff
in each cell. In order to check this conjecture we ran another two no threshold sessions with payoff tables that
included the other group member’s payoff as well. The distribution of contributions from this second wave of
sessions appears similar to our earlier data in shape and magnitude (see ϐigure 26). Kolmogorov-Smirov and
rank sum tests for distributional differenceswere insigniϐicant aswellwith p-values of 0:67 and 0:13 respectively.
12 Three sessions were selected in order to raise subject earnings.
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Let a; b; ; ; ;  2 R++ such that  >  > , andK 2 R.
Private good payoff
s(xi) 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
xi : xi 2 [0; a)
xi + (   )a : xi 2 [a; b)
xi + (   )a+ (   )b : xi 2 [b;mi]
Implementation used
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1:3xi : xi 2 [0; 5)
0:7xi + 2 : xi 2 [5; 9)
0:1xi + 4:7 : xi 2 [9; 12]
Full utility with threshold, T
ui(gi; g i;T ) 
8><>:s(w   gi) + (gi + g i) +K : gi + g i  Ts(w) +K : gi + g i < T
Implementation used
=
8><>:s(12  gi) + 0:5(gi + g i)  5:6 : gi + g i  16s(12)  5:6 : gi + g i < 16
Figure 10: Piecewise Linear Utility with Diminishing Marginal Value of the Private Good
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The quiz consists of reporting the payoffs earned by the subject and her other groupmem-
ber for several contribution levels above and below the threshold level.13 The quiz questions
were the same for both treatments, though the answers varied according to the underlying
payoff function. Outcomes that we anticipated occurring in actual play (Nash outcomes and
Pareto outcomes)were not included in the quiz to avoid priming the subjects. After all quizzes
were completed a solution key was distributed. The solutions were then worked through on
a payoff table, temporarily projected on a white-board for this purpose.
Once the solutions had been worked through, two practice rounds of the software were
played. During the rounds subjects did not interact and the rounds did not count towards
payment. The other player was ϐictional and was set to always contribute four units. The
subjects were informed of this ahead of time and told that the purpose of the rounds was to
familiarize them with the software interface.14
After the practice rounds the rounds that counted for paymentwere played. These rounds
proceeded quickly; typically taking less than ϐifteenminutes. After the rounds had been com-
pleted a monitor was selected from among the subjects to select the rounds that counted for
payment by drawing numbers from a “hat”.
2.5.3 Results
2.5.3.1 No Threshold The Nash prediction for contributions in the no threshold condi-
tion is three units. Three is a strictly dominant strategy and is thus a best response to any
beliefs about the other contribution in the one period game.15 The Nash prediction for con-
tributions is operationalized in hypothesis 5.
13 One consequence of our design choices is that a subject’s cost can exceed their endowment (the payoff
received from contributing zero to the group account); in effect they borrow against earnings from the group
account. While it is impossible to know how many subjects may have been troubled by this, quiz responses
indicate that the majority of subjects understood how their contributions would translate into ϐinal earnings.
Average scores on the quiz were 87% and 98% in each of the treatments with 55% and 88% of the subjects
receiving perfect scores. We suspect that part of the discrepancy in scores is due to the fact that in the threshold
treatment many of the payoffs are the same, $4.00. Hence even carelessness in reading the payoff table often
results in a correct answer.
14 The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
15 Though subjects were randomly rematched to minimize any repeated game effects, if subjects believed
future contributions could be affected by current contributions the best response may differ from three.
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Hypothesis 5. Mean individual contributions in no threshold treatment are three units, NT =
3.
In order to test hypothesis 5 we form a 95% conϐidence interval of bootstrapped mean
contributions. Bootstrapping the mean allows us to provide a nonparametric conϐidence
interval. We use only contributions from round one in order to provide the most statisti-
cally conservative estimates. Round one has both the lowest amount of three unit contribu-
tions and only contains behavior that occurred prior to any interaction within the experi-
ment. The bootstrapped mean contribution is 3.76 with a 95% percent conϐidence interval
of ci = [3:33; 4:29]. As the interval does not contain 3 we can reject hypothesis 5, that mean
individual contributions are three units.
Though hypothesis 5 is rejected, 95% of contributions in round 1 are between 3 and 7
units. These contributions are the Pareto improving contributions. This is consistent with
subjects understanding and responding to the payoff structure.
The most striking aspect of the subjects’ behavior is the large proportion of equilibrium
play in all sessions. Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of actions pooled across all rounds
and sessions in the no threshold treatment. Equilibrium contributions constitute 77 percent
of all contributions in the no threshold sessions. Though play of the dominant strategy did
increase over time to 86 percent, even in the ϐirst round 62 percent of actions in the control
sessions were at the dominant strategy, a contribution of three units to the public good (see
ϐigure 12).
In addition to the high levels of equilibrium play, the typical pattern of contributions seen
in linear VCMdesigns of over contribution in early rounds and signiϐicant decreases over time
is onlyweaklymatched in our data. A randomeffects regression of individual contributions in
the no threshold treatment against a constant and round does indicate a signiϐicant decrease
of -0.0214 units per round (see table 5). However, the relative magnitude of the change is
small. The estimate amounts to less than one percent of the overall mean contribution per
round.
Comparing our design with others in the literature suggests the source of the equilibrium
behavior comes from the piecewise-linear payoffs.16 Payoffs with interior dominant strategy
16 Bracha et al. (2010) uses a similar payoff function and also shows signiϐicant equilibrium play.
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equilibria were initially conjectured to induce greater equilibrium play and a number of stud-
ies have used quadratic payoffs with interior dominant strategy equilibria (see van Dijk et al.
(2002); Falkinger et al. (2000); Gronberg et al. (2009); Keser (1996); Sefton and Steinberg
(1996); Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001)). However none report equilibrium behavior in
line with our ϐindings. We conjecture that the simple presentation the piecewise linear form
allows reduces subject confusion.
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Figure 11: Distribution of individual contributions in no threshold, T = 0, treatments
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Figure 12: Equilibrium play, contributing 3 units, by round in no threshold treatment.
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2.5.3.2 Threshold Nash analysis does not provide a sharp prediction for individual con-
tributions in the presence of a threshold. In our threshold treatment, there are multiple
threshold outcomes that theory predicts should survive the equilibrium reϐinement. How-
ever since all the outcomes lie along the threshold, total contributions are predicted to be 16
units. The prediction for total contributions is operationalized in hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 6. Mean total contributions in threshold treatment are sixteen units, T = 16.
In order to test hypothesis 6 we again form a bootstrapped 95% conϐidence interval. As
before we use only contributions from round one in order to provide the most statistically
conservative estimates. Round one has both the lowestmean contributions and only contains
behavior that occurred prior to any interaction within the experiment. Bootstrapped mean
total contributions are 15.30with a 95%percent conϐidence interval of ci = [13:76; 16:48]. As
the interval contains 16 we cannot reject hypothesis 6, that mean total contributions are 16
units.
The distribution of contributions in the threshold treatment is quite concentrated (see
ϐigure 13). The most popular contribution, eight, constitutes 78 percent of all contributions.
The proportion of 8 unit contributions rises from 48 percent in round one to 95 percent in
round fourteen (see ϐigure 14).
The time trend of mean contributions in the threshold treatment is ϐlatter than in the no
threshold case and shows no evidence of the decreases found in linear VCM data. A random
effects regression of individual contributions in the threshold treatment shows a signiϐicant
increase of 0.17 units per round (see table 5). As in the no threshold case this magnitude is
small relative to the mean contribution, amounting to an increase of less than one percent of
the overall mean contribution per round.
The overall pattern of outcomes strongly supports the equilibrium reϐinements used to
predict the outcome. The undominated-perfect equilibrium reϐinement predicts that only
outcomes that just meet the threshold should occur in equilibria. Outcomes that exceed the
threshold are 71% of outcomes in round 1 and rise in proportion to 95% in round 14.
The stability of individual contributions in the threshold sessions belies the much more
dynamic distribution of public good provision. The probability of the public good being pro-
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vided in the threshold treatment shows an increasing trend across rounds from 62 percent
in round one to 95 percent in round fourteen (see ϐigure 15). The threshold itself appears to
be quite focal for subjects. As ϐigure 14 illustrates, 86 percent of contributions in round one
could have been part of an equilibrium that lies on the threshold. By round three 95 percent
of contributions could have been part of an equilibrium on the threshold and that proportion
does not fall below 95 percent for the remainder of the rounds (hitting 100 percent in 7 out of
11 rounds). The strong draw of the threshold equilibria does not seem surprising given that
it is where the highest payoffs are achieved and that the refund rule makes these relatively
high contributions weakly dominant. Bracha et al. (2010) uses an experimental design with
piecewise-linear payoffs and also ϐinds a similar pattern of contributions with threshold pub-
lic goods; a large concentration of contributions among threshold equilibria, and dynamic
adjustment within the set. Subjects seem to identify the set of Pareto improving outcomes
quite easily, but reaching an outcome within that set is more difϐicult.
Whatever the cause of the variance in responses in early rounds, the resulting “mismatch-
ing” of contributions causes a large proportion of outcomes to fail to meet the threshold and
have zero provision of the public good. The probability that the public good is provided is 62
percent in roundone, rising to95percent in round fourteen. Thediscontinuousnatureof pub-
lic good production causes mean provision of the public good to be much more varied within
and across rounds when compared to the no threshold treatment (see ϐigures 16 and 17).
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Figure 13: Distribution of individual contributions in threshold, T = 16, treatments
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Figure 14: Equilibrium play by round in threshold treatment.
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Regressor No Threshold Threshold
constant 3.50 6.31
(0.00) (0.00)
round -0.02 0.12
(0.04) (0.00)
a p values in parenthesis.
Table 5: Random effects of individual
contributions
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2.5.4 Discussion
The experimental data strongly support the equilibrium reϐinements used to select the over-
provision equilibrium. Total provision in the threshold sessions is statistically indistinguish-
able from the predicted 16 units. Even in the ϐirst round, almost all contributions could be
part of a threshold equilibrium, with virtually no contributions at zero. This pattern is con-
sistent with subjects’ believing the other groupmemberwould contribute a similarmoderate
amount. A belief that appears to be justiϐied based on the actual contributions.
Though the threshold provides an unambiguous increase in expected contributions, a
fundraiser contemplatingusingonemustweigh thegreateruncertainty inprovision the thresh-
old created. The uncertainty in provision is not just an issue for charities, as individual pay-
offs for subjects show a signiϐicant increasing trend of $0.12 per round in a random effects
regression, see table 6. Relative to the mean round payoff, that amounts to an increase of 2
percent per round or 24 percent over all rounds.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that the effect of thresholds could be made more pre-
dictable by introducing mechanisms to help solve the coordination problem at the threshold.
While such a mechanism may need to be complex in order to handle heterogeneity among
donors, there are indications in the data that even simplemechanisms could lead to improve-
ments. A substantialmajority of subjects contributing in the Pareto improving set (89 percent
in round one) contribute at least eight units. Hence most do not appear to be attempting to
get more than 50% of the surplus from crossing the threshold, but ϐind equitable or even
somewhat inequitable divisions acceptable.
2.6 CONCLUSION
Within economics, the anticipated outcome of an environment where a public good is paid
for through voluntary contributions is one of under-provision of the public good, i.e., larger
amounts of the public good would be Pareto improving. However, we have shown that for a
large class of voluntary contribution games we should actually anticipate over-provision of
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No Threshold Threshold
constant 3.50 7.83
(0.00) (0.00)
round -0.02 0.17
(0.00) (0.00)
a p values in parenthesis.
Table 6: Random effects regression of
individual payoff per round
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the public good. As long as the fundraiser can set a threshold for contributions and commit
to refunding contributions if the threshold is not met, then over-provision can occur.
Combining contribution refunds with a threshold for total contributions is a robust tool
to achieve over-provision. In the laboratory, contributions hew to the theory extremely well,
with over-provision of the public good occurring the vastmajority of the time. Overall 96 per-
cent of contributions were part of equilibria that secure provision above the Pareto efϐicient
level.
Equilibrium predictions of behavior proved to be quite accurate in both treatment and
control sessions of the experiment. The largest deviations from predicted outcomes occur
in early rounds of play. The multiplicity of equilibria that secure provision seems to cause
coordinationproblems for subjects, resulting in “mismatched” contributions andnoprovision
of the public good. It seems likely that reϐinedmechanisms that make coordination easier for
subjects would greatly reduce these deviations.
The canonical voluntary contribution game and our extensions highlight the inefϐicien-
cies from free-riding behavior and the continuous nature of public good provision. How-
ever, as we have shown, these can be solved with a refund rule and threshold. Failure to
provide the public good in our experiments appeared to be the result of coordination failure
and not attempted free-riding. Even in the very simple environment of our experiments, mis-
coordination greatly reduced provision in early rounds of play. The most effective method
of increasing provision of public goods may be to address informational and coordination
problems that prevent donors from reaching a goal.
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3.0 FUNDRAISING GOALS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
When charities and non-proϐits begin a fundraising campaign they often provide a goal for
total donations and an overall objective, e.g., $200 million for a new hospital. These goals
are a fairly ubiquitous part of fundraising, but they have not been studied in a game theoretic
framework. We develop a model of fundraising in which a fundraiser sets a goal to increase
contributions based on the risk attitudes of donors and production of the public good.
Goals play a particularly important role in capital campaigns (fundraising drives for par-
ticular capital expenses such as a building). Professional fundraisers suggest the ϐirst step in
such campaigns should be to conduct a feasibility study to determine how much can be col-
lected for a project (Krueger, 2010). This need for goals to be set with an understanding of
possible donations is repeatedly mentioned by fundraising guides, with one fundraiser going
so far as to say, “It is vitally important not to let ‘the tail wag the dog’ ”. These statements
suggest that goals are a strategic choice by charities. When selecting a goal for a campaign,
charities are consideringnot only thephysical production realities, but also the response from
donors.
Current economic models of fundraising for discrete or discontinuous public goods allow
goals to play a role in coordinating donations. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) develop amodel of
discrete public goods in which incrementally increasing goals can achieve efϐicient provision
of the public good. In more recent models, such as Andreoni (1998) or Marx and Matthews
(2000), it is reasonable to interpret goals as identifying a point of discontinuity in production
of the public good.1 An announced goal could be used to coordinate donations in order to
1 Note that these models do not speciϐically address announced goals. We believe this is themost reasonable
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push total contributions beyond the discontinuity.
The role of goals is less clear inmodels of continuouspublic goods. Bergstromet al. (1986)
shows that a large class of public goods games have a unique equilibrium; eliminating any role
for coordination. If goals for continuous public goods are to be studied as a fundraising tool,
an extension to current public goods models is needed.
In order to expand the role of announced goals and the fundraiserswho select them, goals
need to inϐluence donors’ incentives. One possible capability suggested by observation of an-
nouncements for capital campaigns is information transmission. A new project announce-
ment with a goal is typically accompanied by a fairly detailed description of the project. For
example, the fundraising drive for a new hospital would not be complete without a location,
scale model, and allocation of the space between ofϐices, laboratories, and patient rooms.
Providing information about the public good with the goal may have an impact on contri-
butions through an increase in the tangibility of the project. Cryder and Loewenstein (2011)
provides an overview of how more tangible fundraising appeals generate greater contribu-
tions. Appeals that provide greater details on particular recipients of aid, or the impact of
the particular contribution, consistently generate greater contributions. One example, pro-
vided in Cryder and Loewenstein (2011), is a campaign by Procter andGamble to raisemoney
toward eliminating newborn tetanus, a leading cause of newborn deaths in developing coun-
tries. The campaign was co-marketed with Proctor and Gamble’s Pampers brand of dispos-
able diapers. Part of the proceeds from each purchase of Pampers diapers went to providing
vaccines to ϐight newborn tetanus. In South Africa, the campaign used the slogan “1 Pack = 1
Vaccine” and it was one of the most successful in the company’s history, as measured by sales
and consumer attitudes. A competing campaign launched in other countries with the slogan
“1 Pack Will Help Eradicate Newborn Tetanus Globally” was much less successful.
A similar phenomenon is documented by studies examining how goals to motivate em-
ployees should be set by businessmanagers. In many cases the impact of a goal on increasing
productivity is related to the goal’s speciϐicity (Latham and Locke, 1991; Latham and Yukl,
1975). For example, a goal that speciϐies increasing production to 100 units a week is more
effective than a goal of simply increasing production.
model counterpart to goals in these models.
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Themechanism throughwhich tangibility increases donations or effort is not entirely un-
derstood. In some cases providing information on particular recipients appears to increase
demand for the public good by sparking an emotional reaction in the donor. The donor cares
more about the recipient after being informed and so receives greater beneϐit from her dona-
tion. Another portion of the increase seems due to an increase in perceived impact of the do-
nation. Both in the sense that the marginal productivity of a contribution may be higher, and
that the giver’s own donation is directly responsible for helping a recipient (Duncan, 2002).
The donor does not necessarily care more about the recipient or cause, but she expects do-
nations to be more effective and she beneϐits by knowing her own donation has helped.
Though the information in a goal announcement can inϐluence giving in a number ofways,
in ourmodel the effect of the goal is limited to reducing uncertainty in production of the public
good. The goal carries with it some assurance that a particular amount of the public good can
be obtained for the goal level of contributions. As a consequence, the model only relies on
risk-aversion among donors to motivate an increase in giving. Complementary impacts, like
increasing the tangibility of the project, wouldmake announcing goals evenmore effective as
fundraising tools and would not change the model’s implications. Risk-aversion can be seen
as a proxy for other effects that can be heterogeneous among donors and increase a donor’s
expected utility if the goal is achieved.
Of course to reduce uncertainty at the goal requires that the public good itself is uncertain.
Uncertainty in public goods may arise from the nature of the public good itself, or from the
production process the charity employs. For example, consider the construction of a new
hospital. Many design factors impact the ϐinal costs and beneϐits of the facility. The building
may be located on costly urban land or at a cheaper satellite location. The design may be
anything from a bog-standard commercial building to a unique, boldly architected design.
From the perspective of donors, these possibilities create uncertainty about the provision of
the public good to which they are being asked to contribute. At any given level of donations a
donor does not know what trade-offs will be made to complete the building.
Uncertainty in production of the public good creates a unique role for announced goals.
When the goal for the new building is announced with a site selected and a scale-model, the
uncertainty for donors is reduced if the goal is reached. When contributions lie above or
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below the announced level, uncertainty will still be higher as donors and even the designers
do not know what trade-offs will be made to bring costs into line. For risk-averse donors
the reduced uncertainty at the goal brings additional beneϐits over other contribution levels.
In theory, they should be willing to contribute somewhat more than they otherwise would in
order to reach the announced goal. In turn, contributionmaximizing fundraisers who foresee
this advantage can adjust their plans accordingly and announce somewhat larger goals.
We model the goal setting process in a two-stage game in which the fundraiser moves
before donors, setting a goal for donations. We dub the game, the goal game. With weak as-
sumptions, theory guarantees that subgame-perfect equilibriumcontributions increasewhen
charities announce goals.
The greater contributions with an announced goal drive higher equilibrium payoffs for
donors and the fundraiser. In order to investigate to what extent these comparative stat-
ics depend on the equilibrium assumptions, a laboratory implementation of the experiment
is developed. Findings from the laboratory experiment indicate announced goals increase
donations and the likelihood of donations reaching the goal level. Reducing the uncertainty
at the goal level does not further increase these measures. However, donor behavior does
change signiϐicantly as coordination on the symmetric goal outcome increases dramatically.
Consequently, donors earn signiϐicantly more when playing the goal game.
Practical feasibility sharply limits the number of donors who can participate in a sin-
gle game in the laboratory. We turn to computer simulations in order to better understand
the comparative statics of the goal game with a large number of heterogeneously endowed
donors. The simulations indicate the increases in total donations are substantial for charities
announcing a goal; up to a 73% increase. More dramatically the set of donors increases from
less than 1%of the populationwithout a goal, to 100%when a goal is announced. These addi-
tional donors drive the increase in donations and providemore than 99%of the total donated
when a goal is announced. The additional donations are drawn from all endowment levels,
with up to 38% drawn from the two-thirds of donors with the smallest endowments.
In the following section our theoretical model of fundraising is developed. In section 3.3
theoretical results on the equilibrium outcomes are presented. Section 3.4 develops a labora-
tory implementation of the model and discusses the experimental ϐindings. Numerical simu-
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lation results from goal-game implementations with large numbers of heterogeneous donors
are presented in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 MODEL
Ourmodel canbest beunderstoodas amodiϐicationof the voluntary contributiongame (VCG).
There is a single charity which produces a public good through donations of a private good by
a ϐinite number of potential donors. The donors simultaneously choose an amount to donate
to production of the public good from their endowment of the private good.
The important difference lies in the charity’s action space. The charity possesses a tech-
nology to reduce the uncertainty of production at any positive level of donations, but only at
one level.2 For example, if the charity chooses to reduce theuncertainty at $1,000,000 then for
total donationswhich lie in [0; 1; 000; 000)or (1; 000; 000;1)productiondoes not beneϐit from
reduced uncertainty. We term this point of reduced uncertainty a “goal”. The charity moves
before the donors, selecting the goal, which becomes common knowledge for the donors.
After the goal is selected, the donors allocate their endowments between a private and
public good. The allocated donations are then used to produce the public good. If the goal
has been met, the uncertainty in production of the public good is reduced. Otherwise the
uncertainty in production of the public good is higher. The donors then consume their allo-
cations of the private good and the realized provision of the public good.
We call the complete, two-stage game the goal game. Often we also need to make refer-
ence to the VCG that shares the common components of a goal game: utilities, donors, and
production components. We refer to this related game as the no goal game.
Before proceeding we need to deϐine some notation used in the remainder of the paper.
Weoftenneed to sumtheelements of vectors, usually donationvectors. Weprefer the succinct
2 Restricting the reduced uncertainty to a point is a technical restriction for locating equilibria. The restric-
tion should not effect the set of outcomes in practical implementations. In equilibrium, the charity is extracting
the greatest possible amount of donations from donors. The marginal rate of substitution between the public
and private good is less than one for all donors under the non-goal distribution F . Suppose that uncertainty
was reduced for all levels of donations greater than the announced goal. Only if the distribution F 0 is extreme
enough to create increasing returns and a marginal rate of substitution greater than one will the equilibrium
move beyond the goal. Otherwise, a goal at a single point can achieve the same amount of total donations.
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notation, 0d, where  is a vector of ones andd a vector of donations.  is not rigorously deϐined
before use, but the context should make clear its length in particular cases.
3.2.1 Timing
The charity takes the ϐirst move in the game, selecting a non-negative real number to be the
goal. Once the goal has been chosen it becomes public knowledge among the donors.
The donors have the next move. In the same manner as in the VCG, the donors simulta-
neously decide how to allocate their endowments between private and public consumption.
After donations have been selected, the random input is realized (according to the reduced
uncertainty distribution only if the goal ismet), and production of the public good takes place.
Note that each goal leads to a subgame of the goal game.
3.2.2 Agents, Utility, and Production
There are n + 1 agents in the model. A set of donors, I , who number n 2 N, and a charity,
c. The donors, indexed by i 2 I , are endowed withmi 2 R++ of a private good. Each donor
i values the private good and has altruistic preferences over the public good determined by
her utility function, ui : [0;mi]R! R. In ui(x;G), x denotes an amount of the private good
and G an amount of the public good. We assume that all donors have strictly concave utility
functions as we are interested in an environment with risk averse agents.
The charity seeks tomaximize total donations.3 The public good is produced according to
a production function with a random input, G : R+
 ! R, where 
  R. In G(D;!); D 2
R+; ! 2 
, D denotes total donations of the private good and ! the realized value of the
random input. We will assume that G is concave and strictly increasing in both arguments.
The random input, ! 2 
, has distribution function F : 
 ! [0; 1], when donations do not
match the goal. Whendonations domatch the goal,! has distribution functionF 0 : 
! [0; 1],
which second-order stochastically dominates F .4
3 Were the charity to maximize the public good none of the theoretical conclusions would change. However
it should be noted that under concave production the charity would not necessarily be risk neutral.
4 Importantly for the analysis that follows, we have implicitly assumed in the deϐinitions that the distribu-
tions F; F 0 are independent of the level of production. This is to ensure the properties of the utility functions
hold under expectation as well. Note that the implied distribution of the public good can vary with the level
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G is a highly simpliϐied stand-in for what are certainly more complicated production pro-
cesses in the real world. The input ! is intended to ϐill the role of any uncertainty for the
donors. The uncertainty may arise from some aspect of the production process the char-
ity employs; for example, prices of materials, available quantities of materials, or weather.
In some cases, ! may be thought of as capturing uncertainty in how concrete interventions
translate into a public good that cannot be easily measured. For example, it is reasonable
to think that donors care about the overall health of the population and that concern about
particular interventions like hospital facilities is driven through this more general desire. 5
3.2.3 Agent’s Decision Problems
The charity must choose the level of private good donations which will face distribution F 0,
~D 2 R+, referred to as the goal. For each goal, a donormust choose the amount of her private
good endowment to donate to the charity for production of the public good.
3.2.3.1 Donors A donor’s strategy maps every possible announcement to a donation, si :
R+ ! [0;mi]. Equilibrium conditions require that the strategies dictate best responses. The
donor is choosing between donating the best response to others’ donations and donating pre-
cisely the amount needed to match the goal. If the donation required to meet the goal is close
enough to her best response donation, then the reduced uncertainty at the goal makes meet-
ing the goal level the preferred choice.
of production. For example, if ! models the uncertain price of an input available to a charity then F may be
uniform from $0.50 to $1.50, F  U [0:5; 1:5]. Then, assuming linear production, if total donations are $10,000
then G  [6666; 20000] whereas at total donations of $100,000, G  [66666; 200000]. This example meets this
assumption. However, if the distribution of prices depends on the amount purchased, i.e., F (10000) = U [:5; 1:5]
whereas F (100000) = U [:75; 1:25], then this assumption is violated.
The assumption of independence is stronger than necessary for the results that follow. If the properties we
assume of the utility functions hold under expectation with a dependent distribution the results still hold. For
example some dependence on the level of production near zero contributions would be quite natural to model
uncertainty associated with production. If the project cannot cause actual losses to the public good, some trun-
cation of the random variable near the origin may be needed. As long as the truncated region lies below the
outcome in the no goal game then the results will be unaffected.
5 The goal of these production choices is to allow as broad amodel of uncertain production as possible, while
admitting the subtlest possible action by the charity. Hence second-order stochastic domination is the weakest
requirement to ensure that risk averse donors prefer F 0 to F . The results that follow would still hold as long as
donors strictly prefer F 0 to F . For example, if F 0 ϐirst-order stochastically dominates F , the results still hold.
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Nothing is lost mathematically by “absorbing” the production and uncertainty into the
utility function. In order to simplify notation, deϐine
vi(mi   di; ~D;Z)  EZ ui(mi   di; G( ~D; ));
where EZ denotes taking the expectation with respect to distribution Z 2 fF; F 0g.6 Then
given a goal of ~D 2 R+ and donations from others, d i, donor i’s payoffs are
(di; ~D;d i) =
8><>:vi(mi   di;
~D;F 0) if di = ~D  

~D   0d i

vi(mi   di; di + 0d i;F ) if di 6= ~D  

~D   0d i
 :
Her best response solves
max
di2[0;mi](di;
~D;d i):
Let us take the opportunity to deϐine a value function for the no-goal game,
wi(
0d i)  maxdi2[0;mi]vi(mi   di; 0d i + d;F ):
3.2.3.2 The Charity The charity seeks to maximize total donations. Given strategies for
each donor, si, the best response(s) of the charity solves
max
~D2R+
X
i2I
si( ~D):
The solutions we seek are subgame perfect equilibria. An equilibrium consists of a choice of
goal by the charity and donor strategies,

~D; s

, such that every donor is best responding to
other donations and the goal and that the charity is maximizing donations given the donor
strategies. Subgame perfection further requires that si( ~D) solves the donor’s problem for all
~D, even for goals not at the equilibrium.
6 See subsection A.6.3 for a proof that vi satisϐies the same properties as ui: is strictly increasing in both
arguments, is strictly concave, and has a continuous maximum.
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3.3 EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
The focus of this section is on characterizing total donations in subgame perfect equilibria of
the goal game; as opposed to equilibrium strategies. For simplicity we only examine pure-
strategy, equilibrium outcomes. In other words, we only consider donor strategies where a
goal ismapped to a single donation vector, as opposed to a randomdistribution over donation
vectors.7 Much of the analysis is fairlymathematical, the proofs and intermediate results have
been placed in subsectionA.6.2. In this sectionwe state themain result aswell as the intuition
behind the proofs.
Proposition 3 is the main result of this section. It establishes the existence of subgame
perfect total donations for the goal game that lie above the set of total donations collected in
a Nash equilibrium of the no-goal game.
Proposition 3. Let
n
c; F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game. Then there exists at least one
pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium, ( ~D;d) 2 R+
Q
i2I [0;mi]. Moreover, there exists
an equilibrium of the no-goal game, d? 2Qi2I [0;mi], and  > 0 such that total contributions in
every subgame perfect equilibrium are greater thanPni=1 d?i + .
As the goal game is a two stage game and we are imposing subgame perfection, our ap-
proach to proving proposition 3 uses backward induction. Given a goal, donors must reach a
Nash equilibriumvector of donations in the subgame. These are the only donation vectors the
charity considers when determining the goal to announce. Hence, the ϐirst steps in locating
equilibria concern ϐinding equilibrium total donations in the subgame for a given goal.
Identifying equilibrium total donations can be simpliϐied by noting that incentives only
differ from the no-goal game if total donations equal the announced goal. Hence, total dona-
tions in an equilibrium of the subgame either total to the announced goal ormatch an equilib-
rium of the no-goal game. Moreover, it is simple to check that any equilibrium of the no-goal
game,d?, is also equilibriumof the subgamewhen the announced goal coincideswith the total
donations, 0d?. Therefore, the set of equilibrium total donations that match the announced
7 Mixed-strategy equilibria must be discrete distributions over pure-strategy equilibrium vectors that meet
the announced goal and a vector of best responses that do not match the goal. Realized donation vectors are
bounded above by the largest elements of these vectors and below by the smallest elements of these donation
vectors.
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goal is the sameas the unconstrained set of equilibrium total donations. Weare free to impose
the constraint that total donations equal the announced goal without effecting the results.
In the subgame, the choice of a donor when in an equilibrium is
Meet the goal Or Deviate to outside
vi(mi   di; ~D;F 0) wi
 
nX
i=1
di
!
By imposing the constraint that total donations equal the announced goal, the choice of a
donor in an equilibrium of the subgame can be rewritten.
Meet the goal Or Deviate to outside
vi(mi   di; ~D;F 0) wi( ~D   di)
Hence for any potential goal, the set of incentive compatible donations (that could form an
equilibrium) can be found for each donor independently. If it happens that there exist incen-
tive compatible donations that sum to the goal then those donations and goal are a potential
equilibrium. This problem can be framed as a ϐixed-point problem and its solutions charac-
terized. Note thatmany of these solutions requiremultiple donors to simultaneously increase
donations. In these cases no single donor prefers reaching the goal on her own, and a Nash
equilibrium in the no-goal game is still an equilibrium.
Subgame perfect strategies for the donors must dictate Nash equilibria in the subgame
for every goal. Hence for every goal, ~D, donor’s strategies will lead to contributions that meet
the goal or a Nash equilibrium of the no-goal game, 0s( ~D) = ~D or s( ~D) = d?, where d? is a
Nash equilibrium of the no-goal game.
Consider the case when the no-goal game has only one equilibria, d? 2 Qi2I [0;mi]. The
charity will not announce any goals below 0d? as announcing an impossibly large goal will
collect at least as much in donations. Additionally, there is some region around 0d? where all
subgame perfect strategiesmustmeet the goal. As donors are risk averse, goals close enough
to 0d? are strictly preferred by at least one donor. Consequently, donors will always meet
these goals rather than stay at 0d?. No outcome strictly inside this region can be subgame
perfect, as the charity could deviate by announcing a slightly larger goal that must be met by
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any subgame perfect strategies. Therefore total donations collected in any subgame perfect
equilibrium are at least  > 0more than 0d?.
A short example using quadratic quasi-linear utility illustrates the process of locating an
equilibrium outcome in a goal game. For simplicity, we will focus on interior equilibria in
which every donor is contributing a positive amount. As mentioned, suppose n donors have
quadratic quasi-linear utility with a bliss point at K units of the public good and a marginal
return to private consumption of  > 0, u(m   d;G) = (m   d)   (K   G)2:8 The public
good is linear in donations and the uncertainty enters additively, G(D;!) = D + !. For
the typical, non-goal, distribution of uncertainty, F , assume that the expected value is zero
and that the second moment exists. The goal distribution of uncertainty, F 0, is actually just
certainty, placing all the weight on the expected value, zero.
With these components speciϐied, we can fold them together and write utility represen-
tations for a donor on and off a goal, v(m   di; ~D;F 0) = (m   di)   (K   ~D)2 and v(m  
di; 
0d i;F ) = (m  di)  E(K   0d i   di   !)2.
In order to solve the goal game, we ϐirst need to solve for the donor best response and
value functions in the no-goal game. These can be found readily using standard techniques.
d?i = K   0d i  

2
w(0d i) =  [m K + 0d i] + 
2
4
+ E!2
The key equation to locate a goal game equilibrium is the incentive compatibility con-
straint for donors,
ICC( ~D; di; 
0d i) = v(m  di; ~D;F 0)  w(0d i)  0:
The constraint compares the utility of meeting goal ~D by contributing di, to contributing the
best response to outside donations, d?i and not meeting the goal. Since it is safe to assume
the announced goal is met in subgame perfect equilibria, ~D = 0d i + di, we can rewrite the
constraint as, ICC( ~D; d) = v(m  di; ~D;F 0)  w( ~D   di). After algebraic simpliϐication, this
is equivalent to, ICC( ~D; d) =   ~D2 + (2K   ) ~D  K2 + K + E!2   2
4
.
8 Note that the marginal utility of the public good approaches zero as G ! K . Since the marginal utility of
the private good is greater than zero,K is beyond any Pareto efϐicient or Nash outcome of the no-goal game.
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The incentive compatibility constraint canbe solved for themaximum total donations that
can be collected in a subgame perfect outcome, Dmax = K   
2
+
p
E!2. We can also solve
the best response to ϐind the outcome without a goal, 0d = K   
2
. Here the best possible
gain to a charity using a goal,
p
E!2, is precisely the standard deviation of the uncertainty
in production. For comparison, the Pareto optimal level of donations is K   
2n
. Hence, if
p
E!2  
2
 
n 1
n

the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved.
As this example demonstrates, total donations increase when charities employ goals. The
theory underlying this prediction relies on behavioral assumptions that may not be met in
practice. In order investigate the behavioral aspects of the model, section 3.4 develops a lab-
oratory implementation in order to determine if behavior is consistent with the predictions
of the theory.
3.4 EXPERIMENT
Theory implies that more donations are collected in every subgame perfect equilibrium out-
come of any goal game. These equilibrium outcomes rely heavily on the assumption of com-
plete and common knowledge about the environment. Consider the situation a donor faces
after an equilibrium goal has been announced. Reaching the goal will be Pareto improving,
hence as long as she believes with a high enough probability that the goal will be reached, she
will increase her donation to achieve it. However, if she doubts that the goal will be reached,
she will not base her donation on achieving the goal and as a result will donate less.
The sensitivity of the outcome to beliefs suggests that equilibrium outcomes may require
time tooccur as beliefs about the strategic environmentmust converge ϐirst.9 Insteadof focus-
ing directly on equilibirum outcomes, the focus of our analysis is on the comparative statics
of the model. The model predicts that if a goal is announced that reduces the uncertainty of
production, total donations increase, the probability of reaching the goal level increases, and
9 Seely et al. (2005) reports on amodiϐied voluntary contributions gamewith similar a equilibria structure. In
their environment, one equilibrium entails high donations a common belief all donors are increasing donations,
while another has small donations and the mutual belief other donors are also donating small amounts. The
authors report that equilbrium outcomes occurred in a small minority of the cases and overall treatment effects
were weak.
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donor payoffs increase compared to the case without a goal.10 These outcomes are of prac-
tical importance to fundraisers and donors regardless of whether behavior converges to an
equilibrium outcome.
In order to test these implications, two laboratory treatments are needed. One treatment
is a voluntary contribution game with an uncertain public good; the no-goal treatment. The
second treatment implements an environment with a recommended level for total donations
and a reduction in the uncertainty of production at the recommended level; the goal-with-
reduced-uncertainty treatment. Comparing the total donations and probability of reaching
the goal from these treatments can identify the presence and magnitude of the comparative
statics.
The goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment changes two aspects of the environment
from the no-goal treatment. A goal is announced and the uncertainty at the goal is reduced.
While theory would predict no effect from a goal with no payoff consequences, experimenter
demand or moral persuasion may generate an impact from the goal regardless of the reduc-
tion in uncertainty (Croson and Shang, 2008).11 Distinguishing the effect of an announce-
ment with no payoff consequences from the effect of reducing uncertainty requires a third
treatment; the pure-goal treatment. The difference between the pure-goal treatment and the
goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment can aid in isolating the impacts from reducing un-
certainty and other mechanisms.
3.4.1 Design
In every treatment, subjects are organized into groups of two, and are randomly rematched
each round of play for thirty rounds. Subjects begin each round endowed with $7 which they
may choose to “invest” in a group account at a cost of $1.00 per unit. As required by theory,
investment in the group account is uncertain. The uncertainty in investments is introduced
as a binary lottery. When it will not result in negative amounts of the public good, a nega-
10 Theoretically if a goal is announced, the goal is reached with certainty. If a no goal is announced, the goal is
never met. Measuring the probability of reaching the goal allows for detecting smaller changes in likelihood.
11 Our announced goals may be more properly characterized as “recommended play”, though typically rec-
ommendations are directed at individuals not groups. The connection to this literature is discussed in with our
ϐindings in subsubsection 3.4.2.2.
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tive realization of the lottery results in three units being removed from the group account. A
positive realization results in three units being added to the group account. However if the
amount in the group account is less than three units, a negative realizationwill result in nega-
tive amounts of the public good. In this region, the uncertainty ismodiϐied such that a negative
realization results in the group account being reduced to zero. A positive realization doubles
the amount in the group account. Thus, while it is costly to invest, at most the investment can
be lost.
The payoffs in all treatments are a piecewise-linear function; calculated after the random
adjustment is applied. For the ϐirst seven units in the group account every group member
earns $1.20 per unit. For units above seven, every group member earns $0.40 per unit.
When taken together, the uncertainty and payoff functions interact such that in expecta-
tion, the payoffs in all treatments are piecewise-linear functionswith interiorNash andPareto
optimal outcomes. In expectation, the ϐirst four units in the group account earn every group
member $1.20 per unit. For units between four and ten, each group member earns $0.80 per
unit. For any units above ten, each group member earns $0.40 per unit.
In the treatment without a goal, the payoffs are as described above. Every subject is given
a payoff table (Earnings Table) depicting the expected earnings from any investment com-
bination and the difference between the expected earnings and the actual realization in any
round. In the pure-goal treatment, the payoffs are identical, but the instructions include a rec-
ommendation to invest a total of eight units in the group account. Additionally, the diagonal
of the payoff table where investments sum to eight units is shaded. The goal-with-reduced-
uncertainty treatment adds to the pure-goal treatment by making the return at the recom-
mended investment of eight units certain and modifying the uncertainty for investments be-
yond the goal. For investments fromeight to ten units, the uncertainty is adjusted in amanner
similar to that near zero investment. A negative realization of the lottery results in the amount
in the group account being reduced to the recommended level of eight units. A positive real-
ization of the lottery results in the “excess” amount, the units above the goal, being doubled
and added to the group account. This structure ensures that any investment at least as large
as the recommended level, ensures the group account will have at least the recommended
level when payoffs are calculated. Table 7 summarizes the design choices for the experiment.
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While the design does not have a unique Nash equilibrium, total donations are unique for
risk averse subjects. In the treatments without a reduction in uncertainty at the announced
goal, donations to the public good are predicted to total four units. In the treatment with
a reduction in uncertainty, donations to the public good are predicted to total eight units,
the recommended level. One caveat is that the Nash equilibrium predictions do not consider
uncertainty over others’ contributions, strategic uncertainty; just the uncertainty from the
binary lottery we impose, environmental uncertainty. As uncertainty about others’ actions
almost certainly occurs in the laboratory, we focus on the comparative static implications of
the Nash predictions.
Production G(D;!) =
8><>:min f!D;D + 3g : ! > 0max f0; D   3g : ! <= 0
Uncertainty ! =
8><>:0 with probability
1
2
2 with probability 1
2
Endowments m = $7
Group Size N = 2
Payoffs (x;G)  s(G) + x,
s(G) 
8><>:1:2G : G 2 [0; 7]0:4G+ 5:6 : G 2 (7; 14]
Table 7: Experimental Design
In order to collect informationon the risk preferences of the subjects in our sessions, a risk
assessment based on that of Holt and Laury (2002) was administered in all sessions. The risk
assessment was given after the contribution game and subjects had no advance knowledge it
would take place. Subjects were asked to choose between binary lotteries of $2.00 or $1.60
and $3.85 and $0.10.12 The probability of the ϐirst amount occurring varied from zero to one
12 These are the same amounts as the low payoff treatment in Holt and Laury (2002).
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hundred percent. Eleven such choices were presented at once and subjects were asked to
choose a probability to switch from the $2.00/$1.60 lottery to the $3.85/$0.10 lottery. The
interface allowed them to change their decision as many times as they desired.
A total of nine sessions were conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Lab-
oratory. In total, 124 subjects were recruited from the subject pool at the Pittsburgh Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory. It is a between-subjects design, each subject participated in
one treatment. Subjects earned an average of $18 with a guaranteed $6 show-up fee. The
experiment was conducted through software written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Each session lasted about one hour. At the start of each session, instructions were read
aloud and questions were solicited from the subjects. Thirty rounds of the appropriate treat-
ment were then played in the experimental software. Once the thirty rounds had been com-
pleted, a second set of instructionswerehandedout for a versionof the risk assessmentmech-
anism in Holt and Laury (2002). After the risk assessmentwas completed, subjects were paid
in private and in cash, their earnings from the initial treatment, the risk assessment, and the
show up fee.
3.4.2 Findings
In examining the comparative statics of the goal game we measure mean donations, the like-
lihood of reaching the goal level of eights units in donations, andmean donor earnings. These
measures show a signiϐicant trend across rounds.13 Most of the time trend is due to changes
in the no-goal treatment. In the no-goal treatment mean donations fall about one unit over
the thirty rounds. The results presented here use both the complete dataset as well as break-
ing out the last ten of the thirty rounds of data for analysis, presuming these rounds better
match the behavior of experienced agents.
Random-effects regressions are used to establish the results in order to take into account
the repeated actions of individuals. Probit regressions with random-effects errors are used
for the results on likelihood. Our results are also not qualitatively changed by controlling
for risk preferences using the collected measure. For simplicity, this control is left out of the
13 See table 12 for regression results concerning the trend across time.
73
presented regressions.
In the next subsection (subsubsection 3.4.2.1), the results from reducing uncertainty of
the public good at the goal level are compared to the results in the treatment without an an-
nounced goal. In subsubsection 3.4.2.2, the results fromannouncing a goal for total donations
and reducing uncertainty of the public good at the goal level are compared to the results from
announcing a goal with no payoff implications.
3.4.2.1 Introducing a Goal and Reduction in Uncertainty Introducing a goal with a re-
duction in uncertainty is predicted to increase all of the measures under examination. These
predictions are operationalized in hypotheses 7, 8, and 9.
Hypothesis 7. The mean donation to the public good in the no-goal treatment, ng , is less than
the mean donation in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment, g .
Hypothesis 8. The likelihood of donations reaching the goal level of eight units (d1 + d2  8)
in the no-goal treatment, png , is less than the likelihood of reaching the goal level in the goal-
with-reduced-uncertainty treatment, pg .
Hypothesis 9. Mean donor earnings in the no-goal treatment, ng , are less than mean donor
earnings in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment, g .
The data do support hypotheses 7, 8, and 9.14 All measures are signiϐicantly greater in the
goal-with-uncertainty-reduction treatment than in the no-goal treatment. The gaps expand in
the latter half of the experiment due to a stronger decrease in the no-goal treatment. Table 8
reports the results of random-effects regressions on the measures. Mean donations increase
from2.371 in the no-goal treatment to 2.950 in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment.
Coefϐicient tests indicate these means are signiϐicantly different from the Nash predictions of
two and four. However, donations in the no-goal treatment are onlymarginally different from
theNashpredictionwith a p-valueof 0.076. Meandonations are0.579units higher in the goal-
with-reduced-uncertainty treatment than the no-goal treatment. In relative terms, that is a
24 percent increase in mean donations over the treatment without a goal. As the coefϐicient
is signiϐicantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.037, we can accept hypothesis 7.
14 Session level, Wilcoxon-ranksum tests also support hypothesis 7. Mean donations are higher in the goal-
with-reduced-uncertainty treatment with a p-value of 0.05.
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All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.369 0.579
(0.104) (0.037)
Constant (No Goal) 2.744 2.371
(0.000) (0.000)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
(a) Mean donations.
All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.267 0.497
(0.044) (0.003)
Constant (No Goal) -0.755 -1.163
(0.000) (0.000)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
(b) Likelihood of reaching the goal (d1 + d2  8).
All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.540 1.680
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant (No Goal) 10.225 9.347
(0.000) (0.000)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
(c) Donor earnings.
Table 8: Regression results comparing the no-goal and goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treat-
ments (p-values reported in parentheses). 75
The likelihood of reaching the goal is far from the predicted levels of 0 and 1. The likeli-
hood is 0.238 without an announced goal and 0.339 with a goal and reduction in uncertainty.
Though the absolute change inmagnitude is about 10%, in relative terms, that is a 43 percent
increase in likelihood in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment. As the coefϐicient on
the dummyvariable for the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment is signiϐicantly different
from zero with a p-value of 0.003, we can accept hypothesis 8.
Donor earnings increase signiϐicantly in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment from
$9.35 to $11.03 in the last ten rounds. The coefϐicient of the dummyvariable for the goal-with-
reduced-uncertainty treatment is signiϐicantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.000,
thus we can accept hypothesis 9.
The data support the prediction that the introduction of a goal with reduced uncertainty
increases donations and the likelihood of donations reaching the level of the announced goal.
However, two things changed between these treatments: a goal was announced and the un-
certainty inproductionwas reducedat the goal level. In thenext section thegoal-with-reduced-
uncertainty treatment is compared to the pure-goal treatment.
3.4.2.2 Introducing a Reduction in Uncertainty Though a goal with an associated re-
duction in uncertainty of production generates signiϐicant changes in donation behavior, it
is not clear what changes are due to the reduction in uncertainty and what changes are due
to the announcement of a goal. In order to distinguish these, our design incorporates a treat-
ment inwhich a goal for total donations is announced that has no payoff consequences. Intro-
ducing a goal with a reduction in uncertainty is predicted to increase donations and increase
the probability of reaching the goal level of donations. These predictions are operationalized
in hypotheses 10, 11, and 12.
Hypothesis 10. The mean donation to the public good in the pure-goal treatment, nr , is less
than the mean donation in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment, g .
Hypothesis 11. The likelihood of reaching the goal level of eight units (d1+d2  8) in the pure-
goal treatment, pnr , is less than likelihood of reaching the goal level in the goal-with-reduced-
uncertainty treatment, pg .
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Hypothesis 12. Mean donor earnings in the no-goal treatment, nr , are less than mean donor
earnings in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment, g .
Somewhat surprisingly, the data do not support hypotheses 10 and 11. There is little
separation of the measures over the thirty rounds, with the lines crossing multiple times.
Table 9 reports results of the random-effects regressions. The random-effects estimate of the
difference in mean donations between the treatments is a statistically insigniϐicant -0.029
units; from 2.979 in the pure-goal treatment to 2.950 in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty
treatment. The coefϐicient is not signiϐicantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.929 and
we cannot reject that nr = g . Similarly, the random-effects, probit estimated likelihood
of reaching the goal level is 0.361 with an announced goal and no reduction in uncertainty,
and 0.326 with a goal and reduction in uncertainty. The associated probit coefϐicient is not
signiϐicantly different from zerowith a p-value of 0.472. Hencewe cannot reject that pnr = pg .
The data do support hypothesis 12. Earnings increase signiϐicantly with uncertainty re-
duced at the goal level from $9.53 to $11.03. Over all rounds, the increase with a reduction
in uncertainty is estimated to be even larger than the increase over the no-goal treatment.
As the coefϐicient on the dummy variable for the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment is
signiϐicantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.000, we can accept hypothesis 12.
The three outcome measures produce a puzzling picture of the treatment effects. Mean
donations and the likelihood of provision are not signiϐicantly different under a reduction in
uncertainty, suggesting that the announcement is driving the effect. Whereas, donor earnings
are only signiϐicantly different under a reduction in uncertainty, suggesting that the uncer-
tainty reduction is driving the effect. Amore detailed examination of the underlying distribu-
tion of donations reveals the cause of these differing outcomes.
Figure 18a shows the distribution of donations in the treatments with and without a re-
duction in production uncertainty at the goal level. Reducing the uncertainty in production
appears to signiϐicantly increase the proportion of donations at four units, half the announced
goal. As shown in Figure 18b, the difference in four unit donations ismaintained for almost all
of the thirty rounds of play. The plot of the proportion of four unit contributions in the goal-
with-reduced-uncertainty treatment remains above the plot of the proportion of four unit
contributions in the pure-goal treatment and they never cross. Table 10 reports the results of
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All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.030 -0.286
(0.919) (0.929)
Constant (Goal w/o Reduction) 3.083 2.979
(0.000) (0.000)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
(a) Mean donations.
All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.001 -0.155
(0.995) (0.472)
Constant (Goal w/o Reduction) -0.517 -0.570
(0.000) (0.000)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
(b) Likelihood of reaching the goal (d1 + d2  8).
All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.907 1.498
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant (Goal w/o Reduction) 9.858 9.526
(0.000) (0.000)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
(c) Donor earnings.
Table 9: Regression results comparing the pure-goal and goal-with-reduced-uncertainty
treatments (p-values reported in parentheses).78
a random-effects, probit regression on the probability of donating four units. The regression
estimate of the difference in likelihood of donations of four units is 0.303 from 0.183 in the
treatment without a reduction in uncertainty to 0.485 in the treatment with a reduction in
uncertainty. As the p-value on the coefϐicient of Ig is 0.007, we can accept that the difference
is statistically signiϐicant.
These results suggest that reducing the uncertainty at the goal is improving coordina-
tion on the symmetric goal outcome (4,4). The increased amount of symmetric play in the
goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment drives the signiϐicantly improved earnings over the
pure-goal treatment. Since payoffs are concave, asymmetric outcomes generate less total pay-
out than symmetric outcomes with the same level of donations. Hence, even though average
donations were not signiϐicantly different, the donations were being converted to dollars at a
better rate.
In environments where goals are more costly, both in terms of earnings and the number
of agents needed to coordinate, goals with reduced uncertainty may become increasing dif-
ferent frompure goals. In an environmentwith a larger number of agents and higher goal, the
ability of a single agent to inϐluence reaching the goal is diminished. Consequently, the im-
proved coordination when uncertainty is reduced may allow donors to reach goals that are
unreachable with only an announcement.
Our goal treatments (the pure-goal and goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatments) have
a number of similarities to experiments on selecting equilibria through recommending ac-
tions to subjects. The main difference is that in the literature on recommended play the rec-
ommendations are often for particular actions by individual subjects. Here the recommen-
dation is only for total contributions and is announced to all subjects in a session. Since we
used homogeneous groups of two subjects, the symmetric contribution proϐile to reach the
recommended total contribution level is trivial to calculate. We conjecture that the impact
of individual recommendations would be quite similar to recommending total contributions
and hence it is worthwhile to compare our results with those from this literature.15
In contrast to earlier laboratory experiments, the recommendations induce signiϐicant in-
15 The high incidence of four unit contributions in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment is consistent
with the symmetric equilibrium being quite salient. This is consistent with the recommendation for total con-
tributions being commonly understood by subjects as recommending the symmetric equilibrium.
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Figure 18: Donations in the pure-goal and goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatments.
All Rounds Last 10
Goal w/ Reduction 0.870 0.844
(0.007) (0.047)
Constant (Goal w/o Reduction) -0.905 -0.992
(0.000) (0.001)
Total No. of Obs. 2460 820
Total No. of Agents 82 82
Table 10: Random-effects, probit regression of the likelihood of donating four units from the
last ten rounds of the treatments with and without an uncertainty reduction (p-values re-
ported in parentheses).
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creases in average contributions. Laboratory studies examining suggested contributions in
public goods environments have found a limited impact on average contributions (Croson and
Marks, 2001; Marks et al., 1999; Dale and Morgan, 2010; Seely et al., 2005). We conjecture
the low levels of dominated contributions in the no-goal treatment (< 18% of contributions
overall) may have made detecting an increase in average contributions easier. If the impact
of recommendations fallsmostly on those giving non-dominated, individually-motivated con-
tributions then the impact on average contributions would be larger in our environment.
Though the difference in average contributions stands out, the improved coordination in
the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment is in line with other work in the literature on
recommended play. Croson and Marks (2001); Marks et al. (1999); Seely et al. (2005) report
signiϐicant increases in the frequency of the recommended contribution proϐile. Seely et al.
(2005) ϐind the largest effect when the recommended strategy is part of an equilibrium of the
game, as is the case in the goal-with-reduced-uncertainty treatment.
Laboratory experiments do not scale well to models with a large number of donors. The
physical limitations of a laboratory environment limit group size to a few dozen at most; far
fewer in practice. In order to investigate the comparative statics of the goal gamewith a large
number of donors we turn to numerical simulations. Section 3.5 details the implementation
used and the results from numerical simulations with a large number of donors.
3.5 SIMULATIONS
Section 3.3 established that under weak assumptions charities increase total donations by
announcing goals. Section3.4 investigated thebehavioral implicationsof the announcedgoals
in small groupswith homogeneous donors. However, large capital campaignsmay havemany
donors with different resources. The comparative statics of goal game equilibria with large
numbers of heterogeneous donors are not clear. In order to investigate such an environment
we develop a parametric model and use simulations to get numerical estimates of equilibria
in the goal game. These simulations are intended to supplement the theory, providing amore
concrete context in which to understand it. Of particular interest are the potential beneϐits to
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fundraisers from employing a goal.
The two dimensions examined are
1. the increase in total donations generated and
2. the size of the set of contributors, (di > 0).
Generatingmore donations is certainly a desirable feature for fundraisers. As noted in Landry
et al. (2006), the practical fundraising literature also places a great deal of emphasis onwarm
donor lists, i.e., lists of donors who have previously contributed. Apparently the emphasis
is not misplaced. In List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), the authors explain that the profes-
sional fundraisers they contacted indicated campaigns directed at “cold” donors typically lose
money. They are conducted in order to build lists of future donors. Hence as long as contrib-
utors provide some form of contact information with their donations (a name perhaps), a
larger number of contributors is desirable.
Table 11 summarizes the choicesmade for the simulations. The production aspects of the
simulation were selected for simplicity. The production of the public good is simply linear in
donationswith a randomproductivity parameter drawn on a uniformdistribution that enters
multiplicatively, i.e., !D. It varies over an interval from 0.95 to 1.05, plus andminus 5 percent
of the expected value, one. The distribution at the goal level is degenerate; the productivity
parameter is simply the expected value, one.
Theutility representationexamined is a generalized constant relative risk-aversionmodel,
u(mi   di; !D) = ((mi   di)
r(!D)1 r)1 
1   :
It was chosen for a variety of reasons: it is well known, it is convenient to work with compu-
tationally, the degree of risk-aversion is simple to adjust, and there exist experimental esti-
mates of  (Holt and Laury, 2002). The familiar parameter  2 (0; 1)[ (1;1) determines the
relative-risk aversion; higher values lead to greater risk aversion. The r 2 (0; 1) parameter
determines the relative utility of the private and public goods; higher values lead to greater
utility from the private good. The best interpretation may be that r represents the optimal
share of the private good for a donor in an individual consumption problem. Every donor
has identical preferences when simulating a particular parameter combination. Six values of
82
r and six values of  were used in the simulations for a total of thirty-six parameter combi-
nations run. The values of r are spread roughly evenly across the parameter space of (0; 1).
The values of  are spread roughly evenly across (0; 1:1]. The majority of values lie in (0; 1) as
experimental estimates of  typically lie in that range (Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al.,
2007). Additionally, the no-goal game satisϐies the conditions needed to have a unique equi-
librium.16 Hence, by locating the equilibrium without a goal and the goal game equilibrium
with the most total donations, we can establish the interval of total donations within which
all goal game equilibria lie.17
The simulations were run with nine endowment proϐiles drawn from a shifted 24 distri-
bution. The endowments were drawn, then one was added to each endowment to ensure all
endowments were large enough that 0 << mi, in order to avoid dividing by small values. The
24 distribution was used since it is well-studied, strictly positive, and roughly mimics typical
income distributions. Goal and no goal (abbreviated as gg and ng) equilibria were then cal-
culated for each endowment proϐile and parameter combination. Thus nine samples of each
equilibria were available for every parameter combination.
The simulations do not scale well computationally. This limitation led us to use N 2
f1000; 2000; 8000g. The simulations were run with differing numbers of agents purely to
gauge how the size of the population affects the statistics of interest over these small popula-
tions. Implications of the limited population size are discussed with other robustness testing
in subsection A.7.4. However, all tests indicate that the results either do not change with
population or strengthen with larger populations. All results presented are drawn from the
largest population,N = 8000.
In order to gauge the aspects of interest (the total donations collected and the size of the
set of contributors) fourmeasureswere calculated. The improvement in total donations from
16 This result comes from Bergstrom et al. (1986), see subsection A.7.5 for a discussion.
17 In addition to comparing the goal equilibrium to the no goal equilibrium, it may be of interest to compare
to the equilibrium of the no goal game where the uncertain input is always drawn from F 0 instead of F , i.e.,
the VCG described by the collection
n
C;F 0; G; fij ; uj ;mjgnj=1
o
. Under the simulation choices, the equilibrium
donations of the no goal equilibrium are the same as those of the VCG
n
c; F 0; G; fij ; uj ;mjgnj=1
o
. In brief, the
objective function is the certain CRRA utility function multiplied by a constant determined by the distribution
of the random input. Hence the best response function is independent of the distribution and thus the total
donations and distribution of donations are independent as well. As a result, the results we report for the no
goal game are also results for the no goal game,
n
c; F 0; G; fij ; uj ;mjgnj=1
o
.
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Production !D, linear in total donations
Uncertainty !  U [0:95; 1:05], uniform around 1
Endowments m0i  24,mi = m0i + 1
Number of Donors N 2 f1000; 2000; 8000g
Utility u(x; y) = (xry1 r)1 
1 
r 2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:5; 0:7; 0:9; 0:99g
 2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:64; 0:7; 0:9; 1:1g
Table 11: Simulation choices
announcing a goal ismeasuredby themean relative increase in total donations, Ia = Dgga /Dnga ,
for parameter combination a. Gauging the size of the set of contributors is more complicated.
Directly using thenumber of agentswith positive donationsmight bemisleading. Due to strict
risk aversion, every agent in the goal gamemodel is induced to contribute in equilibrium, but
the donations can get vanishingly small. Using the deϐinition that a contributor donates a
positive amount, the set of contributors in every goal game equilibrium will be the entire
population. Hence, directly comparing the number of agents with positive donations does
not convey much information. Instead we attempt to measure the distribution of donations
within the population. Our reported measures are the differences between the proportion
of donations coming from the poorest third, middle third, and wealthiest third of donors.
Figure 19, depicts a typical plot of the distribution of donations.
The results suggest substantial beneϐits for charities announcing a goal. Under param-
eters least advantageous to an improvement (r = 0:99;  = 0:10) donations increased 6
percent. Under parameters most advantageous to an improvement (r = 0:10;  = 1:10)
donations increased 73 percent.
The change in the distribution of donations is perhaps the most interesting. Without a
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Figure 19: Plot of the mean distribution of donations at  = :64, r = :9.
goal, only the wealthiest donors contribute; ϐigure 19 is not atypical.18 Hence the values in
ϐigures 20b and 20c are effectively the proportion of total donations in the goal game equilib-
rium. At almost all parameter combinations, the goal draws substantial donations from the
poorer two-thirds of donors,  12   38 percent. Interestingly this proportion is increasing
in both  and r. This is somewhat counter-intuitive as a higher r indicates less interest in
the public good. It appears that a higher r drives down donations from the wealthiest donors
relatively faster than the donations frommoderate income donors.
These improvements are complementary, so it is not clear if the improvement in total
donations is mostly driven by the increase in contributors or increases from those who con-
tribute in the no goal game. In order to determine the source of changes, we examined the
absolute differences in donations between the two equilibria. For all parameter combina-
tions, those donorswho contributedwithout a goal always give lesswhen a goal is announced.
Hence the improvement in total donations is universally driven by the increase in the set
of contributors. The charity is able to increase contributions by limiting the amounts from
18 Giving being restricted to the wealthiest individuals without a goal is true of public goods games more
generally, see Andreoni (1988).
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0.1 0.3 0.5 0.64 0.9 1.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.99
1:1 1:19 1:29 1:38 1:56 1:73
1:12 1:17 1:23 1:28 1:38 1:47
1:14 1:17 1:2 1:23 1:29 1:34
1:14 1:15 1:17 1:18 1:21 1:23
1:1 1:1 1:11 1:11 1:12 1:12
1:06 1:06 1:06 1:06 1:06 1:06

r
(a) Increase in donations from using a goal a
.
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.64 0.9 1.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.99
0:04 0:07 0:09 0:1 0:12 0:13
0:06 0:08 0:09 0:1 0:12 0:12
0:08 0:09 0:1 0:1 0:11 0:12
0:09 0:1 0:1 0:11 0:11 0:12
0:11 0:11 0:11 0:11 0:11 0:12
0:11 0:11 0:11 0:11 0:11 0:11

r
(b)W low;gga  W low;nga , difference in proportion of dona-
tions from the poorest third b
.
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.64 0.9 1.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.99
0:08 0:14 0:18 0:21 0:24 0:25
0:12 0:16 0:19 0:2 0:23 0:24
0:15 0:18 0:2 0:21 0:23 0:24
0:18 0:2 0:21 0:21 0:23 0:24
0:21 0:22 0:22 0:22 0:23 0:23
0:22 0:22 0:22 0:22 0:22 0:23

r
(c)Wmid;gga  Wmid;nga , difference in proportion of dona-
tions from the middle thirdc
.
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.64 0.9 1.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
0.99
 0:12  0:2  0:27 0:31 0:35 0:38
 0:18 0:23 0:28 0:31 0:35 0:37
 0:23 0:26 0:29 0:31 0:34 0:36
 0:28 0:29 0:31 0:32 0:34 0:35
 0:32 0:32 0:33 0:33 0:34 0:34
 0:34 0:34 0:34 0:34 0:34 0:34

r
(d)Whigh;gga  Whigh;nga , difference in proportion of dona-
tions from the wealthiest third d
aThe mean relative increase in total donations from the no goal outcome to the goal game outcome.
bW lowa is themean proportion of total donations collected from the third of donors with the smallest endow-
ments.
cWhigha is the mean proportion of total donations collected from the third of donors with the largest endow-
ments.
dWmida is the mean proportion of total donations collected from the third of donors in neither of the above
sets.
Figure 20: Simulation Results
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wealthy contributors and gathering more frommoderate income contributors.
3.6 CONCLUSION
Wedeveloped amodel of charitable giving that explains the practice of charitable fundraisers
setting goals, the goal game. The announced fundraising goals indicate a level of production
of the public good that has reduced uncertainty. Under weak assumptions, subgame perfect
equilibria always generate greater donations than the equivalent game without a goal. Re-
sults from a laboratory implementation of the goal game produced mixed results. Announc-
ing a goal generates signiϐicantly more in donations and increases the likelihood of donations
reaching the goal level. However, additionally reducing uncertainty at the goal does not fur-
ther increase the beneϐits for fundraisers. Donor behavior does change signiϐicantly, concen-
trating donations at half the goal level and increasing donor earnings. We conjecture that
these changes indicate a reduction in uncertainty may enable goals to maintain these bene-
ϐits even in environments where reaching the goal is more difϐicult for an individual donor.
Whereas the beneϐits of goals that are merely announced will fall. Numerical simulations
were conducted in order to better understand the comparative statics of the goal game in
an environment with large numbers of heterogeneous donors. The simulation data provides
evidence of the effectiveness of exploiting risk aversion among donors; the beneϐits are sub-
stantial and robust under CRRA utility.
With this evidence as support, we conjecture that signiϐicant beneϐits to charities exist
in more realistic settings. If better fundraising improves a charity’s survival then the avail-
ability of signiϐicant beneϐits to charities that can exploit risk-aversion suggests that current
fundraising techniques do in fact exploit it. No charitywould leave these beneϐits on the table.
The various tools used by fundraisers may exist in order to capture some of these beneϐits.
Extensions/modiϐications to the goal game should be straight-forward and may provide
new theoretical justiϐication for fundraising practices. To be clear, this discussion departs
from ϐirmly grounded theory into educated speculation. Possible avenues for extension in-
clude modifying the charity’s ability to set goals, and creating more dynamic versions of the
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model. For example, in the current model the charity is fully aware of the donors’ willing-
ness to pay and can perfectly exploit it. It may be of interest to consider limiting the charity
to setting goals it can achieve with a ϐinite menu of possible donations. The menu could be
interpreted as an analog to the donor “clubs” charities often have, i.e., silver members, gold
members, platinummembers, etc.
Many charities appear to announce a series of fundraising goals during a campaign; smaller
intermediate goals as well as a target for total contributions. A sequential version of the
goal game may be of interest in order to investigate the purpose of these repeated goals.
We foresee no technical hurdles to extending the model in a manner similar to that of Marx
and Matthews (2000), were donations can occur over several periods. Sequential giving may
shrink the set of possible outcomes as initial donors will be able to select equilibria that they
prefer. For example, suppose there are many possible donation proϐiles that sum to the char-
ity’s announced goal, but the ϐirst donor’s contribution is unique to each proϐile. Then the ϐirst
donor can in essence choose her preferred proϐile with her corresponding donation. Based
on the simulation data, there may be fundraising incentives to have a particular order to do-
nations in some contexts. In the simulations, the wealthiest donors gave less in the goal game
equilibrium than in the no goal equilibrium, allowing the charity to extract more from the
moderate income donors. Hence there may be incentives for fundraisers to pay particular
attention to the wealthiest donors in order to target their donations.
A model with a dynamic charity may also be of interest. Consider the example of an Na-
tional Public Radio listener being asked for contributions “to keep bringing you quality pro-
grams”. She is familiar with current programming levels (at current funding levels), but may
be uncertain about how the station would change if funding is reduced. Her reduced uncer-
tainty at the current level of funding creates a discontinuity in her utility which gives her
strong disincentives to have funding move away from that point. Setting current programing
levels seems fundamentally different from the goal announcement used by the charity in the
goal game. However, a model of charities including lump sum investment with the possibil-
ity of acquiring debt, and periodic funding drives may predict something similar. Suppose a
charity wants to maximize an inϐinite stream of public good production and donors value an
inϐinite stream of utilities earned in each period. The founders have an incentive to increase
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production early on, knowing that donors will want to keep that initial production level in
each period. This mechanism may cause the initial outlays for the charity to far exceed what
might be expected from one period donation levels.
To the extent that these extensions provide theoretical models of fundraising practices,
the goal game is a useful foundation for further fundraising research.
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A.1 EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
A.1.1 Introduction
This is an experiment about decision making. There are fourteen people in this room partic-
ipating in the experiment. You must not talk to the other participants or communicate with
them in any way. If you have a question raise your hand and a monitor will come to where
you are sitting to answer it.
The experiment consists of fourteen rounds. In each round you are randomly paired with
one other participant. Your round earnings depend on the decisions made by you and by
your group member for that round. Your decisions are anonymous; no one will be able to
determine which decisions were made by you. At the end of the fourteen decision rounds we
will randomly select three rounds for payment. You will be paid, in private and in cash, the
sumof your earnings from the three selected roundsplus $5 for showingup to the experiment.
A.1.2 Investments
In each round you will be given $4. You can keep the $4 or you can invest in the group ac-
count. The cost of investing in the group account depends on the number of units you invest.
The payoff from the group account depends on the sum invested by you and by your group
member. Your earnings in each roundwill equal your initial $4 plus the payoff from the group
account minus the cost of your individual investment.
A.1.3 Payoff from the group account
[Threshold: Provided the total amount invested by you and by your group member equals
or exceeds 6 units, you and your group member will each get a payoff of 50 cents per unit
invested in the group account. Thus if a total of 4 units are invested in the group account, then
neither you nor your groupmember will get a payoff from the group account.] [No Threshold:
You and your group member will each get a payoff of 50 cents per unit invested in the group
account. Thus if a total of 4 units are invested in the group account, then you and your group
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member will each get a payoff of 4x0.5=$2 from the group account.] If you and your group
member invests a total of 20 units in the group account, then you and your group member
will each get a payoff of 20x0.5=$10. Your payoff from the group account depends only on the
total amount invested in the group account by you and your group member.
A.1.4 Cost of investing in the group account
The cost of investing in the group account depends on the number of units you invest. If you
invest 3 units or less the cost per unit invested is 40 cents. Every unit you invest between 4
and 7 units will cost you 70 cents per unit. Finally, every unit you invest in excess of 7 will
cost you $1.10 per unit. If you invest 9 units your costs are 40 cents per unit for each of the
ϐirst three units (3x0.4=$1.2), 70 cents per unit for the fourth through seventh unit (4x0.7 =
$2.8), and $1.1 per unit for the eighth through the ninth (2x1.1=$2.2). Thus the total cost of
your nine unit investment is 1.2+2.8+2.2=$6.2. You can at most invest 10 units in the group
account. With you and your group member each investing anywhere from 0 to 10 units, the
total investment in the group account will range from 0 to 20 units.
A.1.5 Earnings
To determine the round earnings from the possible investments please take a look at the pay-
off table. Your earnings are reported in blue at the top left corner of each cell, the earnings to
your group member are reported in orange at the lower right corner of each cell. Let us ex-
amine two examples to better understand the payoff table and how earnings are determined.
A.1.5.1 Example 1: [Threshold: Suppose you invest 2 units and your group member in-
vests 0 units. With a total investment of 2 units, the investment in the group account is below
the threshold and you and your group member will each get $0 from the group account. The
per unit cost of your 2-unit investment is 40 cents for a total cost of 80 cents. Thus your
earnings from this round equal $4 plus $0 from the group account minus your cost of $0.8 for
a total of $3.2. Since your group member has zero investment cost he/she earns $4. These
earnings are shown in the 0-column and 2-row cell, your earnings of $3.2 are listed in blue,
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and the $4 earnings to your groupmember is listed in orange. If the investment by your group
member increases to 1 unit the payoff from the group account does not change because the
total investment is still less than 6; while your earnings stay constant at $3.2 the earnings
of your group member decreases by 40 cents from $4.0 to $3.6 to cover the 40 cent invest-
ment cost (see the 1-column and 2-row cell). If instead you increase your investment by 6
units, then the total investment of 8 is above the threshold and the payoff from the group
account increases from $0 to $4 (0.5x8). However the cost of the additional investment is
$4.3(=1x0.4+4x0.7+1x1.1). Therefore your earnings decrease by $0.3 dollars from $3.2 to
$2.9, and the earnings to your group member increase by $4 from $4 to $8 (see the 0-column
and 8-row cell).] [No Threshold: Suppose you invest 2 units and your groupmember invests 0
units. With a total investment of 2 units, you and your group member will each get 2x0.5=$1
from the group account. The per unit cost of your 2-unit investment is 40 cents for a total
cost of 80 cents. Thus your earnings from this round equal $4 plus $1 from the group account
minus your cost of $0.8 for a total of $4.2. Since your groupmember has zero investment cost
he/she earns $5. These earnings are shown in the 0-column and 2-row cell, your earnings
of $4.2 are listed in blue, and the $5 earnings to your group member is listed in orange. If
the investment by your group member increases to 1 unit the payoff from the group account
increases by $0.5; while your earnings increases by $0.5 to $4.7 the earnings of your group
member increases by 10 cents from $5.0 to $5.1 to cover the 40 cent investment cost (see
the 1-column and 2-row cell). If instead you increase your investment by 6 units, the payoff
from the group account increases from $1 to $4 (0.5x8). However the cost of the additional
investment is $4.3(=1x0.4+4x0.7+1x1.1). Therefore your earnings decrease by $1.3 dollars
from $4.2 to $2.9, and the earnings to your group member increase by $3 from $5 to $8 (see
the 0-column and 8-row cell).]
A.1.5.2 Example 2: Suppose you invest 8 and your group member invests 6. With a total
investment of 14 units, you each earn $7 (14x0.5) from the group account. Your investment
costs for the 8 units are: 40 cents per unit for each of the ϐirst three units (3x0.4=$1.2), 70
cents per unit for the fourth through seventh unit (4x0.7 = $2.8), and $1.1 for the eighth unit.
Thus the total cost of your eight unit investment is 1.2+2.8+1.1=$5.1. As shown in the 6-
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column and 8-row cell you earn 4+7-5.1=$5.9, and your groupmember earns $7.7. Increasing
your investment by oneunit increases the payoff from the group account by50 cents and costs
you $1.1. Thus as seen in 6-column and 9-row cell, your earnings decrease by 60 cents (0.5-
1.1=-$0.6) to $5.3, your group member’ earnings increase by 50 cents from $7.7 to $8.2.
A.1.6 Order of Investments
Seven participants will have the role of ϐirst mover, the other seven will have the role of sec-
ond mover. The computer randomly assigns you to be either ϐirst or second mover. You are
informed of your role at the beginning of the experiment, and you remain in this role through-
out the experiment. Your role will appear at the top of your screen. It will either say “You are
a FIRST mover” or “You are a SECOND mover”, depending on your role. In each round, each
ϐirst mover will be anonymously and randomly paired with a second mover. In subsequent
rounds you are randomly paired with a new participant. In the ϐirst stage of a round the ϐirst
mover decides howmuch to invest. Then, in the second stage, the secondmover decides how
much to invest. Before making his or her investment decision the second mover will not be
informed of the ϐirst mover’s investment decision.
A.1.7 Summary
Inmaking your investment decisions, youwill beneϐit from looking at the payoff table, or from
recalling how earnings are determined.
1. In each round your earnings equal $4 plus your group-account payoff minus your invest-
ment costs.
2. First movers are randomly paired with second movers in each round. First movers make
their investment decisions ϐirst, and secondmovers make their investment decisions sec-
ond. The secondmover will not be informed of the ϐirst mover’s investment prior to mak-
ing his or her decision.
3. [Threshold: Provided the total amount invested by you and by your groupmember equals
or exceeds 6 units, the per unit payoff from the group account is 50 cents.][No Threshold:
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the per unit payoff from the group account is 50 cents.] That is $0.5 x [the investment by
you + the investment by your group member].
4. The cost per investment unit is:
a. 40 cents per unit between 1-3
b. 70 cents per unit between 4-7
c. $1.1 per unit between 8-10
Before we begin the experiment we want to make sure that you know how to read the
payoff table. We therefore ask you to take a little quiz to help you understand the payoffs.
Once you have ϐinished the quiz, we will go over the correct answers. Your answers to the
quiz will not inϐluence your earnings.
A.2 PAYOFF TABLES
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Figure 21: Payoff table with FC = 0.
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Figure 22: Payoff table with FC = 6.
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Figure 23: Payoff table with FC = 8.
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A.3 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA
Below are the individual payoffs as a function of individual giving.
i(gi = 6) =
10X
g i=0
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  3:3
i(gi = 5) =
10X
g i=1
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  2:6
i(gi = 4) =
10X
g i=2
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  1:9
i(gi = 3) =
10X
g i=3
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  1:2
i(gi = 2) =
10X
g i=4
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  0:8
i(gi = 1) =
10X
g i=5
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  0:4
i(gi = 0) =
10X
g i=6
Pr(g i)  1
2
(6 + g i)  0
As is clear from these equations, the beneϐit in contributing 6 units is that whatever is the
contribution of the opponent (g i), therewill be a positive payoff from thepublic account. The
disadvantage is, of course, the cost of 3.3 units. Contributing less than 6, say 5 units, reduce
the beneϐit from public account payoff in case the opponent contributes zero units. The plus
side is that contributing 5 units costs only 2.6. Comparing the payoff in both cases, we ϐind
the conditionswhen contributing 6 is a best response. That is, when is it the case that it yields
greater payoff than the other contribution levels (we do not consider contributing more than
6, since these are clearly dominated strategies). In writing these inequalities belowwe use to
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be the probability the opponent contributing x units,i.e. Pr(g i).
2:6p0 > 0:2 6 > 5
2p0 + 2:5p1 > 0:4 6 > 4
1:5p0 + 2p1 + 2:5p2 > 0:6 6 > 3
p0 + 1:5p1 + 2p2 + 2:5p3 > 0:5 6 > 2
0:5p0 + p1 + 1:5p2 + 2p3 + 2:5p4 > 0:4 6 > 1
0:5p1 + p2 + 1:5p3 + 2p4 + 2:5p5 > 0:3 6 > 0
A.4 PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
A.4.1 Proposition 1
Deϐinition 2. A threshold game,
n
c; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
, consists of:
1. a charity, c, which monopolizes production of the public good,
2. a set of n 2 N donors, I ,
3. a vector of endowments of a private good, fmigi2I , such that each donor i 2 I is endowed
with some positive amount of a private good,mi 2 R++,
P
i2I mi = M ,
4. a set of continuous utility functions, fuigi2I , ui : [0;mi]  R ! R, ui(x;G), which depend
on consumption of a private good, x, and total contributions of the public good,G, such that
each donor i 2 I is associated with ui. ui is increasing in both arguments.
The game has a continuum of information sets, but of only two types. At the ϔirst information
set the charity, c, chooses a threshold for donations to the public good, T 2 R+.
Each possible goal determines the information set to which the game then moves. At the
second information set, the donors, I , with full knowledge of T , simultaneously choose how to
allocate their endowments between private consumption and donations to the charity for pro-
duction of the public good, gi 2 [0;mi].
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After donations are allocated, production of the public good takes place. The donors receive
a payoff from their allocations of private good and the realized quantity of public good, i.e.,
ui
 
mi   di;
P
i2I gi

. The charity receives a payoff from the the realized quantity of public good,P
i2I gi.
Deϐinition 3. Deϔine three functions:
• i : [0; 0m]! [0;mi], i(T )  sup fd 2 [0;mi] jui(mi   di; T )  ui(mi; 0)  0g.
•   : [0; 0m]!Qi2I [0;mi],  i(T )  i(T ).
•  : [0; 0m]! [0; 0m], (T )  0 (T ).
Lemma 1.   is a monotone function, i.e., if T < T 0 then  (T )   (T 0).
Proof. The proof follows by showing that i is monotone which extends to  .
Let T < T 0. Since ui is increasing, ui(mi   i(T ); T ) < ui(mi   i(T ); T 0). Then ui(mi  
i(T ); G(T
0))   ui(mi; 0) > 0. By construction i is the largest individual contribution, g for
which ui(mi   g; T 0)  ui(mi; 0)  0 holds. Hence, i(T 0)  i(T ).
Since i was chosen arbitrarily, this holds for all i 2 I . Therefore,  (T )   (T 0) and the
lemma holds.
Lemma 2. Let g? 2 Qi2I [0;mi] be a Nash equilibrium vector of donations in the equivalent
VCG.  has a greatest ϔixed-point in [0g?; 0m].
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 1 and Tarski’s ϐixed-point theorem.
Since g? is at a Nash equilibrium it must be the case that ui(mi   di; 0g?)  ui(mi; 0)  0.
Hence i(0g?)  g?i for all i 2 I . Then (0g?)  g? and(0g?)  0g?. It follows fromLemma1
that  is monotone increasing. Thus,  maps [0g?; 0m] into itself. Then Tarski’s ϐixed-point
theorem implies that  has a greatest ϐixed-point in [0g?; 0m] and the lemma holds.
Proposition 1. LetX =
n
c;G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be a threshold game. Then there exists a Nash
equilibrium outcome,
n
~T ; ~g
o
, where ~g is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting at ~T , and
0~g > 0g for any other Nash equilibrium, g, of any subgame.
Proof. Let T 2 R+ be the greatest ϐixed-point of  in [0g?; 0m]. Let g =  (T ). First we show
that gi is a best response for the ith donor in the subgame.
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Any donation g0 < gi will result in the threshold not being met and no production of the
public good. The ith donor would then receive ui(mi; 0). By the construction of  , ui(mi  
gi; T )  ui(mi; 0)  0. Hence gi is at least as good as any g0 < di.
Suppose there exists a g0 > gi such that ui(mi  g0; T   gi+ g0)  ui(mi  gi; T ) > 0. Then
the threshold T   gi + g0 > ~D could be supported by the donations g0 where g0j = gj for all
j 6= i and gi = g0. However T   gi + g0 would then be a ϐixed-point of which contradicts the
fact that T is the greatest ϐixed-point. Hence our supposition is incorrect and there does not
exist a g0 > gi such that ui(mi   g0; T   gi + g0)   ui(mi   gi; T ) > 0. Hence gi is at least as
good as any g0 > gi, and is a best response for donor i. As we chose i arbitrarily, g =  (T ) is
a best response for all donors.
Now consider aNash equilibriumoutcome, g0, in another subgamebeginningwith thresh-
old T 0 6= T . If 0g0 < T 0 then no public good is provided and the proposition holds with ~T = T
and ~g = g. If 0g0 = T 0 then T 0 is a less than or equal to a ϐixed-point of  and is thus T 0  T
and the proposition holds with ~T = T and ~g = g. Finally, consider 0g0 > T 0. Then it must
be the case that g0 is a Nash equilibrium vector of donations in the equivalent VCG. Thus by
Lemma 2 T 0  T and the proposition holds with ~T = T and ~g = g.
Proposition 2. LetX =
n
c; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be a threshold game such that a Nash equilibrium
exists for every threshold. Then ~T 2 R+, is the unique threshold that is part of a subgame,
undominated-perfect equilibrium and total equilibrium contributions equal ~T .
Proof. Let fT; gg 2
n
R+;
 Q
i2I [0;mi]
R+o be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
By construction ui(mi   ~gi; ~T )   ui(mi; 0)  0 for all i 2 I . By assumption ui is strictly
increasing and continuous, hence there exists  > 0 and g0 2 B(~g( ~T ); ) such that ui(mi  
g0i; 
0g0)  ui(mi; 0) > 0 for all i 2 I . The subgame at 0g0 is precisely the model of Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989) for which they show that contributions which sum to 0g0 are undominated-
perfect equilibria. Thenno total contributionsbelow 0g0 canbe subgameperfect or the fundraiser
would have a proϐitable deviation. Since g0 can be arbitrarily close to ~T , g(T )  ~T . By con-
struction, there is no Nash equilibrium of the subgame, g? 2 Qi2I [0;mi] such that 0g? > ~T .
Hence the donors’ strategies must dictate g(T )  ~T for all T 2 R. Therefore g(T ) = ~T and
T = ~T .
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Proposition 3.
n
~T ;~g
o
, generates more public good than any vector of donations that Pareto
dominates the zero provision outcome.
Proof. Let g be a vector of donations that Pareto dominates the zero provision outcome. Then
0g  (0g) and there exists a ϐixed-point of, T , such that 0g  T . As ~T  T the proposition
holds.
Corollary 1.
n
~T ; ~T
o
, generatesmore public good than any socially optimal vector of donations
that Pareto dominates the zero provision outcome.
A.4.2 Proposition 2
A.5 PAYOFF TABLES
A.6 THEORY
A.6.1 Game Deϐinitions
In this subsection are the formal, working deϐinitions for the voluntary contribution game
(VCG), goal game, and the no goal game. However, these deϐinitions should closely match
readers expectations and be in no way surprising.
Deϐinition 4. Let
1. a set of n 2 N donors, I ,
2. a set of endowments of a private good, fmigi2I , such that each donor i 2 I is endowed with
some positive amount of a private good,mi 2 R++,
P
i2I mi = M ,
3. a set of utility functions, fuigi2I , ui : [0;mi]R! R, ui(x;G), which depends on consump-
tion of a private good, x, and total production of the public good, G, such that each donor
i 2 I is associated with ui.
4. andG : R+ ! R be the production function the public good.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0
1 4.4 4.9 5.4 5.9 6.4 6.9 7.4 7.9 8.4 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.4
2 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.3 8.8 9.3 9.8 10.3 10.8
3 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.7 7.2 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.2 9.7 10.2 10.7 11.2
4 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0
5 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.3 8.8 9.3 9.8 10.3 10.8
6 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.1 9.6 10.1 10.6
7 4.4 4.9 5.4 5.9 6.4 6.9 7.4 7.9 8.4 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.4
8 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.1 9.6
9 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.3 8.8
10 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0
11 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.7 7.2
12 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.4 5.9 6.4
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Figure 24: Payoff table given to subjects in the no threshold condition
Given
n
I;G; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
, the voluntary contribution game (VCG) is the game where each
agent i, chooses di 2 [0;mi] to donate to the production of a public good. The payoff to agent i
is then ui(mi   di; G(
P
i2I di)).
Deϐinition 5. A goal game,
n
c; F; F 0; G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
, consists of:
1. a charity, c, which monopolizes production of the public good,
2. a set of n 2 N donors, I ,
3. a set of endowments of a private good, fmigi2I , such that each donor i 2 I is endowed with
some positive amount of a private good,mi 2 R++,
P
i2I mi = M ,
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Figure 25: Payoff table given to subjects when re-running the no threshold condition
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4. a production function for the public good,G : R+
! R,
  R,G(D;!), which depends
on total donations of the private good,D, and a random input, !,
5. a distribution function F : 
! [0; 1], for the random production input !,
6. a distribution function F 0 : 
 ! [0; 1], for the random production input !, which second-
order stochastically dominates F ,
7. a set of utility functions, fuigi2I , ui : [0;mi]R! R, ui(x;G), which depends on consump-
tion of a private good, x, and total production of the public good, G, such that each donor
i 2 I is associated with ui.
The game has a continuum of information sets, but of only two types. At the ϔirst information
set the charity, c, chooses a goal for donations to the public good, ~D 2 R+.
Each possible goal determines the information set to which the game then moves. At the
second information set, the donors, I , with full knowledge of ~D, simultaneously choose how to
allocate their endowments between private consumption and donations to the charity for pro-
duction of the public good, di 2 [0;mi].
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After donations are allocated, production of the public good takes place. If total donations
equal the goal,Pi2I di = ~D, then the random input,!, is drawn fromdistributionF 0. Otherwise,
the random input, !, is drawn from distribution F . The donors receive a payoff from their allo-
cations of private good and the realized quantity of public good, i.e., ui
 
mi   di; G(
P
i2I di; !)

.
The charity receives a payoff from the total collected donations,Pi2I di.
Deϐinition6. Given agoal game,
n
C;F; F 0; G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
, thenogoal game is a VCGwhere
the set of donors, endowments, and utilities are identical to their goal game counterparts. Ad-
ditionally, the public good production function in the no goal game matches the goal game pro-
duction function, with the random input always having distribution F . Hence a no goal game
can be described by a collection
n
F;G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
.
A.6.2 Mathematical Results
This subsection presents the proofs and intermediate results required to prove Proposition 3.
We begin by stating the model assumptions, equilibrium deϐinitions, and deϐining some com-
monly used notations. Then proofs showing that the goal game is well-deϐined, and charac-
terizing necessary conditions for equilibria follow in A.6.4. The results that directly lead to
Proposition 3 are found in A.6.2.2 and A.6.2.3.
The model assumptions are gathered together in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. Let
n
c; F; F 0; G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game. We assume the following:
1. ui is strictly concave for all i 2 I .
2. G is concave and strictly increasing in both arguments.
3.

F; F 0; G; fuigi2I
	
are such that for all i 2 I ,
EF ui (mi   di; G(D;!)) <1; and
EF 0 ui (mi   di; G(D;!)) <1; for all di 2 [0;mi]; D 2 [0;M ]; i 2 I:
4.

F; F 0; G; fuigi2I
	
are such that for all i 2 I , the donor objective functions have a continu-
ous maximum.
111
For the remainder of this section the results will reference a representative goal game
whichwe deϐine here; labelling some objects that reoccur frequently in the results that follow.
Additional mathematical structures will need to be deϐined, but we place their deϐinitions
closer to the results that require them.
Deϐinition 7. Let X =
n
c; F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game satisfying Assumption 1.
Let
br : R+
Y
i2I
[0;mi]! P
 Y
i2I
[0;mi]
!
; bri( ~D;d)  [0;mi];
be the best response of the ith donor to announcement ~D and donations d in the goal game, and
br? :
Y
i2I
[0;mi]! P
 Y
i2I
[0;mi]
!
; bri(d)  [0;mi];
be the best response of the ith donor to donations d in the no goal game.
LetA be the set of Nash equilibria of the no goal game.
LetM =Pi2I mi, be the total amount of private good available.
Before proceeding through the results it is worthwhile to be precise about the equilib-
ria, and equilibrium outcomes we are seeking. The following deϐinitions deϐine the subgame
perfect equilibrium, and subgame perfect outcomes in the context of the goal game.
Deϐinition 8. A subgame perfect equilibrium of the goal gameX is a collection of the charities
announced goal, ~D 2 R+, and donor strategies s 2
 Q
i2I [0;mi]
R+ such that ( ~D; s) is a Nash
equilibrium:
1. the donors are best responding to each other and the charity, s( ~D) 2 br( ~D;d),
2. the charity is best responding to the donor’s strategies, ~D 2 argmax
D02R+
0s(D0)
and moreover the donors strategies dictate best responses even off the equilibrium path,
3 s(D0) 2 br(D0; s(D0));8D0 2 R+.
Deϐinition9. Asubgameperfect outcomeof thegoal gameX is a donation vectord 2Qi2I [0;mi],
such that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium ( ~D; s) 2 R+
 Q
i2I [0;mi]
R+ in which
s( ~D) = d. Moreover, D = 0d is a level of total donations supported in a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
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A.6.2.1 Preliminaries First someminor results in order to show that our problem iswell-
deϐined. The existence of solutions for the donor’s problem and equilibria for the subgame
need to be established. The proofs are straight-forward and so are placed in A.6.4. The con-
clusions are summarized in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. 1. a solution exists to the ith donor’s problem for all goals ~D 2 R+ and other dona-
tions d i 2
Qn
j=1;j 6=i[0;mj],
2. there exists at least one Nash equilibrium vector of donations, d? 2 Qni=1[0;mi], for the no
goal game,
3. and for every announced goal, ~D 2 R+, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
The following two Lemmas (4 and 5) establish necessary conditions for subgame perfect
equilibria of the goal game and that equilibria from the game without a goal are incentive
compatible in the goal game. Whereas many of the other results are heavily mathematical,
these have the most “economic” style proofs and are probably the most important.
Lemma 4 provides some structure to the set of subgame perfect equilibria. It implies
that equilibria can be classiϐied into two types: those where the total donations equal the
announcement, and those where total donations equal the amount in a Nash outcome of the
game without a goal. By Lemma 3, our assumptions imply that an equilibrium of the sub-
game exists for every announcement. Thus announcements either “succeed” with total con-
tributions equaling the announcement, or “fail” with total contributions equaling a no goal
outcome. Note that both outcomes may be equilibria of the subgame. If the announcement is
signiϐicantly larger than ano goal outcome, thennoonedonorwill ϐind it optimal to supply the
difference. Then both strategies that lead to an no goal equilibrium outcome and strategies
that lead to meeting the announcement satisfy the best response constraints.
Lemma 5 has two important implications. The ϐirst is that announcing the total donations
in an equilibriumof theno goal game can succeed in the goal game. This implies that a number
of important sets are nonempty. The second is that an incentive compatible donation vector
exists for any goal that equals a Nash outcome of the no goal game. Hence by considering all
goals which can be supported by incentive compatible donations, we are also considering all
equilibrium total donations.
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Lemma4. Givenagoal ~D 2 R+, letd 2
Q
i2I [0;mi], be a subgameperfect, equilibriumoutcome
of donations for the subgame. Then if d 62 A, 0d = ~D.
Proof. Suppose the lemma does not hold. Then there exists an equilibrium outcome of the
subgame, d0 2 Qi2I [0;mi], where the amount collected does not equal the goal, 0d0 6= D and
d0 62 A.
Since the goal is notmatched andd0 is an equilibriumoutcome of the subgame, the donors
must be best responding to the no goal problem as well,
d0 2 br(D;d0) = br?(d0):
Hence d0 is a Nash equilibrium in the game without a goal. Thus, d0 2 A by deϐinition. How-
ever, this contradicts the assumption that d0 62 A. Hence, it must be that d0 does not exist.
Therefore, the lemma holds.
Lemma 5. An equilibrium of the game without a goal, d?, in combination with the goal which
equals the total donations, 0d?, (0d?;d?), is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
Proof. This follows from the observation that d?i = 0d?   0d i;8i 2 I . Hence the no goal
best-response coincides with the donation level needed to reach the goal. Since d? is a Nash
equilibrium of the game without a goal,
vi (mi   di; di + 0d i;F )  vi (mi   d?i ; d?i + 0d i;F ) ;8di 2 [0;mi]:
By the risk-aversion assumption,
vi (mi   d?i ; d?i + 0d i;F ) < vi (mi   d?i ; d?i + 0d i;F 0) :
Thus,
vi (mi   d; di + 0d i;F ) < vi (mi   d?i ; d?i + 0d i;F 0) ;8di 2 [0;mi]:
Hence, d?i remains a best-response for all i 2 I . Therefore, (0d?;d?) is a Nash equilibrium of
the subgame.
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Lemma 6 is needed to help locate the lower bound for equilibrium outcomes in the goal
game. It establishes that announcing a goal close enough to a Nash equilibrium outcome will
“disrupt” the equilibrium under any subgame perfect donor strategies. The result follows
from the assumption of strictly risk averse donors. Hence, for each donor there is an open
ball of donations around an equilibrium of the no goal game where the donor strictly prefers
meeting the goal herself.
Lemma 6. Let d? 2 Qi2I [0;mi] be a Nash equilibrium of the game without a goal. Then there
exists an interval, (0d?   L(d?); 0d? + U(d?)), L; U > 0, such that for a goal ~D 2 (0d?  
L; 0d?+ U)n f0d?g, L(d?); U(d?) > 0, d? is not a subgame perfect outcome of the goal game.
Moreover, d? is a subgame perfect outcome of the goal game for goals outside that interval, i.e.,
~D 2 R+ n(0d?   L(d?); 0d? + U(d?)).
Proof. The proof follows from the strict concavity of the donor objective functions. Deϐine
gi : R+ ! R be deϐined by
gi() = vi(mi   d?i   ; 0d? + ;F 0)  vi(mi   d?i ; 0d?;F ):
Note that the second term of the deϐinition is just a constant in this context. Hence gi inherits
strict concavity and continuity from vi. Thus f 2 R+ jgi() > 0g is nonempty, convex, and
open, i.e., an interval (Li ; Ui ). On its complement R+ nXi, gi  0.
Let L = max

L1 ; 
L
2 ; : : : ; 
L
n
	
and U = max

U1 ; 
U
2 ; : : : ; 
U
n
	
. Consider a goalD 2 (0d?  
L; 0d? + U)n f0d?g. Let  = D   0d?. By construction 0 < jj < maxL; U	. Hence there
exists at least one i 2 I such that vi(mi   d?i   ;D;F 0)  vi(mi   d?i ; 0d?;F ) > 0. Thus d?i is
not a best response for i, and 0d? is not a subgame perfect outcome.
Similarly, consider a goal D0 2 R+ n(0d?   L; 0d? + U). Since d? is a Nash equilibrium
of the no goal game it must be the case that for all i 2 I , vi(mi   d?i ; 0d?;F )  vi(mi  
d; 0d? i;F );8d 2 [0;mi]:
As vi is strictly concave, d?i is the unique maximizer. Let 0 = D0   0d?. By construction
j0j  maxL; U	. Hence gi  0 for all i 2 I . Thus for all i 2 I , vi(mi   d?i   ;D;F 0) 
vi(mi   d?i ; 0d?;F ): As such, d?i is a best response for all i 2 I . Therefore d? 2 br(D0;d?) and
the lemma holds.
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A.6.2.2 Donor Constraints Lemmas 4 and 5 provide the key tools to characterizing in-
centive compatible donations. Since equilibria only occur at the announcement level, the
donor’s problem, in equilibrium, can be greatly simpliϐied. Consider the choice of a donor
when in an equilibrium, ( ~D;d),
Meet the goal Or Deviate to outside
vi(mi   di; ~D;F 0) wi(0d i)
The necessary condition that equilibrium donations must equal the goal means that the out-
side option of the donor can be valued in equilibrium without explicitly considering other
donations.
Meet the goal Or Deviate to outside
vi(mi   di; ~D;F 0) wi( ~D   di)
Hence for any potential goal the set of incentive compatible donations (that could form an
equilibrium) can be found for each donor independently. If it happens that there exist incen-
tive compatible donations that sum to the goal then those donations and goal are a potential
equilibrium. This problem can be framed as a ϐixed-point problem and its solutions charac-
terized.
In order to further analyze those goals that can succeed it is helpful to deϐine indicator
functions for goals that are incentive compatible for donors to meet. Something akin to,
ICCi( ~D; d) = vi(mi   d; ~D;F 0)  wi( ~D   d):
Unfortunately, when ~D < d or d > mi this is not deϐined. In these regions meeting the an-
nouncement is not feasible and hence not useful, so ICCi needs to be extendedwith negative
values. Setting ICCi =  1 in the infeasible regions would sufϐice, but then it is no longer
continuous. Since continuity simpliϐies the proofs that follow, ICCi is extended with a con-
tinuous function that takes on negative values.1
1 Tietze’s extension theorem can be used to show that such an extension exists, see A.6.5 for a proof.
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Deϐinition 10. Choose a donor i 2 I . Construct,
ICCi : R2+ ! R;
ICCi( ~D; di) 
8><>:vi(mi   di;
~D;F 0)  wi( ~D   di) : d  mi and ~D  di
gi( ~D; di) : otherwise
where g < 0 and is such that ICCi is continuous. If ICCi( ~D; di) > 0 then contributing di to
meet the goal is strictly preferred. If ICCi( ~D; di) < 0 contributing d?i 2 br?i ( ~D di) is preferred.
If ICCi( ~D; di) = 0 then she is indifferent between contributing d?i and di.
The results in this subsection use properties of the incentive compatibility constraint to
establish compactness on sets successively closer to the set of subgame perfect outcomes.
Linking these sets are three correspondenceswhichwe deϐine in Deϐinition 11. First, the pos-
sible outcomes from announcing a particular goal are characterized. It follows quickly from
the previous results that these outcomes form a compact set. Compactness is then extended
to the set of outcomes from all relevant goals. The extension relies on establishing that the
correspondence linking goals to outcomes is upper hemi-continuous. The end result of this
process is a set S that is slightly larger than the set of subgame perfect outcomes.
Deϐinition 11. Deϔine d be a Nash equilibrium of the game without a goal which generates the
least total donations, i.e., d 2 argmind2A 0d.
Deϔine three correspondences that link the incentive compatibility constraints of individual
donors to compatible levels of total donations.
• i : [0d;M ] ! P ([0;mi]), i( ~D) 
n
d 2 [0;mi]
ICCi( ~D; d)  0o, the set of compatible
donations for donor i given goal ~D.
•   : [0d;M ]! P  Qi2I [0;mi],  ( ~D) Qi2I i( ~D), the set of compatible donation vectors
given goal ~D.
•  : [0d;M ] ! [0;M ], ( ~D) 
n
D 2 [0;M ]
9d 2  ( ~D); s.t. Pi2I di = Do, the set of lev-
els of total donations that are compatible given goal ~D.
These enable us to deϔine the set, S  fD 2 [0d;M ] jD 2 (D)g the set of ϔixed-points of .
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Lemma 7.   is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. The proof follows by showing that   is a compact correspondence and then establish-
ing the conditions under which it is upper hemi-continuous.
CđĆĎĒ:   is a compact correspondence.
PėĔĔċ Ĕċ CđĆĎĒ: Note that ICCi is continuous. Then the pre-image ICC 1i ([0;1)) is
closed. As ICC 1i ([0;1))  [0;mi], it is bounded as well. Hence i = ICC 1i ([0;1)) is
compact. Thus i is a compact correspondence and   as the product of compact correspon-
dences is a compact correspondence as well.
LetfDngn2N ; Dn 2 [0d;M ]; 8n 2 N; Dn ! D bea convergent sequence. Letfyngn2N ; yn 2
 (Dn); 8n 2 N, be a sequence.
In order to prove the lemma, it sufϐices to show that:
1.  (D) 6= ;, for allD 2 [0d;M ].
2. fyng has a convergent subsequence, fynkg,
such that lim ynk = y 2  (D).
CđĆĎĒ:  (D) 6= ;, for allD 2 [0d;M ].
PėĔĔċ Ĕċ CđĆĎĒ: LetD 2 [0d;M ].
Consider the incentive compatibility constraint for a donor with endowment mi 2 R++
and no goal best response function, br?i , when evaluating a donation of d 2 [0;mi]. If the
donation coincides with the best response when there is no goal, br?i (D   d) = d, then the
assumption of risk aversion ensures d is incentive compatible. Then ICCi(D; d) > 0 and
i(D) 6= ;. Hence it is sufϐicient to show that there exists d 2 [0; D] such that br?i (D   d) = d
for the claim to hold.
Note that br?i is decreasing in outside donations. Additionally, note that 0d i < D. Hence
br?i (D)  br?i (0d i)  D. Let d = D   0d i. Then br?i (D   d) = br?i (0d i) = di  d. As
br?i is continuous, it must be the case that br?i (D   d) = d will be satisϐied for at least one
d 2 [0; D   0d i]. Hence ICCi(D; d?i ) > 0, and i(D) 6= ;. Since iwas chosen arbitrarily this
holds for all i 2 I . Therefore  (D) 6= ; for allD 2 [0d;M ], and the claim holds.
CđĆĎĒ: There exists fynkg, a subsequence of fyng, such that lim ynk = y 2
Q
i2I [0;mi].
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PėĔĔċ Ĕċ CđĆĎĒ: By the deϐinition of fyngn2N. yn 2  (Dn) for all n 2 N. Hence yn 2Q
i2I [0;mi] for all n 2 N. As
Q
i2I [0;mi] is compact there exists fynkg, a subsequence of fyng,
such that lim ynk = y 2
Q
i2I [0;mi]. Therefore the claim holds.
CđĆĎĒ: Let fzngn2N ; zn 2  (Dn) for all n 2 N, be a convergent sequence. Then lim zn = z 2
 (D).
PėĔĔċ Ĕċ CđĆĎĒ: By the deϐinition of  , it must be the case that ICCi(Dn; zni)  0 for all
n 2 N. By the continuity of ICCi, lim ICCi(Dn; zni) = ICCi(D; zi)  0. Hence, zi 2 i(D) for
all i 2 I and z 2  (D). Therefore the claim holds.
The ϐirst claim establishes condition 1 for upper hemi-continuity. By the second claim
fyng has a convergent subsequence, fynkg. By the third claim that subsequence must con-
verge to an element of  (D), lim ynk = y 2  (D). Hence, together they show condition 2 for
upper hemi-continuity. Therefore the lemma holds.
Lemma 8.  is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. The lemma follows from the upper hemi-continuity of   as (D) is a linear transfor-
mation of  (D).
Lemma 9. S is nonempty and compact.
Proof. Lemma 5 implies there exists at least one ϐixed-point of , namely the total donations
in a Nash equilibrium of the no goal game. Hence, S 6= ;.
Let B  f(D;D0) 2 [0d;M ]2 jD0 2 (D)g, be the graph of incentive compatible total do-
nations and I = f(D;D0) 2 [0;M ]2 jD = D0g be the graph of the 45 line. Observe that
D 2 S, (D;D) 2 B \ I , the intersection of the graph of  and the 45 line. The upper
hemi-continuity of , established in Lemma 8, implies that B is closed. By construction I is
closed. It also follows from their construction that both B and I are bounded. Thus, B \ I is
the intersection of closed and bounded sets and is itself closed and bounded. Hence B \ I is
a compact set. Then by virtue of their equivalence, S is also compact. Hence, S is nonempty
and compact and the claim holds.
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A.6.2.3 Charity Constraints In this subsection the charity’s maximization constraint is
used to reϐine the set of outcomes developed from the donor’s incentive compatibility con-
straints. The objects deϐined in Deϐinition 12 act as outside options for the donors and the
charity. 0d0 is the largest Nash equilibrium outcome of the no goal game that the charity can
force the donors to reach. No subgame perfect outcome of the goal game can collect fewer
donations, or the charity could deviate and receive 0d0 in donations. On the other hand, the
donors “worst threat” is 0dL. Nothing below 0dL + U(dL) can be a subgame perfect equilib-
rium as the subgame perfection constraint on strategies ensures there is some goal that gen-
erates greater donations for the charity. The set of subgame perfect outcomes, S, is reached
by adjusting the lower bound of the set of incentive compatible outcomes, S , to account for
these outside options.
The special case of a unique Nash equilibrium in the no goal game is simplest to describe.
With a unique equilibrium, d0 = dL. The charity can always announce an impossible goal,
e.g., 2M , and receive 0d0, as it is the only equilibrium of the subgame. With a unique equi-
librium the subgame perfection constraints on donors’ strategies are particularly strong. All
outcomes must be either the no goal Nash outcome, 0d0, or meet the announced goal. Hence,
for announcements in the region deϐined in Lemma 6, [0d0; 0d0+U(d0))whered0 is not sub-
game perfect, the only possibility is meeting the announced goal. Thus donors are compelled
to meet a goal of 0d0 + U(d0)with any subgame perfect strategies.
Deϐinition 12. Deϔine S  R+, to be the set of all total donations supported in a subgame
perfect equilibrium ofX .
By Lemma 3 a Nash equilibrium of the subgame exists for every goal. The equilibrium either
sums to the announced goal or is a Nash equilibrium of the no goal game. Deϔine h : R+ !Q
i2I [0;mi] to be a function which maps each announced goal to an equilibrium vector such
that h(D) 2 argmind2A 0d, or d if such a vector does not exist. Then deϔine:
D0 2 argmaxD2R+ 0h(D); and d0 = h(D0);
dL 2 argmind2A 0d+ U(d); where U is as deϔined in Lemma 6,
Dmin = max

0dL + U(dL); 0d0
	
:
Lastly, deϔine S 0 = S \ [Dmin;1).
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Lemma 10. S  S 0.
Proof. LetD 2 S.
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that any subgame perfect equilibrium donation vector can be sup-
ported by a goal that equals its sum, i.e., total donations equal the goal. Hence there exist
subgame perfect strategies, s 2  Qi2I [0;mi]R+ , such that s(D) = d, 0d = D.
CđĆĎĒ: D  Dmin.
PėĔĔċ Ĕċ CđĆĎĒ: From its deϐinition, 0d0 is a lower bound on the level of donations the
charity can extract from donors in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Otherwise, the charity
could announceD0 and be assured of collecting at least 0d0. HenceD  0d0.
Now consider 0dL+U(dL). Suppose thatD < 0dL+U(dL). SinceD is subgame perfect,
the donor strategies, s, must map all goals greater than D to equilibria that generate less
than D. Let one of these equilibria be d0. By the deϐinition of dL, it must be the case that
0dL + U(dL) < 0d0 + U(d0). Hence the quantities are in the following order, 0d0  D <
0dL + U(dL) < 0d0 + U(d0). However, goals in the interval [D; 0d0 + U(d0)) cannot be
mapped to d0. As this holds for all such equilibria, d0 does not exist. Hence, the supposition is
incorrect andD  0dL + U(dL).
AsD  0d0 andD  0dL + U(dL), the claim holds.
As s is subgame perfect, d 2 br(D;d), which implies that d is incentive compatible for
donors given goal D. By construction (D) is precisely the set of total donations which are
incentive compatible with goalD 2 [0d;M ]. Hence,D = 0d 2 (D). Thus,D is a ϐixed-point
of  and is therefore an element of S 0. AsD was chosen arbitrarily, S  S 0.
Lemma 11. S 0  S:
Proof. The proof follows by constructing a parameterized class of subgame perfect strategies
that can support any level of donations in S 0.
By the construction of S , for a goal D 2 S , an incentive compatible donation vector, d 2Q
i2I [0;mi], exists such that d = D. Let g : S !
Q
i2I [0;mi] be a function which maps each
goal in S to such a vector of donations. Deϐine the parameterized class of donor strategies,
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s(D; D), D 2 S 0.
s(D; D) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
h(D) : D 2 R+ nS
g(D) : D 2 S andD  D
dL : D 2 S andD > D
:
By construction s is a subgame perfect strategy for the donors.
The lemma can be directly demonstrated with s. Given the strategies, s(; ~D), any goal
D, in the interval [0; 0d0) or ( D;1) generates total donations strictly less than or equal to
0d0. Hence given the strategies, s(; D), the charity maximizes donations by announcing goal
D, 0s( D; D) = D. Thus,
 
D; s(; D) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the goal game X .
Hence D is a level of total donations supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium; D 2 S. As
D was chosen arbitrarily from S 0, S 0  S.
Proposition 4. The set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes, S is precisely S 0 and it is
nonempty and compact.
Proof. The proof follows from the previous lemmas. Lemma 10 and 11 imply that S = S 0.
Compactness follows from the compactness of S as S 0 = S \ [Dmin;1). By Lemma 5
S is nonempty, as Dmin is an incentive compatible outcome and is thus in S . Therefore the
proposition holds.
A.6.3 Equivalence of ui and vi
Rather than working with both utility functions, ui, over the private and public goods, and
production functionG, over donations of the private good, it is often preferable to work with
a single equivalent utility function vi, over the private good and donations of the private good.
The following proof establishes that such a function exists and has all the assumed properties
of ui.
Lemma 12. Let
n
c; F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game. Let the function vi be deϔined by
vi(x; y;F )  EF ui(x;G(y; !)):
Then vi:
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1. is strictly increasing in both arguments,
2. is a strictly concave function over the private good and donations of the private good,
3. has a continuous maximum.
Proof. In order to establish that vi is strictly increasing in the private good choose x1 < x2 2
R+. By the assumption that ui is strictly increasing,
ui(x1; G(y; !)) < ui(x2; G(y; !));8! 2 
:
As this holds for all !,
EZ ui(x1; G(y; !)) < EZ ui(x2; G(y; !)):
vi(x1; y;Z) < vi(x2; y;Z):
Hence vi is strictly increasing in the private good.
In order to establish that vi is strictly increasing in donations choose y1 < y2 2 R+. By
the assumption that ui andG are strictly increasing,
ui(x1; G(y1; !)) < ui(x1; G(y2; !)); 8! 2 
:
As this holds for all !,
EZ ui(x1; G(y1; !)) < EZ ui(x1; G(y2; !)):
vi(x1; y1;Z) < vi(x1; y2;Z):
Hence vi is strictly increasing in in donations.
In order to establish that vi is strictly concave, ϐix x1; x2; y1; y2 2 R+, ! 2 
,  2 (0; 1). By
the assumption of strict concavity of ui,
ui (x1; G(y1; !)) + (1  )ui (x2; G(y2; !))
< ui (x1 + (1  )x2; G (y1; !) + (1  )G (y2; !)) :
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Then, by the assumption of concavity ofG,
ui (x1; G(y1; !)) + (1  )ui (x2; G(y2; !))
< ui (x1 + (1  )x2; G (y1 + (1  )y2; !)) :
Since this holds for all ! 2 
,
EZ fui (x1; G(y1; !)) + (1  )ui (x2; G(y2; !))g
< EZ ui (x1 + (1  )x2; G (y1 + (1  )y2; !)) :
) EZ ui (x1; G(y1; !)) + (1  )Eui (x2; G(y2; !))
< EZ ui (x1 + (1  )x2; G (y1 + (1  )y2; !))
() vi(x1; y1;F ) + (1  )vi(x2; y2;Z)
< vi(x1 + (1  )x2; y1 + (1  )y2;Z):
Hence, vi satisϐies the strict concavity assumption.
Since vi ismerely a relabellingof thedonorobjective function, the assumption thatF; F 0; G;
and ui are such that the donor objective function has a continuous maximum applies di-
rectly.
A.6.4 Preliminaries
The proofs in this section establish the results found in Lemma 3.
Lemma 13. Let
n
C;F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game satisfying Assumption 1. Then
a solution exists to the ith donor’s problem for all goals ~D 2 R+ and other donations d i 2Qn
j=1;j 6=i[0;M  mj].
Proof. Consider i 2 I . Since ui is strictly concave over a convex set it is also continuous. If
mi < ~D D i, the problem is tomaximize a continuous function over a compact set. Hence a
solution exists. So consider the situationwheremi  ~D D i. A solutionmayonly fail to exist
if the maximizer of EF ui [mi   di; G(di +D i; !)], d?i , coincides with the amount needed to
reach the announced level, ~D D i. It is then possible that EF ui [mi   d?i ; G(d?i +D i; !)] >
EF 0 ui [mi   d?i ; G(d?i +D i; !)]. However, by the risk aversion assumption onui thiswould be
a contradiction. Therefore, a solution exists. As iwas chosen arbitrarily the lemma holds.
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Lemma 14. Let fij; uj;mjgnj=1 be a voluntary contribution game. If ui is strictly concave for all
i 2 I then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the game. Moreover, it follows that there
exists at least one Nash equilibrium in every no goal game.
Proof. The proof follows the approach used inBergstromet al. (1986). Existence follows from
Brouwer’s ϐixed point theorem.
Since each ui is strictly concave over a convex set each is also continuous. As the strategy
sets are compact and convex, it follows that the best response function, br? : Qi2I [0;mi] !Q
i2I [0;mi], is continuous and single valued. As
Q
i2I [0;mi] is compact and convex, br? maps
a compact, convex set into itself and thus has at least one ϐixed point. This ϐixed point is by
deϐinition a Nash equilibrium.
As shown in Lemma 12, in a goal game it is equivalent to consider a set of strictly concave
functions fvigni=1, instead of fuigni=1 and G. Hence the above argument applies to all no goal
games as well. Therefore, the lemma holds.
Lemma 15. Let
n
C;F; F 0; G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game satisfying Assumption 1. Then
the payoff to donor i 2 I , given by
ggi (di;d i; ~D) =
8><>:vi(mi   di; 
0d i + di;F ) : di 6= ~D   0d i
vi(mi   di; ~D;F 0) : di = ~D   0d i
:
is upper semi-continuous in di.
Proof. Since vi is continuous in di, ggi (di;d i; ~D) is upper semi-continuous for all di 6= ~D  
0d i. It may only fail to be upper semi-continuous at d0 = ~D   0d i. The assumption of risk
aversion ensures this does not occur. Let fdngn=N  [0;mi] be a sequence which converges
to d0 = ~D   0d i, i.e., lim dn = d0. Strict risk aversion implies that vi(mi   dn; ~D;F ) <
vi(mi   dn; ~D;F 0) for all n 2 N. By construction, vi(mi   dn; ~D;F )  ggi (dn;d i; ~D) 
vi(mi dn; ~D;F 0) for alln 2 N. Hence by the continuity of vi, lim ggi (dn;d i; ~D)  lim vi(mi 
dn; ~D;F
0) = vi(mi   d0; ~D;F 0) = ggi (d0;d i; ~D). Therefore ggi (di;d i; ~D) is upper semi-
continuous in di.
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Lemma 16. Let
n
C;F; F 0; G; I; fuj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game satisfying Assumption 1. For ev-
ery announced goal, ~D 2 R+, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
Proof. The proof is a direct application of Theorem 12.3 in found in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). The action space for each i 2 I , [0;mi], is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of
R. By assumption the payoffs have a continuousmaximumas deϐined in Fudenberg andTirole
(1991). By Lemma 15 the payoffs are upper semi-continuous in the donor’s own actions.
Hence, the no goal game satisϐies the prerequisites of Theorem 12.3. Therefore, there exists
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame.
A.6.5 Extending the Incentive Compatibility Indicator
It is easier to work with the incentive compatibility constraints for donors in the goal game if
the indicator function for compatibility is continuous. Continuity follows immediately from
the continuity of the utility functions in the regions of the action space that are feasible. How-
ever, we also need to deϐine the indicator function over infeasible regions. As these regions
are infeasible, the actions they contain are incompatible and thus it is safe to set the indica-
tor to a negative value Extending the function into these regionswhile maintaining continuity
has to be handled with some care. Luckily showing that such an extension can be made is a
straight-forward application of Tietze’s extension theorem.
Lemma 17. Let mi > 0, and ~D; d 2 R+. Deϔine Ci =
n
( ~D; d) 2 R2+
mi  d and ~D  do.
Deϔine ICC0i : Ci ! R as
ICC0i ( ~D; d) = v
i(mi   d; ~D;F 0)  wi( ~D   d):
There exists a continuous extension of ICC0i , ICCi : R2+, such that
ICCi( ~D; d) 
8><>:ICC
0
i ( ~D; d) : ( ~D; d) 2 Ci
gi( ~D; d) : otherwise
where gi < 0 and continuous.
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Proof. The proof follows by constructing a suitable gi through applying Tietze’s extension the-
orem.
Note that as R2 is a normal space and ICC0i is continuous, Tietze’s extension theorem
implies that there exists a continuous extension to all of R2,
Q( ~D; d) 
8><>:ICC
0
i ( ~D; d) : ( ~D; d) 2 Ci
gi( ~D; d) : otherwise
where gi : R2 ! R is continuous.
Construct ~gi : R2 ! ( 1; 0) by
~gi( ~D; d) =  jgi( ~D; d)j+min
n
~D;mi
o
  d: (1)
Since taking the absolute value andadding thequantitymin
n
~D;mi
o
 d are continuous trans-
formations to the continuous function gi, ~gi is continuous. Note that jgi(x)j  0 and that on
the domain R2 nCi, min
n
~D;mi
o
  d < 0. Therefore
ICCi( ~D; d) 
8><>:ICC
0
i ( ~D; d) : ( ~D; d) 2 Ci
~gi( ~D; d) : otherwise
is an extension of ICC0i satisfying the lemma.
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A.7 SIMULATION DETAILS
A.7.1 Theory
We begin the simulation details with a general proposition that provides sufϐicient condi-
tions for the largest outcome of the goal game to occur where the incentive compatibility
constraints bind for all donors. The practical value of this is that the largest outcome can be
located by ϐinding the ϐixed-point of the incentive compatibility constraints. Locating ϐixed-
points is a well-studied problem in numerical analysis and so greatly simpliϐies locating equi-
libria of the goal game. After discussing the details of the simulations in Section 3.5 we show
that they satisfy Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Let X =
n
C;F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game. Deϔine the functions,
dmaxi : R+ ! [0;mi],Dmax : R+ ! [0;M ] by
dmaxi (D) = max i(D);
Dmax(D) = max (D):
This is awell-deϔined function since i is shown to be a compact correspondence in Proposition 7.
AssumeDmax is lower semi-continuous on [0d?;M ]. Then the largest total donations collected
in subgame perfect equilibrium is ~D = Dmaxi ( ~D).
Proof. The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that Dmax is not on the upper contour
of  , i.e., Dmax 6= Pi2I dmaxi (Dmax). By construction Dmax( ~D)  ~D. By the supposition this
inequalitymust in fact be strict,Dmax( ~D) > ~D. Note thatDmax is bounded above byM , hence
at some pointD 2 [0d?;M ], Dmax(D)  D. By assumptionDmax is lower semi-continuous,
hence it only decreases continuously. Thus theremust exist some interval [Dl; Du]  (0d?;M ]
on which Dmax is continuous, such that Dmax(Dl) > Dl and Dmax(Du)  Du. Hence there
exists a ϐixed-point ofDmax on [Dl; Du],D0. Howeverwehave reached a contradiction asD0 >
~D and is itself a subgame perfect outcome of the goal gameX . Therefore, our supposition in
incorrect and the proposition holds.
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A.7.2 CRRA Simulation
This section provides the details of ϐinding the functions needed to locate equilibria in simu-
lations with a generalized constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. In addition
to the standard parameter,  2 (0; 1), that determines the relative risk aversion, there is
r 2 (0; 1)which determines the relative importance of the private and public goods.
u(x; y) =
(xry1 r)1 
1  
For the remainderof this sectionwewill be considering a goal game,
n
C;F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
,
whereG(D;!) = !D, and ui has a generalized CRRA form for all i 2 I . Note that under CRRA
utility Inada conditions ensure that x = 0 is never an optimal choice.
First we can combine the production and utility functions to simplify the analysis. Below
the linear production function, y = !D, is substituted into the utility and the results simpli-
ϐied.
Eu [x; !D] = 1
1  

xrD1 r
1  E!(1 r)(1 )
LetKF  EF !(1 r)(1 ).
= KFui(x;D)
Denote this function by
v(x;D;F ) =
KF
1  

xrD1 r
1 
The end result is just a constant,KF , derived from the distribution of!multiplied by the non-
stochastic utility function. It actually plays no role in determining the donations in the no goal
game; it only modiϐies the utility of donors at the solution.
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A.7.2.1 No Goal Best Response Standard constrained optimization yields the best re-
sponse function.
d?i (d) = max f(1  r)mi   rD i; 0g
Note that the demand for donations whenD i = 0 is fi(mi) = (1   r)m and f 0i(mi) 2 (0; 1).
This implies that the no goal gamehas a uniqueNash equilibriumas shown in Bergstromet al.
(1986). See A.7.5 for a discussion and statement of the proof.
The best response can be solved for the equilibrium vector of donations.
d? = (1  r)mi   r0d? i
[(1  r)I + r0]d? = (1  r)m
It can be shown that,
[(1  r)I + r0] 1 = 1
((n  1)r + 1)(1  r) f[(n  1)r + 1] I   r
0g
Then
d? = 1
((n  1)r + 1) f[(n  1)r + 1] I   r
0gm
d?i = mi  
r
(n  1)r + 1
X
j2I
mj: (??)
Note that this only holds for those donors giving strictly positive amounts. A donor gives a
positive amount if and only ifmi > r(n 1)r+1
P
j2I mj . Hence the number of donors contribut-
ing is the ϐixed-point of
n = ]
(
mi >
r
(n  1)r + 1
X
j2In
mj
)
:
Also note that if a donor with endowment m is contributing then any donors with endow-
ments greater thanmmust also be contributing. The algorithm we use relies on these prop-
erties to locate the equilibrium. With the donors sorted in endowment order we repeatedly
calculate ]
n
mi >
r
(n 1)r+1
P
j2In mj
o
until the ϐixed-point is located. Then (??) is used to de-
termine the equilibrium.
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Substituting in the best response gives the value function for the ith donor in the no goal
game,
wi(D i) = v (mi   d?i (D i); d?i (D i) +D i;F )
=
8><>:
KF
1  (r
r(1  r)1 r)1  (mi +D i)1  : (1  r)mi   rD i > 0
KF
1 

mriD
1 r
 i
1 
: otherwise
A.7.3 Goal Game Equilibria
The key equation needed for ϐinding the goal game equilibrium is the individual’s incentive
compatibility constraint (ICC).
ICCi(d;D) = v(mi   d;D;F 0)  wi(D   d)
=
8><>:f
i
1(d;D) : (1  r)mi   r(D   d) > 0
f i2(d;D) : otherwise
The pieces f i1, f i2 are deϐined by,
f i1(d;D) =
1
1  
n
(mi   d)rD1 r
1 
: : :
 KF
 
rr(1  r)1 r1  (mi +D   d)1 o
f i2(d;D) =
1
1  
n
(mi   d)rD1 r
1 
: : :
 KF

mri (D   d)1 r
1 o
Note that ICCi is only deϐined when d  mi and d  D. We will assume these hold for this
section. They are feasibility constraints and assuming they hold does not cause problems. In
practice ICCi can be augmented to be some negative value outside the feasible region.
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For the purposes of ϐinding equilibria we are really only concerned with where
fd 2 [0; D] \ [0;mi]jICCi(d;D)  0g. Simpler functions can be found that are equivalent to
ICCi in this role.
f i1(d;D)  0
, (m  di)rD1 r  K1/(1 )F rr(1  r)1 r(m+D   d)  0
f i2(d;D)  0
, (m  d)rD1 r  K1/(1 )F mr(D   d)1 r  0
Allow us to reuse our notation, and denote these simpler functions as f i1, and f i2.
In determining the equilibrium of the goal game we need to locate
max
n
d 2 [0; D] \ [0;mi]j ~Fi(d;D)  0
o
, whichwill be at ad 2 [0; D]\[0;mi] such that ~f i1(d;D) =
0 or ~f i2(d;D) = 0. Unfortunately, there are no closed-form solutions to the roots of ~f i1, and
~f i2. Hence, numerical root ϐinding techniques are used in the simulations. It is shown in
Lemma 19 that the region of incentive compatible regions deϐined by these functions is al-
ways convex. The algorithm we employ in our simulations uses that fact by ϐirst locating the
maximum value of the incentive compatibility constraint to use as a lower bound for the root.
This ensures only the largest root is found.
Lemma 18. Let F be a uniform distribution around one, i.e., with a > 0
F (x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 : x 2 ( 1; 1  a)
x+a 1
2a
: x 2 [1  a; 1 + a]
1 : x 2 (1 + a;1)
:
ThenKF = EF !(1 r)(1 ) < 1 for all ; r 2 (0; 1).
Proof. The proof follows by computation. First we locate the extrema ofKF .
KF = EF !(1 r)(1 )
=
1
2a
Z 1+a
1 a
!(1 r)(1 )d!
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Let z = (1  r)(1  ).
=
1
2a
Z 1+a
1 a
!zd!:
The second derivative ofKF with respect to z is
@2KF
@z2
=
1
2a
Z 1+a
1 a
!z (log!)2 d!:
As @2KF
@z2
is strictly positive the extreme values of KF occur at the extreme values of z. Since
z 2 (0; 1),
1
2a
Z 1+a
1 a
!d! = 1
1
2a
Z 1+a
1 a
d! = 1:
ThereforeKF < 1 and the lemma holds.
Lemma 19. LetX =
n
C;F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game. Assume that,
uj(x; y) =
1
1  
 
xry1 r
1 
;
F (x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 : x 2 ( 1; 1  a)
x+a 1
2a
: x 2 [1  a; 1 + a]
1 : x 2 (1 + a;1)
;
F 0(x) =
8><>:0 : x 2 ( 1; 1)1 : x 2 [1;1) ;
where ; r; a 2 (0; 1). Then for all D 2 [0d?;M ], A(D) = fd 2 [0;mi] jICCi(d;D)  0g is
convex for all i 2 I . Moreover, ICCi(d;D) > 0 for all d 2 A.
Proof. Let D 2 [0d?;M ], and d1; d2 2 fd 2 [0;mi] jICCi(d;D)  0g. Without loss of gener-
ality assume that d1 < d2. Due to the piecewise nature of ICCi there are several cases to
consider:
1. ICCi(d1; D0) = f1(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f1(d2; D0),
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2. ICCi(d1; D0) = f1(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f2(d2; D0),
3. ICCi(d1; D0) = f2(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f2(d2; D0).
4. ICCi(d1; D0) = f2(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f1(d2; D0),
By construction if ICCi(d;D) = f2(d;D) then ICCi(d0; D) = f2(d0; D) for all d0 < d. Likewise,
if ICCi(d;D) = f1(d;D) then ICCi(d0; D) = f1(d0; D) for all d0 > d. Hence we can reduce the
cases to consider to:
1. ICCi(d1; D0) = f1(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f1(d2; D0),
2. ICCi(d1; D0) = f2(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f2(d2; D0).
3. ICCi(d1; D0) = f2(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f1(d2; D0),
We will consider each case in turn.
Suppose case 1 occurs, ICCi(d1; D0) = f1(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f1(d2; D0). The
Hessian of f1 is
H[f1] =  r(1  r)
0@(m  d)r 2D1 r (m  d)r 1D r
(m  d)r 1D r (m  d)rD r 1
1A
The parameter assumptions ensure thatH[f1] is negative deϐinite. Hence f1 is strictly concave
and the lemma holds.
Suppose case 2 occurs, ICCi(d1; D0) = f2(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f2(d2; D0). Note
that
@f2
@d
=
 1
(D   d)(m  d)

r(D   d)  (m  d)rD1 r   (1  r)(m  d)  Cmr(D   d)1 r :
The domain constraint on f2 is (1  r)m < r(D d). Hence (1  r)(m d) < r(D d) as well.
Then f2 > 0 implies that @f2@d < 0. Thus, for all d 2 [0; d2) f2(d;D) > 0 and the lemma holds.
Suppose case 3 occurs, ICCi(d1; D0) = f2(d1; D0) and ICCi(d2; D0) = f1(d2; D0). In this
case itmust be that the transitionpoint between the functions, dt = D  1 rr m, lies in [d1; d2]. If
f1(dt; D) = f2(dt; D)  0 then the previous cases ensure that the lemmaholds. Thus consider
f1(dt; D) = f2(dt; D) < 0.
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As shown in case 1, f1 is strictly concave in d. Combined with the fact that f1(d2; D) > 0
and f1(dt; D) < 0 it must be that @f1@d (dt) > 0. Hence,
@f1
@dt
= rr(1  r)1 rK
1
1 
F   r

D
m  dt
1 r
> 0
rr(1  r)1 rK
1
1 
f > r

D
m  dt
1 r

1  r
r
1 r
K
1
1 
f > D
1 r(m  dt)r 1:
As dt 2 [d1; d2], it must be that dt > 0. Hence,D > 1 rr m. Substituting this into the condition
derived from the derivative, (?), implies

1  r
r
1 r
K
1
1 
f > D
1 r(m  dt)r 1
>

1  r
r
1 r 
m
m  dt
1 r
)
K
1
1 
f >

m
m  dt
1 r
> 1:
By Lemma 18,KF < 1 and we have reached a contradiction. Hence it must be that case that
f1(dt; D) = f2(dt; D)  0 and the lemma holds.
Lemma 20. LetX =
n
C;F; F 0; G; fij; uj;mjgnj=1
o
be a goal game. Assume that,
uj(x; y) =
1
1  
 
xry1 r
1 
;
F (x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 : x 2 ( 1; 1  a)
x+a 1
2a
: x 2 [1  a; 1 + a]
1 : x 2 (1 + a;1)
;
F 0(x) =
8><>:0 : x 2 ( 1; 1)1 : x 2 [1;1) ;
where ; r; a 2 (0; 1). ThenDmax is lower semi-continuous on [0d?;M ].
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Proof. The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that Dmax is not lower-semi continuous
on [0d?;M ]. Then there exists aD0 2 [0d?;M ] such that
lim inf
D!D0
Dmax(D) < Dmax(D0):
Then there exists some i 2 I such that
lim inf
D!D0
dmaxi (D) < d
max
i (D0):
Note that dmaxi (D) 2 i(D) for all D 2 [0d?;M ]. Since i is upper hemi-continuous by
Lemma 7, lim infD!D0 dmaxi (D) 2 i(D0). Hence ICCi(lim infD!D0 dmaxi (D); D0)  0.
Let d2 = dmaxi (D0) and d1 = lim infD!D0 dmaxi (D). By Lemma 19, ICCi( d;D0) > 0where
d = d1+d2
2
. Since ICCi is continuous there exists an  > 0 such that ICCi( d;D) > 0 for all
D 2 B(D0; ). However, as d > d1 this contradicts the fact that d2 = lim infD!D0 dmaxi (D).
Hence the supposition is incorrect and the lemma holds.
A.7.4 Simulation Robustness
In order to investigate goal game equilibriawe calculated numerous subgame perfect equilib-
ria under various parameters. Computational constraints make simulating large populations
difϐicult and thus we used population sizes of N 2 f1000; 2000; 8000g. If our statistical mea-
sures on the goal game equilibria vary wildly, or appear to become insigniϐicant outside of
our tested populations, it would diminish their impact. In order to check our measures we
conducted a nonparametric test for trends of our statistical measures across population size.
At each parameter combination a Jonckheere-Terpstra test was used to check for a positive
trend. This test extends theWilcoxon rank sum test tomultiple treatments. The null hypothe-
sis is that there is no treatment effect, medians are equal in each cell,H0 : 1000 = 2000 = 8000.
The alternative hypothesis is that there is a positive trend, H1 : 1000  2000  8000, where
at least one inequality is strict. With nine population draws at each parameter combination
and population level, our sample size is nine for all tests.
Our measure of the increase in collected donations, Ia, showed strong evidence of a posi-
tive trend with populations. Across all parameter combinations the largest p-value is 2:87 
10 7. Hence it appears that our conclusions strengthen with larger populations.
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Ourmeasures of the donation distribution,W lowa ,Wmida , andWhigha , show no evidence of a
trend with population. For all the measures, across all parameter combinations, the p-values
lie in [0:35; 0:66]. The lack of a trend is consistent with the distributional measures being pri-
marily functions of the population distribution. We conjecture that even the smallest popula-
tion tested, N = 1000, is a good approximation of the 24 distribution used for endowments.
Hence, there is little trend with population size at these sizes.
A.7.5 Unique Nash Equilibrium in VCG
This section provides conditions under which the Nash equilibrium of a VCG is unique. The
proof of uniqueness is provided as theorem 3 in Bergstrom et al. (1986). We repeat the the-
orem here for convenience, but do not include the proof.
The needed assumptions require some context. Following the discussion in Bergstrom
et al. (1986), consider a donor’s problem in a VCG,
max
xi;di
Eui (xi; G(di +D i; !))
s.t. xi + di  mi:
By addingD i to the budget constraint the problem can be turned into the equivalent prob-
lem,
max
xi;D
Eui (xi; G(D;!))
s.t. xi +D  mi +D i
D  D i:
This problem is very similar to a standard consumer choice problemwherewealth ismi+D i,
max
xi;D
Eui (xi; G(D;!))
s.t. xi +D  mi +D i:
Assume that there exists a demand function for donations in the consumer choice problem,
fi : R+ ! R+; fi(mi+D i). As discussed inBergstromet al. (1986), the demand for donations
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in the VCG is then d?i (mi; D i) = max ffi(mi +D i) D i; 0g. In order to ensure a unique
VCG equilibrium we need to assume that fi is differentiable and has 0 < f 0i < 1.
Proposition 6. Let fij; uj;mjgnj=1 be a voluntary contribution game. If there exists a differen-
tiable demand function, fi, such that f 0i 2 (0; 1), which solves the consumer choice problem,
max
xi;G
ui (xi; G)
s.t. xi +G  mi:
then there is a unique Nash equilibrium with a unique quantity of the public good and a unique
set of consumers.
Proof. Shown in Bergstrom et al. (1986), page 34.
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A.8 EXPERIMENT
A.8.1 Time Trend
Individual Donations
constant round roundInr roundIg
coefϐicient 3.272 -0.033 0.025 0.016
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.110)
Probability of Reaching Goal (d1 + d2  8)
constant round roundInr roundIg
coefϐicient 0.386 -0.008 0.008 0.004
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042)
Table 12: Random-effects regressions of mean donations and likelihood of reaching the goal
level against round (N = 124, t = 30).
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